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ABSTRACT
School finance reform cases have become immensely more common since the
Serrano v. Priest case in California in 1971. Tennessee’s case Small Schools v.
McWherter led to a significant reform of the Tennessee school finance system during the
1992-1993 school year. This reform created a new system of education funding in
Tennessee known as the Basic Education Program (BEP). Essay 1 examines the impact
Tennessee’s school finance reform had on education spending as well as local and stateprovided education revenues from 1989-2006. Results indicate that as state funding for
education improved, locally-provided funding decreased, all else constant. In addition,
institutional features such as the phase-in of state funds and the nominal maintenance of
spending effort requirement decreased locally-provided funding, all else constant.
Essay 2 includes analyses regarding the changes in equity associated with the
switch to the BEP during the 1992-1993 school year and the factors that may have
impacted changes in equity. The calculation of commonly used equity measures shows
an increase in school spending equity during time period analyzed. These equity
measures also indicate that locally-provided revenues have become less equitable over
time. Further analyses show the relationship between school district level wealth
measures and key spending and revenue variables. Results indicate that the relationship
between wealth and state spending has grown over time, which shows that from the state
perspective, the BEP has continued to equalize over time. However, the relationship
between locally-provided funding and wealth has become more positive over time and
has led to a considerable gap between education spending in rich and poor districts. In
vii

order to decrease this gap in spending, tighter controls are needed on locally-provided
spending via the school finance system.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Part 1: General Introduction...............................................................................................1
Part 2: Essay 1: Constrained Bureaucratic Model of Behavioral Responses to School
Finance Reform: The Case of the BEP .............................................................................16
1.A
Introduction ..............................................................................................17
1.B
Previous Literature....................................................................................22
1.C
Theoretical Analysis .................................................................................28
1.D
Empirical Model .......................................................................................42
1.E
Data ...........................................................................................................45
1.F
Empirical Results ......................................................................................52
1.G
The Cost Differential Factor .....................................................................62
1.H
Tax Effort Analysis ..................................................................................74
1.I Conclusion ..................................................................................................83
Appendix
....................................................................................................................88
Part 3: Essay 2: Differing Responses to School Finance Reform: The Haves vs. the
Have-Nots ........................................................................................................................109
2.A
Introduction ............................................................................................110
2.B
Previous Literature..................................................................................115
2.C
Equity Measurement and Descriptive Analysis ......................................121
2.D
Theoretical Considerations .....................................................................127
2.E
Empirical Model .....................................................................................131
2.F
Data .........................................................................................................132
2.G Empirical Results.....................................................................................135
2.H Conclusion ...............................................................................................157
Appendix
..................................................................................................................162
References
..................................................................................................................180
Vita
..................................................................................................................185

ix

LIST OF TABLES
Part 2: Essay 1: Constrained Bureaucratic Model of Behavioral Responses to School
Finance Reform: The Case of the BEP .............................................................................16
Table 1.1 Nominal vs. Real Revenues ...........................................................101
Table 1.2 Summary Statistics of Revenue Measures .....................................102
Table 1.3 Summary Statistics .........................................................................103
Table 1.4 Baseline Results .............................................................................104
Table 1.5 Results Using Census of Governments Data..................................105
Table 1.6 CDF Model I Results......................................................................106
Table 1.7 CDF Model II Results ....................................................................107
Table 1.8 Tax Effort Model Results ...............................................................108
Part 3: Essay 2: Differing Responses to School Finance Reform: The Haves vs. the
Have-Nots ........................................................................................................................109
Table 2.1 Current Spending Equity Measures...............................................164
Table 2.2 Local Revenue Equity Measures ...................................................165
Table 2.3 State Revenue Equity Measures ....................................................166
Table 2.4 Total Revenue Equity Measures ...................................................167
Table 2.5 Summary Statistics of Revenue Measures ....................................168
Table 2.6 Summary Statistics – Control Variables .......................................169
Table 2.7 Fixed Effects Panel Regression: Full Time Period: 1989-2006 ...170
Table 2.8 Panel Analysis of the Pre-BEP Period ..........................................171
Table 2.9 Panel Analysis of the Post-BEP Period .........................................172
Table 2.10 Yearly OLS Regression Results: CURSPENDING .....................173
Table 2.11 Yearly OLS Regression Results: STATEFUNDING ..................174
Table 2.12 Yearly OLS Regression Results: LOCALFUNDING .................175
Table 2.13 Panel Model Using Property Tax Base .........................................176
Table 2.14 Yearly Results Using Property Tax Base: CURSPENDING .......177
Table 2.15 Yearly Results Using Property Tax Base: STATEFUNDING ....178
Table 2.16 Yearly Results Using Property Tax Base: LOCALFUNDING....179

x

LIST OF FIGURES
Part 2: Essay 1: Constrained Bureaucratic Model of Behavioral Responses to School
Finance Reform: The Case of the BEP .............................................................................16
Figure 1.1 Average Per Pupil Expenditures in Tennessee ...............................89
Figure 1.2 School Expenditures from Government Sources ............................90
Figure 1.3 Median Voter Framework ...............................................................91
Figure 1.4 Romer and Rosenthal Model ..........................................................92
Figure 1.5 Theoretical Proposition 1 ................................................................93
Figure 1.6 Theoretical Proposition 2(a) ...........................................................94
Figure 1.7 Theoretical Proposition 2(b) ...........................................................95
Figure 1.8 Theoretical Proposition 3 ................................................................96
Figure 1.9 Counties Receiving CDF Funds......................................................97
Figure 1.10 CDF Receipt Across Tennessee ......................................................98
Figure 1.11 Per Pupil Current Expenditures by CDF Receipt History ..............99
Figure 1.12 CDF Funding Per Pupil .................................................................100
Part 3: Essay 2: Differing Responses to School Finance Reform: The Haves vs. the
Have-Nots ........................................................................................................................109
Figure 2.1 Gap in Spending Between Rich and Poor Districts ......................163

xi

Part 1: General Introduction

1

Upon the subject of education, not presuming to dictate any plan or
system respecting it, I can only say that I view it as the most important
subject which we as a people can be engaged in.
Abraham Lincoln, 1832

The overall budget for public education in the United States exceeds all other
government programs outside of national defense. The National Education Association
(NEA) estimates that total primary and secondary school expenditures in the United
States totaled more than $519.0 billion during the 2005-2006 school year.1 Given a
national estimate of average daily attendance of 45.9 million, this translates into spending
of about $9,576 per student.2 Tax revenues that support this spending come from all
levels of government within the U.S. The NEA estimates that total revenue receipts for
public primary and secondary education exceeded $498.0 billion in 2006. This figures
breaks down to $45.3 billion, or 9.1 percent, from the federal government, $237.0 billion,
or 47.6 percent, from state governments, and $215.7 billion, or 43.3 percent, from local
governments. As of 2006, nearly 30 percent of all state and local tax revenues were
utilized in the provision of public education.
Since the finding in California’s Serrano v. Priest in the early 1970s, a great deal
of attention has been paid to the way in which state and local governments fund public
education. This has led to a swell of school finance reforms that have impacted nearly all
50 states. Many of these states have faced court challenges related to their school finance
mechanisms that have led to court mandated alterations to their funding formulas. The
1

Current expenditures are estimated by NEA to be around $439.5 billion.
All figures from this section can be found in the following source: NEA, Rankings and Estimates: 2006,
available at www.nea.org
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majority of cases over the past thirty years have been brought on the basis of equity
amongst school districts. Specifically, many court challenges claim that the system
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. The general argument is that
low wealth school districts do not have the tax base needed to raise school funding to the
similar levels that rich districts enjoy.
The general movement has been toward school finance systems that are
equalizing to some degree and therefore provide state funding based on some measure of
district wealth, with lower wealth districts receiving relatively more money from the state
towards K-12 public education. Because of these new equalizing systems, states are now
providing larger grants to local governments in support of public education. This is the
general result from school finance reform; education spending from state resources
increases. Economic theory predicts that local governments will respond to this increase
in state funds by decreasing the local funding provided for education if left to their own
devices. Because this theoretical result is well known, most states have included
regulations like maintenance of effort mechanisms in the school finance system that
attempt to prevent this behavior.
Theoretically, any increase in state education grants that accompany a school
finance reform should have the same impact on education spending as an equivalent
increase in local (school district) income under the median voter hypothesis (Oates,
1979). However, previous empirical results typically indicate that state grants stimulate
public expenditures at a rate higher than that associated with income (Gramlich and
Galper, 1973; Feldstein, 1975; Fisher, 1982). This anomaly has been dubbed “the
3

flypaper effect” and has been analyzed in many contexts throughout the literature. The
magnitude of the flypaper effect depends at least partially on the median voter’s
preferences regarding spending on government services, his preferences regarding private
goods, the response of bureaucrats, as well as the institutional regulations regarding the
provision of the grant. All else equal, more money will “stick” in jurisdictions with a
higher taste for spending in the expenditure category for which the grant is provided. The
flypaper effect has been shown to exist in numerous empirical studies with results
generally ranging from 0.25 to 1.00 (see Hines and Thaler, 1995).
As changes in school finance formulas have evolved, local governments have
faced an interesting dilemma related to the flypaper effect. School district bureaucrats, in
conjunction with local and/or county governments, have at least partial control over how
much of the new grant will “stick”. They could choose to take the additional money
provided by the state through the school finance formula and pass 100 percent of it
through to students via increased spending. Districts may be able to do this in a way in
which total education spending would still increase and it would not be readily apparent
that they were doing so.
The ability of a school district to decrease local revenues through reductions in
tax effort or expenditure diversion is highly dependent on the school finance system in
place. Some states have implemented tax effort maintenance requirements or local
spending requirements that constrain the districts’ control over locally provided spending
levels. California’s system, for example, disallows local governments from spending
more than $300 per student more than the poorest district in California. Other states’
4

programs contain maintenance of effort requirements which mandate that school districts
keep their spending and/or tax effort at levels seen in the previous year. Others have
recapture mechanisms in which any local revenue collected above a certain prescribed
amount is recaptured by the state and distributed to other districts. The variation in these
programs across the country is stark, and is somewhat surprising given the 30 plus years
since Serrano. A common, most preferred method of school funding has not emerged
over this period, and districts continue to struggle with the issues on a state by state basis.
Like many other U.S. states, Tennessee has seen a significant evolution of its
school finance system since the early 1990s. State funding was increased significantly,
new rules were enacted, and the formula calculating costs and state revenue
disbursements was completely changed. The significant alteration in education funding
leads to numerous questions regarding the behavioral decisions of local governments that
resulted from these changes. The analyses in the first essay that follows examines many
of these questions including whether or not local districts decreased their own-source
funds for education and whether or not the maintenance of effort requirement in
Tennessee impacted the provision of local funds. In addition to these questions, further
analyses examine the impact of receiving funds via the Cost Differential Factor (a cost of
living adjustment and supplement to the basic grant program), the impact of phasing-in
state funds as well as the impact that the increased state funding had on local tax effort.
Essay two puts additional focus on the equity issues surrounding school finance reform.
Since the intent of the education reform in Tennessee was to reduce inequality, equity
measures are employed in order to analyze the change in equity over time. In addition,
5

empirical analyses investigate the relationship between school district wealth and school
funding, and how that relationship has changed over time as the school finance system in
Tennessee has evolved.

School Finance Reform in Tennessee
The state of Tennessee has faced three school finance reform cases in the past 15
years known as the Small Schools lawsuits. The court has found in favor of the plaintiff
in each of the three cases. The first case, Tennessee Small School Systems v. McWherter
(Small Schools I), challenged the Tennessee Foundation Program (TFP) and was found in
favor of the plaintiffs. This led to the passage of the Tennessee Education Improvement
Act in 1992. This legislation brought tremendous changes to the education system in
Tennessee including the elimination of the TFP (the funding mechanism used from 1975
until 1992) and the creation of a new funding formula (the Basic Education Program, or
BEP), the enactment of an accountability system using school and district report cards,
and the formation of a new local governance structure for K-12 public education (Smith,
2004). This represented a fundamental change in the way in which education services
were funded and delivered to Tennessee children.
Student enrollment, measured as average daily membership, was the driving force
for the determination of costs under the BEP. These funds were deemed necessary by the
state to provide a basic (though not necessarily adequate) level of education for its public
school students. The calculated costs included both the state and local shares for
classroom and non-classroom costs. The CDF was included in the formula to assist
6

counties that confronted relatively high labor market wage structures, the presumption
being that these counties faced a higher cost of delivering schooling services.3
The basic formula for determining costs under the BEP was as follows:
I

I

i =1

i =1

E j = CDF j * ( ∑τ i * ADM ij * ci ) + ( ∑ λi * ADM ij * γ i ) ,
CDF j =

ωj
,
ω

where
E
CDF
τ
ADM
c
λ
γ

ωj
ω

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

Total district education cost
Cost differential factor
Inputs eligible for CDF adjustment (e.g. personnel)
Average daily membership in district
Cost of inputs ( τ ) used
Inputs ineligible for CDF adjustment (e.g. equipment)
Cost of inputs (λ) used
Weighted average wage in county private sector

= 95 percent of the state weighted average private sector wage
These costs were then aggregated across all counties to yield total schooling costs.

There were 45 cost components in the BEP (corresponding to ci in the first equation),
most of which were determined by average daily membership.
The level of funding support provided to school districts via the BEP was
calculated through the use of an equalization formula known as the Fiscal Capacity
Index. This formula was calculated yearly using a modified regression-based version of
the representative tax system approach. The agency charged with calculating the BEP
(TACIR), defines fiscal capacity as “the potential ability of local governments to fund
education from their own taxable sources, relative to the cost of their service
responsibility” (Green et al., 2004). The Fiscal Capacity Index was based on regression
3

The CDF is discussed more thoroughly in the first essay.
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analysis and was driven primarily by county income levels, property values and sales tax
collections.4 The calculation of the formula provided for some equalization across
Tennessee counties, with counties with lower property tax or sales tax revenues receiving
relatively more revenue per pupil from the state than counties with high levels of property
and sales tax revenues.
Tennessee’s switch to the BEP included additional changes including a mandate
to reduce class sizes and a requirement for districts with below average teacher salaries to
bring those salaries to the 1993 state average. These requirements were not binding until
the end of the BEP phase-in, which may have resulted in considerable uncertainty
regarding their viability. The BEP also included a nominal maintenance of effort
requirement that forbid districts from decreasing overall, nominal spending from local
sources from year to year. This number was not adjusted for enrollment growth or
inflation, so real per pupil decreases in local funding could be seen if districts chose to
have stagnant growth in education spending at the local level.
One of the more controversial aspects of the BEP proved to be its use of countylevel equalization calculations rather than equalizing at the district-level. While most
Tennessee school districts are coterminous with the county there are a few school
districts that are not. These districts are classified as special school districts, city systems
and partial county systems. In 2007 there were 67 school districts (out of 136 total
school districts) that were coterminous with their county. There were an additional 69
school districts classified as special, city or partial county systems. The BEP calculated
4

Variables included in the regression analysis include local revenue used for education, ability to pay
(based on per capita income), property and sales tax bases, resident taxpayer burden and service
responsibility (Green et. al, 2004).
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funding of these non-county school districts based on county-level data. This is
significant because city districts may have a very different fiscal capacity than the county
as a whole. For example, Maryville City School District’s funding level per pupil is
based on the fiscal data for Blount County as a whole. Maryville City (which is wholly
part of Blount County) is significantly more affluent than Blount County, and therefore
received more funding per pupil than they would if their funding was calculated
separately. On the other hand, Blount County received lower funding per pupil than they
would under a district-driven formula because the taxes collected within the Maryville
City School District are included in their formula calculation. Therefore, unless the noncounty school districts had characteristics identical to the county districts, there were
differences in funding compared to a district-specific model.
Until 2007, the BEP was the funding mechanism through which the state
attempted to comply with the mandate handed down by the Tennessee Supreme Court in
Small Schools I. In 2007 a new school finance system was instituted known as BEP 2.0.5
The BEP 2.0 is similar to the original BEP and did not represent a fundamental reform.
Changes include a simplification of the fiscal capacity measure and an elimination of the
Cost Differential Factor (CDF). While the switch to BEP 2.0 is an important one, this
analysis will examine only those years associated with the BEP. Funds provided to
school districts through the BEP were divided between classroom and non-classroom
components. For the first fourteen years of the BEP the state provided 75 percent of
classroom component funds and 50 percent of the BEP’s non-classroom components. In

5

The switch to BEP 2.0 was not mandated by the Tennessee court system. It was a voluntary change
passed via the Tennessee Legislature.
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2005, the state lowered the classroom provision percentage to 65 percent. The Local
Education Agencies (LEAs) are responsible for the remainder of the funding.

Tennessee in a National Context
As stated previously, nearly all 50 states have faced litigation surrounding their
public school financing systems. As of June 2007, only seven states nationwide have not
had a court case challenging their education finance systems decided (Delaware, Hawaii,
Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, Nevada, and Utah). Of these seven states, only five have not
had cases filed (Delaware, Hawaii, Mississippi, Nevada and Utah).
There are four primary types of systems and formulas that are used across the
country to calculate state funding for public school education: Flat Grant Programs,
Foundation Programs, Full State Funding and Power Equalization Programs (Verstegen,
2001). Currently all states have programs that fall into one or more of these categories.
States can combine methods if desired. For example, the state could provide a flat grant
to all districts in addition to the funding provided through the foundation program.
In a 2003 study, Leyden examined how states choose between school finance
program types. He concludes that when a court finds a state’s funding structure to be
unconstitutional due to equal protection arguments, the state legislature is more likely to
prefer a power equalizing scheme than a foundation grant program. Conversely, when a
state’s structure is found to be unconstitutional because it is not “thorough and efficient”,

10

the legislature will be more likely to prefer a foundation grant system over a power
equalizing scheme.6
It is interesting to note that, although most states have had a court case based on
similar equity concerns, the school finance systems still vary significantly across states.
The majority of states have some sort of foundation program, many of which have an
equalizing feature added in to the traditional foundation system. Several other states have
a guaranteed flat grant, typically determined per pupil, which is provided to school
districts. As Leyden concluded, the type of program chosen by the state depends on
many factors, including the language in the state constitution and the determination of the
court.
The behavioral responses associated with a change in the school financing
mechanism depend on the specifics related both to the grant calculation and the provision
of state funds through the formula. This varies significantly from state to state. The
following analysis uses one state’s experience to analyze some intriguing questions
related to the behavioral responses associated with a significant increase in state funding
for public education. This examination specifically relates to the school finance reform
implemented in Tennessee during the 1992-1993 school year.
The school finance reform in Tennessee during the early 1990s represented a
fundamental reform in public education funding in the state. Not only did it change the
way in which local school districts received money from the state, it also changed the

6

The basis for the lawsuits that states face depends on the structure of their state constitution. Some
constitutions contain a clause that states that the level of education provided must be “thorough and
efficient.” Other states’ constitutions contain an equal protection clause through which cases can be filed
based on distributive justice arguments.
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amount of money that they received. All school districts received more state funds under
the BEP than they did under the Tennessee Foundation Program. For low income
districts, the new money was a tremendous increase in the funds previously received for
schools, and allowed them to increase per pupil school expenditures by a remarkable
amount. However, with the new money received from the state also came new rules and
regulations that had to be followed by the district. In addition, the matching mechanisms
of the BEP required an increased amount of local funds for education spending as well.
There has been a recent movement away from lawsuits and reforms that target
spending equity towards reforms and lawsuits regarding the adequacy of state-provided
education. This has been amplified by the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act in
2001. Many states have already faced adequacy lawsuits, and many others, including
Tennessee, have attempted to prepare themselves for one by participating in an adequacy
“costing out” study. These studies examine the cost associated with providing an
adequate education to all students in the state. In general, a school finance reform that
addresses adequacy issues is much more expensive than a reform focused on equity.
While an equity based reform may simply involve reorganizing funds, an adequacy case
may require increased provision of funds to all districts. It is important to continue to
examine specific school finance programs across the country, as these systems continue
to evolve over time, and many changes continue to be made. It is vital to learn what
system characteristics are effective and which should be avoided based on the goals of
the reform.

12

This situation in Tennessee allows for a rich analysis of how local school districts
responded both to the increased state funds and the new requirements of the BEP. A
simple examination of the data shows that school spending increased as the BEP was
implemented. However, it is impossible to see in a simple analysis how the precise
details of the BEP affected local district behavior during that period. Previous literature
demonstrates that as the state increases their granting of education funds to local districts,
those districts will decrease their own-source funds committed to education by some
degree. This reduction in local funds is accomplished via local tax relief and/or diversion
of local education funds to other non-education programs. The degree to which local
districts can do this depends on the taste for education in the school district as well as the
specifics related to the school finance program itself. The analyses that follow examine
many issues surrounding local responses to the BEP while also investigating the
program-specific characteristics of the BEP and how they impacted the local response.
Essay 1 examines the impact that the institution of the BEP program had on the
level of locally-provided revenues and the tax effort expended by school districts.
Analyses are conducted using a constrained bureaucrat framework in which panel data is
utilized. Results indicate that local districts decreased own-source funding as the BEP
was phased in. It also indicates that existence of a nominal maintenance of spending
requirement caused local spending to decrease over time, all else equal. Essay 1 also
examines the impact that the CDF had on the school districts that received it and on local
expenditures as a whole. Results show that districts who received funds via the CDF
each year increased spending in conjunction with the CDF by more than districts who
13

received the CDF on an inconsistent basis. A further analysis examines the impact of the
BEP on local tax effort, in terms of both the sales tax and property tax, and shows that
local districts decrease sales tax effort and increased property tax effort during the phase
in period of the BEP. Overall effort, when considering both taxes together, was not
significantly impacted during the phase in.
Essay 2 breaks down the analysis on spending further with an assessment of the
impact of the BEP on spending and revenue equity in Tennessee over the period in
question. This analysis is extremely important given that one of the stated goals of
school finance reform is to make spending more equitable across school districts. Panel
data methods are employed in Essay 2 as well as an examination of the change in
coefficients over time using yearly cross-section analyses. The analysis shows that the
gap between spending in rich and poor school districts narrowed in the early years of the
BEP, but began to widen yet again after 1999. Results indicate that while overall
spending equity has improved, both state and local revenue equity have lessened over the
same period. This is expected in the case of state revenue since the BEP is equalizing.
However, this may not be expected in terms of local revenues. This shows that over time
the amount of money being spent from local funds in rich districts is growing at a faster
rate than those same own-source funds in poor districts. This is the primary cause for the
widening gap in spending between the poorest and richest school districts in Tennessee.
Essay 2 also examines an empirical issue confronted in previous literature. Due
to the difficulty in obtaining local property value data, previous studies have used local
income (per capita or median) as a proxy of district property wealth (see Card and Payne,
14

2002, and Baicker and Gordon, 2004). For the analyses that follow, local property wealth
data have been collected and Essay 2 examines whether or not per capita income is a
reliable proxy for local property wealth. Results indicate that although it performs
relatively well in some analyses, it cannot be relied on as an ideal substitute for property
wealth.
In addition to these issues, additional nuances of the BEP are explored within the
following essays which results in a broad analysis of the implementation of school
finance reform in Tennessee. This is especially timely in Tennessee, where they have
once again reformed their school finance system (now called BEP 2.0) and where a
possible adequacy lawsuit, or another equity lawsuit, still looms in the distance. School
finance systems are constantly evolving, and the analyses that follow present important
issues that should be considered as states develop the systems that will support statewide
funding of public education for years to come.
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Part 2: Essay 1:
A Constrained Bureaucratic Model of Behavioral Responses to School Finance
Reform: The Case of the BEP
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1.A

Introduction
Following the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in favor of the plaintiffs in

Small Schools v. McWherter in 1992, the BEP was instituted during the 1992-1993
school year. Because of the enormous expense of instituting such a program, Tennessee
phased in BEP funding over a five year period beginning in the 1992-1993 school year
and ending at the completion of the 1996-1997 school year. In addition to the phase in
of funds there were class size restrictions and teacher salary mandates implemented via
the Education Improvement Act that became binding after the end of the phase-in period.
During the phase-in, districts had considerable flexibility regarding how they could
respond to the new mandates and the new funds provided by the state through the BEP.
This essay examines the way in which BEP grants affected overall spending and local
support for education in Tennessee.
There are several novel features of the BEP that provide for an interesting
analysis of behavioral responses. The first is the decision to phase in new state funds and
the rules that accompanied the BEP. There may have been considerable uncertainty
regarding the BEP and doubt that the rules would ever become binding. This may have
led school district bureaucrats to delay changes in funding until the end of the phase in
period. In addition, the phasing in of funds may have impacted local school funding
differently than would have been seen absent a phase in period.
Secondly, the BEP contains a nominal maintenance of effort requirement which
requires local districts to maintain nominal spending from year to year. This prevents a
district dropping school expenditures below the nominal level seen in the previous year.
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This is an interesting caveat to the increase in state funding since many local school
districts in Tennessee previously had a very low revealed taste for education, which was
translated into very low levels of school expenditures. The maintenance of effort
requirement may have prevented districts from selecting school expenditure levels in line
with their residents’ taste for education. It may have also impacted school expenditures
by constraining school district bureaucratic decision-making and making school districts
more hesitant to spend money for fear that they could not maintain it in the coming year.
Thirdly, the Tennessee program provided a relatively unique spending addendum
for districts located in areas with high wage structures. This was not designed as a
simple cost of living adjustment as is seen in several other states. Instead, the CDF was
provided to only a handful of districts each year and receipt was relatively inconsistent
for some districts. This allows for an analysis regarding the behavioral decisions of
school district bureaucrats based on how confident the bureaucrat was about continued
receipt of the CDF. It is reasonable that bureaucrats in districts who consistently
received the CDF may behave differently than bureaucrats who were one-time recipients.
There is no question that overall per pupil expenditures in Tennessee have increased
significantly since the implementation of the BEP. Figure 1.1 shows the average level
real per pupil current expenditures in Tennessee between 1989 and 2006. However, on
the surface it is impossible to tell if this increase is specifically from the institution of the
BEP, or if the growth in expenditures would have existed even without school finance
reform. In addition, it is difficult to tell what affect, if any, the phasing in of BEP funds
had on school spending in Tennessee. This essay will examine the impact the phase-in
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of the BEP had on both local and overall expenditures as well as the levels of local tax
effort across the state.
School districts necessarily expend all funds received through the BEP in support
of local education. Absent a maintenance of effort requirement, which requires that
districts maintain some level of school spending from year to year, it is conceivable that
a recipient district might simply reduce own-source commitments toward education by
the amount of the BEP grant. Tennessee’s BEP does contain a maintenance of effort
requirement that ensures that school systems at least maintain their overall level of
nominal spending for education from year to year. Over time, however, school districts
might choose to reduce their own-source funding for elementary and secondary
education, insofar as they can avoid running afoul of the nominal maintenance of effort
requirement. This depends on the district’s taste for education, their education tax price
and other related factors. In other words, the state grant may free up own-source
revenues that could be used to reduce local tax burdens or to support spending in other
categorical areas outside education. Indirect evidence of this type of response would be
lower levels of local contributions to fund education after passage of the BEP.
The phenomenon described here is one aspect of the now well-known “flypaper
effect.” According to the flypaper effect, the receipt of a grant will increase overall
spending by an amount greater than would be seen with an equivalent increase in income.
Empirical results have shown that an intergovernmental grant will increase spending by
an amount greater than zero but less than the full amount of the grant. For example, if
Tennessee were to give a school system a grant of $5 million, the system would certainly
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spend the entire proceeds of the grant. At the same time, the overall increase in
spending—including state and local funds—would likely be less than $5 million,
especially over time when districts have an opportunity to change their spending
commitments. As noted above, Tennessee’s maintenance of effort requirement lessens a
district’s ability to decrease total nominal revenue unless enrollment has declined.
However, per pupil revenue and/or real revenue could be decreased while staying in
accordance with the maintenance requirement. Table 1.1 shows how a nominal
maintenance requirement can actually lead to a decrease in per pupil, or even total,
spending. These figures come from actual examples found in two Tennessee School
Districts. In each case total nominal local revenue is not only maintained, it is actually
increased. However, given enrollment increases and inflation, real revenues per pupil are
decreased.
This is not an isolated phenomenon. Between the school years of 2004-2005 and
2005-2006, 63 of the 136 Tennessee school districts had decreases in locally provided
real revenues per pupil. This may have occurred in three different ways even as districts
satisfied the maintenance of effort requirement. First of all, locally provided real
revenues may have grown, but at a rate slower than enrollment. Secondly, school
districts could have chosen to increase nominal spending by an amount less than
inflation. For example, if nominal revenues were increased by 1.5 percent and the
consumer price index grew by 2.0 percent, then real revenues would have decreased for
that year by 0.5 percent. Thirdly, districts may have been allowed to reduce revenue
provision due to falling enrollments.
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Figure 1.2 shows the levels of per pupil spending in real terms from 1989 until
2006. The significant increase in state-provided funds is easily seen in Figure 1.2. Local
expenditures, however, have not had the same upward trend as state-provided funds. In
fact, there has actually been a decrease in locally-provided funds in Tennessee in three of
the eighteen years in the analysis (1993, 2003 and 2005). Further analysis is required
with the respect to locally-provided funds in order to examine the impact of the BEP and
its related policies, including the previously mentioned nominal maintenance of effort
requirement.
This study will examine if the BEP, and specifically the phase-in and/or the
maintenance of effort requirement, were significant factors in changes in local funding
using a constrained bureaucratic model. It will also examine if tax effort was altered in
response to the influx of state funds via the BEP. Lastly it will examine a relatively small
but important part of the BEP, CDF. The CDF was structured as an add-on to the
standard BEP funds for school districts in Tennessee that confronted high market wage
structures. Qualification for the CDF was determined by a wage index of all jobs in the
county. This additional grant was provided to assist high cost (high wage) school
districts with the increased provision costs associated with higher county wages. Receipt
of the CDF was not guaranteed from year to year.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 1.B presents previous
literature related to the topics at hand. Section 1.C describes the theoretical basis of the
primary analyses. Section 1.D explains the central empirical model utilized. Section 1.E
summarizes the data that have been collected for the study and describes the variables in
21

detail and Section 1.F describes the results obtained. Sections 1.G and 1.H elucidate two
additional issues regarding Tennessee’s school finance reform: the impact of the Cost
Differential Factor and changes in tax effort. Section 1.I contains the conclusion and
areas for future research.

1.B

Previous Literature
Early research on school finance reform and state school finance systems focused

on the sizable inequities seen between education spending in wealthy and poor districts
and turned their attention to the rather poor way in which these funding mechanisms were
constructed. Bowman’s 1974 study examines West Virgina’s system in 1969 using a
cross-sectional analysis. He concludes that if a matching requirement is not in existence,
and the grant is simply a lump-sum transfer, that local school taxes decrease by around
$0.50 for every dollar in aid that is granted. He further postulates that if the purpose of
school finance reform is for any reason other than taxpayer relief, then a matching
requirement should be included. In another early study, Weicher (1972) concludes that
local school districts respond to increases in state aid by decreasing their own-source
revenues. These decreases are driven by tastes for education and local tax prices
associated with public education. While these studies are thought provoking and well
developed, new studies are certainly warranted, as econometric methods as well as school
finance systems have changed drastically in the past 30 years. Many examinations of
school finance reform have followed these early studies and, even with changes in
methods and programs, continue to highlight many of the same issues.
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Several recent analyses examine the effect of school finance reform on local
spending and on local tax effort. Baicker and Gordon (2006) conclude that localities
respond to increased state education spending by decreasing their own tax effort and their
spending on non-education programs, although total education spending does increase
overall. This analysis utilizes state data collected at the county level between 1982 and
1997. This paper, while very thorough, has two significant limitations. Firstly, the
analysis aggregates all school distircts to the county level. From a national perspective,
most states have multiple school districts in each county (Baicker and Gordon (2006)).
Therefore, they cannot differentiate between offsetting effects occuring in multiple
school districts in the same county. One can imagine how this may occur, especially in a
county that contains a rural county district that is relatively poor and a much more
wealthy city school district. For example, in the relatively poor school district, tastes for
overall education spending may also be relatively low. Therefore, an increase in state
funding may substitute for the local district’s use of own-source revenues. A lower
amount of the state grant would be expected to “stick” in this district. In the wealthy
district, tastes for education may be high, and they will likely pass more of the increase in
state funds into overall spending. In other words more money “sticks.” If a model is
used in which all districts in a county are aggregated for the analysis, the differential
effects in these districts would not be seen. The aggregated model would assume that
these very different school districts have identical behavior regarding the increase in state
funding. This strong assumption lessens the model’s ability to examine the true effect of
the reform as well as it’s ability to understand the behavioral responses associated with it.
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Secondly, similar to many other school finance reform studies, Baicker and
Gordon utilize U.S. Census of Governments data that is only collected every five years.
So, while their research spans a time period of 15 years, they only utilize a total of four
observations for each county. Not being able to observe what occurs in those “in
between” years is very limiting. For example, Tennessee’s school finance reform took
place beginning in the 1992-1993 school year. Baicker and Gordon’s data would not
have picked up these impacts until 1997. But, by 1997 the BEP had been fully phased-in,
and many of the impacts had already occurred. Limiting the data in Tennessee to Census
of Goverments years would eliminate the ability to analyze the impact of the phase-in
period as a whole. Data regarding district spending is extremely tedious to collect, and
therefore, nearly all studies use Census of Governments data.
Gordon (2004) examines whether federal grants for education via the Title I
program boost school spending. The Title I program is a special education program and
is now responsible for distributing funds for the costs associated with No Child Left
Behind. The Title I program is interesting to examine because it contains a maintenance
of effort requirement in which local and/or state funding per pupil cannot drop below 90
percent of its nominal level in the previous year for a district to receive Title I funds.
Gordon is able to conduct her analysis using yearly district level data to examine what
impact the increase in Title I funds in 1992 and 1993 had on spending variables in years
1992 through 1995. She concludes that the increase in Title I funds has no significant
impact on state revenues per pupil, either in the short run or over time. In the case of
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local revenues, however, new Title I revenues are crowded out by a decrease in the level
of per pupil local revenues by the third year following receipt.
Romer and Rosenthal (1982) conclude that a school district whose share of state
aid is close to the statewide average before and after the increase in state aid would
increase total spending by the increased amount of state aid that they receive. This
explains a perfect flypaper effect in which all of the grant “sticks.” This provides an
explanation for the flypaper effect outside of the common explanation of fiscal illusion
(See Fisher, 1982). In this case, Romer and Rosenthal are able to explain the flypaper
effect as a misperception of grant size. While district residents may have a firm idea of
their property tax price, they likely have very little idea related to the amount of funding
provided to the school district by the state. The model predicts a flypaper effect for all
levels of state aid, but a perfect flypaper effect is only seen when state aid is close to the
state average.
Very few analyses examine the impact of school finance reform in a specific state.
This is likely due to the difficulty in obtaining reliable district-level data. However, a
few district-level examinations have been completed in recent years. In an analysis
regarding Wisconsin’s reform, Maher, Skidmore and Statz (2006) conclude that the most
recent adjustments to the school finance formula in Wisconsin have not decreased
disparities in tax effort, which was a stated goal of the Wisconsin reform. In fact tax
effort disparities have widened since the reform. Their results further demonstrate that
school finance reform had a lesser effect on spending in districts who spent a relatively
high amount on education prior to the reforms. Their empirical analysis is a cross25

sectional analysis using the change in variables between 1995 and 2002. Their model
additionally shows that a change in tax price is a weak determinant of changes in school
spending. Other factors, such as the change in per pupil property tax base and changes in
state aid are better predictors of changes in spending.
In another state-specific examination, Olmsted et al. (1993) investigate the impact
institutional factors, such as voter approval of education spending, played on school
spending levels in Missouri during the 1970s. The cross-sectional analysis, using a tobit
specification, concludes that giving local governements more control over spending
levels (through the relaxation of a voting requirement for all spending increases) led to
substantial increases in local spending. This study lends credence to the idea that school
district bureaucrats desire to increase their budgets as much as possible within the
contraints set by the state and/or the county in which they reside. They conclude that
more constraints lead to a decrease in local spending. This occurs because constraints
limit the local school district bureaucrat’s ability to manipulate school spending via
agenda control.
While these state-specific analyses have thought provoking results, it is difficult
to compare studies conducted on data related to specific states, as state laws regarding
school finance differ significantly across the country. This is highlighted in Hoxby
(2001), as she concludes that different school finance reforms should not be treated as
equals. Many previous studies examine results across states in which a dummy variable
is utilized that shows whether or not a state has undergone school finance reform. These
programs differ so drastically from state to state that Hoxby asserts that lumping them
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together is inappropriate. Therefore, the current analyses presented examine the impact
of Tennessee’s statewide reform on specific school districts. In addition, the ability to
examine issues at the school district level allows for a rich analysis of the behavioral
effects of such reforms. While Tennessee’s system may not be identical to others across
the country, an analysis of its components allows for general lessons regarding school
finance reform and how institutional features impact education expenditures.
The differences between school finance programs across the country is quite
stark. These differences go far beyond the type of program that the states employ. Stark
differences occur even in states that have the same “type” of school finance systems. For
instance, states that have foundation programs can have distinctive program
characteristics that make the provision of state funds to local districts very different. For
example, some states have programs that mandate that local governments maintain their
level of tax effort regardless of state support levels. In these cases, local funding cannot
decrease as the state increases financial support. In states that do not require spending
maintenance, local districts are able to reduce spending as much as will be supported by
local residents. Other states, including Wisconsin, have revenue limits in which wealthy
districts are limited to a certain level of local school funding before the state begins to
recapture local funds. The nuances of these programs are very important to both the level
of spending that results and the behavioral reaction to an increase in state funds.
The current analysis improves on previous work in several ways. This analysis
provides evidence regarding the response of local school districts to numerous
institutional factors such as the phase in of education funds, the existence of a
27

maintenance of effort requirement, and a cost differential grant for high wage districts.
The ability to incorporate all of these institutional factors allows for a unique context in
which to analyze education expenditures over time. The dataset used in this essay is
much more extensive than others seen in the literature. A yearly panel of 136 school
districts has been collected including several years prior to the school finance reform.
Most national studies use aggregated data based on a sporadic time period (for example,
the Census of Governments). All previous state level studies found use school-district
level information, but limit the analysis to a cross-sectional examination due to the
difficulty in collecting school-district level data. The essay is also valuable in that
Tennessee’s reforms have not been studied previously, and given the wide distribution of
incomes and other demographic characteristics in Tennessee, there is a great deal of
variation in many of the explanatory variables which can lead to a rich analysis of school
finance reform impacts.

1.C

Theoretical Analysis
The majority of school finance reform evaluations have utilized the median voter

model (See Chang, 1981; Addonizio 1991; Murray, 1997; Card and Payne, 2006). The
median voter model has also been used frequently to examine other granting programs.
Another line of inquiry utilizes Romer and Rosenthal’s bureaucratic voting model
(Romer and Rosenthal 1979a, 1979b, 1982) which recognizes the ability of local
government to take part in agenda control and yields outcomes that deviate from the
median voter’s preferred outcome. Some believe that this model better explains the
flypaper effect which says that a one dollar governmental grant normally increases
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spending more than an equivalent increase in the income of the median voter. The
bureaucratic voting model suggests that bureaucrats will seek to increase the budget of
their bureaus through the use of grants and the setting of relatively unattractive reversion
spending levels.
The median voter and bureaucratic models lead to similar predictions with regard
to changes in local spending levels in response to the BEP. The existence of the nominal
maintenance of effort requirement, as well as the required levels of spending on
classroom and non-classroom expenditures via the BEP, led to a significant increase in
local funds during the phase-in period for districts with relatively low education tastes.
These districts had to increase local expenditures to higher levels in order to comply with
the new regulations of the BEP. After BEP implementation, the median voter in these
districts was unable to select the level of local education expenditures associated with
their particular level of education tastes (assuming it was below the required amount).
Figure 1.3 presents this case graphically.
Assume a district consumes at point A in Figure 1.3 prior to the implementation
of the BEP. BEP funds are then introduced to Tennessee school districts via the use of
matching grants. Districts are required to match a portion of both classroom and nonclassroom costs. Given the district’s taste for education and other goods (considering the
relative prices for those goods), the district’s median voter would prefer to consume at
point B after BEP implementation. However, the matching scheme of the BEP and the
existence of the maintenance of effort requirement prevent the district from spending
below M. The portion of the budget constraint below M has been removed from the
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median voter’s potential choice set. Therefore, the median voter will select the lowest
level of local spending possible given the matching requirements, point C. If income
remained constant, all districts who consumed local education expenditures below M
prior to BEP implementation would choose to remain at the nominally required level
from year to year. Consuming local education expenditures equal to M, the required
level, leaves these districts on a lower indifference curve than was seen prior to the
institution of the BEP.
Over time, since this required level is based on nominal numbers rather than real
and is not adjusted for enrollment increases, remaining at the nominal requirement results
in a real, per-pupil decrease in locally-provided expenditures. These districts would be
expected to remain at point C until their education tastes, or other related factors, adjusted
to a point in which an increase in local education expenditures above point C would put
the median voter on a higher indifference curve. This may or may not occur, but would
be less likely in districts with especially low tastes for education spending.
The five year phase-in of BEP funds would also have an impact on the model
shown in Figure 1.3. BEP funds were phased in from the 1992-1993 school year until the
1996-1997 school year. While state funds were phased in, the matching requirements via
the BEP program were also phased in. Therefore, M increased on a yearly basis from the
beginning of the phase-in until the phase-in was complete. This increase would mean
that a larger percentage of districts would choose to remain at M each year as the required
spending level surpassed their desired level of local education spending.
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What if there was an increase in income in a district consuming force to consume
at point C?

If district income increases, the entire budget constraint shifts to the right.

After this shift, the preference of the district shown would lead to a preferred
consumption point equal to point D in Figure 1.3. This point is not possible, however,
because the maintenance of effort requirement forces them to spend a minimum of M.
Therefore, given the options available to the median voter, the district consumes at point
E. Education consumption remains at M while the consumption of non-education goods
increases. Once again, since the nominal maintenance requirement does not adjust for
inflation and enrollment, maintaining spending of M would result in a real per-pupil
decrease in local funding.
This model does not restrict districts that prefer education spending above M from
spending at a level that corresponds with their tastes for education, given relative costs.
The behavior in those districts may not be affected by the existence of the nominal
maintenance of effort requirement if they desire to increase education spending from year
to year and desire to remain above the state required matching levels. Therefore, the
theoretical prediction of the model regarding the impact of the nominal maintenance of
effort requirement is ambiguous. The impact depends on the number of districts whose
preferred level of spending falls below M compared to the number of districts who prefer
to maintain spending greater than the matching levels required.
While the overall predictions of behavior are similar, there are notable differences
in the median voter and bureaucratic models. First of all, in the median voter model,
matching grants result in a larger increase in public spending than do lump-sum grants of
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the same amount. Under the bureaucratic model the two types of grants would have
identical expenditure effects because the bureaucrat ensures that the money sticks since
the bureaucrat’s primary goal is the maximization of the bureau’s budget. Secondly, the
median voter model predicts that a lump-sum grant will increase spending by an amount
equivalent to the increase seen with an equivalent increase in income. The bureaucratic
voting model forecasts that a lump-sum grant increases spending by a larger amount than
an increase in income. This difference is especially significant because of the notable
flypaper effect. The bureaucratic model can explain this phenomenon while the basic
median voter model cannot (Romer and Rosenthal, 1979a). Thirdly, in the bureaucratic
model the increase in public expenditures is always larger than the amount of the grant.
Under the median voter model the rise in public spending depends on the price elasticity
of demand.
Romer and Rosenthal use the bureaucratic model in their analyses (1979a, 1979b,
1982) to examine the level of public school expenditures in Oklahoma during the 1970s.
Their results indicate that school district bureaucrats utilize agenda control by setting
reversion levels of spending very low so that the median voter prefers the higher level of
expenditure. They deduce, using a logarithm cross-sectional model, that the reversion
level was a significant determinant of spending in school districts. Moreover, they find a
negative relationship between the reversion level of spending and the actual level of
spending instituted. In other words, the lower the reversion level set by district
bureaucrats, the higher the level of spending accepted by the median voter.
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Two noteworthy analyses compare the median voter model and the bureaucratic
model in the context of public education expenditures. In an early application Wyckoff
(1988) concluded that the bureaucratic model performed better in the case of analyzing
capital expenditures while the median voter model was preferred when examining current
expenditures. He compares the median voter and bureaucratic models via a double log
model that estimates education spending in Michigan. In a more recent analysis,
Chandler (2005) expands this analysis using more sophisticated statistical techniques and
utilizing data from Connecticut’s school finance reforms. He finds that both models
predict education spending in Connecticut consistently, and cannot separate out which
model is preferred over the other.
In their cross-sectional examination of school funding in Missouri, Olmsted et al.
(1993) postulated that “tax rates in [these] districts do not appear to simply reflect voter
demands…Institutional factors, not changes in demand, apparently cause these
increases.” This strengthens the argument that the bureaucratic model is the most
appropriate when analyzing local school finance expenditures. School district
bureaucrats desire to maximize their budgets in order to maximize the level of funds
provided for their bureau. Therefore, we should expect them to spend as much as
residents and the structure of the granting mechanism will allow.
There are statutes related to the BEP in Tennessee that may assist in model
selection. The BEP contains a “maintenance of effort” requirement for local spending.
The requirement to maintain a level of spending restricts the median voter’s ability to
fully control local spending levels. This requirement is a nominal spending requirement,
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which differs significantly from a maintenance of real per pupil spending or a tax effort
maintenance requirement. When only nominal spending must be maintained, inflation
and/or enrollment growth may lead to a decrease in real per pupil spending. In addition,
this level of spending is partially determined by the match required for classroom and
non-classroom spending via the BEP. This also restricts the choices available to the
median voter. These constraints would not be considered in a typical median voter model
although they may play a significant role in the determination of school funding across
the state. Because the median voter model assumes that the voter can choose any level of
spending along the continuum, which is not the situation faced in Tennessee, the
traditional median voter model is expected to underperform when compared to the
bureaucratic model. In addition, the way in which school expenditures are funded at the
local level must also be considered. There is no required open referendum process in
Tennessee in which voters approve the budget each year. Instead, local school district
budgets are proposed by school district bureaucrats who then must obtain approval from
the school board and the county (city) government. Under this scenario it seems likely
that the school district bureaucrat may have influence beyond what would be seen in a
case, such as Oregon, where voters consider school district budgets in elections each
year. Due to these considerations and previous literature related to this topic, the
bureaucratic voting model will be utilized in the spirit of Romer and Rosenthal with
adjustments made for the current analysis.
Romer and Rosenthal present a bureaucratic model in which a bureaucrat is
interested in maximizing spending for their particular bureau. In order to accomplish this
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they set a reversion level of spending that is less attractive to the median voter than the
higher proposed level of spending. They then allow voters to select only from their
proposed level of spending and the lower reversion level of spending. Figure 1.4 presents
this situation. The slope of the median voter’s budget constraint is determined based on
the relative prices of local education expenditures and all other goods and services. The
‘price’ of education expenditures is measured as the tax price of the median voter. Given
the budget constraint, the median voter would prefer a level of local education
expenditures of μv. According to the median voter model, this is the level of education
expenditures that would be expected absent bureaucratic influences. Under the
bureaucratic model, however, the bureaucrat has agenda control, and can determine
which levels of funding are proposed for the coming year. In addition, the bureaucrat
that proposes the budget (the school district bureaucrat) may have access to information
that the bureaucrat approving the budget (the county/city bureaucrat) does not have.
These information asymmetries can assist in the district bureaucrat’s aim to maximize
their district’s budget. In the case of the model in Figure 1.4 the bureaucrat is assumed to
prefer a spending level of ξp. The bureaucrat knows that local education spending equal
to ξp lies on an indifference curve below that of μv. Therefore, the bureaucrat utilizes his
agenda control ability and sets a reversion level of spending of ξr. In other words, the
median voter can only choose between two levels of school spending, ξp and ξr.
Spending level ξp is located on a higher indifference curve, and is therefore the level of
spending chosen by the median voter. By taking advantage of agenda control, the
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bureaucrat is able to obtain a level of spending that is higher than the preferred level of
the median voter.
There is a significant difference between Romer and Rosenthal’s model and the
current analysis that should be noted. Romer and Rosenthal’s model assumes that the
bureaucrat can set any reversion level necessary to maximize their bureau’s funding.
They therefore set a reversion level that is less preferred than their higher level of
spending that the bureaucrat desires. This ensures that their preferred level of spending
will be accepted. Tennessee’s situation is a bit different since the bureaucrat cannot
suggest a funding level lower than the maintenance of effort requirement. Therefore, the
model utilized in this analysis is better described as a constrained bureaucratic model.
This will lead to different theoretical results than those seen in Romer and Rosenthal’s
studies. Where the setting of a reversion level in Romer and Rosenthal increases the
level of spending in school districts, the existence of a nominal maintenance of effort
requirement may decrease spending in Tennessee’s school districts since the bureaucrat
cannot set the reversion level that they would choose in the absence of the maintenance
of effort requirement.
The existence of the maintenance of effort requirement and the BEP matching
requirement have similar effects on the level of education expenditures in Tennessee as
seen in the Romer and Rosenthal model shown in Figure 1.4. The median voter does not
have full control over the level of local spending due to these constraints. The median
voter can choose increased spending, as proposed by the school district bureaucrat
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(analogous to ξp), or they can choose to revert to nominal spending in the previous year
(the reversion level).
In addition to this constraint, the school district bureaucrat does not have the
ability to set a low reversion level. Their choice is limited by the maintenance of effort
requirement. They do not have the option of choosing to decrease nominal spending on
public education or to set a reversion spending level of zero dollars. Romer and
Rosenthal’s theory shows that the bureaucrat has an incentive to set the reversion level as
low as possible in order to increase the level of spending that will be approved by the
median voter. Due to the constraint of the maintenance of effort requirement, the
bureaucrat cannot set a reversion level below that amount. The bureaucrat will therefore
choose the nominal maintenance of effort as its reversion level of spending, and that
amount essentially becomes the constrained reversion, ξr. Because of these institutional
details, both the median voter and the bureaucrat’s options regarding public education
financing are constrained.
The constrained bureaucrat model is based on four assumptions. First of all, the
school budget process is viewed as a negotiation between the school district bureaucrat
and the local (county) government. The preferences of the county government are
assumed to be equal to that of the median voter in the district. Secondly, the school
district bureaucrats are assumed to be concerned with maximizing the budget of their
school district. Thirdly, it is assumed that the school district bureaucrat has additional
knowledge regarding the school district and their budgeting needs that the county
government does not have. Lastly, it is assumed that there is no open referendum process
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in which the median voter can choose their preferred level of spending. Using the
constrained bureaucratic model leads to several propositions regarding local education
expenditures as they relate to the BEP in Tennessee. 7

Proposition 1: If the required level of local education spending exceeds the median
voter’s preferred level of spending (ξr > μv), the level of spending will not increase above
the required level.

In Figure 1.5 μv represents the preferred level of spending by the median voter
and ξr and ξp represent the level of spending required by the maintenance of effort and the
desired level of spending proposed by the school district, respectively. The median voter
does not have the option to choose their preferred level of spending because ξr > μv. The
median voter may only choose between the required level and the level proposed by the
school district in their budget request. The median voter would choose to remain at the
required level of spending, as increasing spending by any further amount would put them
on a lower indifference curve.
A different situation may occur in cases in which the minimum required level of
education spending through the maintenance of effort requirement is below the level
preferred by the median voter (ξr <μv). This may occur in districts with high tastes for
education expenditures.

7

All theoretical specifications included in this analysis assume that preferences over local education
spending are single-peaked.
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Proposition 2: If the required level of local education spending via the maintenance of
effort requirement is less than the median voter’s preferred level of spending (ξr < μv),
the level of spending chosen by the median voter depends both on the required level of
spending and the level of spending proposed.

There are several potential results that may follow Proposition 2. First of all, we
may have a situation where education spending level ξr lies on an indifference curve
above that of education spending level ξp. In the case depicted in Figure 1.6, the median
voter will choose to revert to the required level of spending if confronted with a choice
between ξr and ξp. The required level of spending is lower than that preferred by the
median voter, but it lies on an indifference curve below that associated with the proposed
level of spending. In this case an increase in spending above the required maintenance
level would not be expected.
A well-informed bureaucrat would never choose to propose ξp as presented in
Figure 1.6 due to the voter’s preference for the reversion level over ξp. Instead, the
bureaucrat would propose a level of spending that lies on an indifference curve higher
than ξr. Figure 1.7 shows this potential result. This case is similar to the one presented in
Figure 1.6, but now the median voter prefers the increased proposed level of spending to
the level required under the maintenance of effort requirement. In this case, we expect
the local level of school expenditures to increase above that required by the state.
A third prospect exists in which ξp = μv. In this case the proposed level of school
spending exactly equals that of the median voter, and therefore the proposed level is
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selected. This is unlikely, however, because the bureaucrat (the school district) cannot
directly observe the precise level of expenditures preferred by the median voter.
These results lead to a proposition regarding the relationship between the
reversion level (the maintenance of effort requirement) and the highest level of spending
that would be approved by the median voter.

Proposition 3: When ξr < μv, there is a negative relationship between the level of
nominal spending required by the maintenance of effort requirement (the reversion level)
and the highest level of school expenditures above μv that will be preferred by the median
voter.

The implementation of the BEP was phased in over a five year time period (from
1992-1992 until 1997-1998). Local school districts were responsible for providing 25
percent of classroom expenditures and 50 percent of non-classroom expenditures as
calculated by the BEP.8 Therefore, with the implementation of the BEP and the increase
in state expenditures, an increase in local expenditures was also required. This
essentially increased the reversion level of local spending at a higher rate than would
have been seen absent the BEP phase in. Since districts could not decrease spending
below the previous year’s nominal level, the reversion level of spending increased
significantly during the phase in period as state and local spending grew. The increase in

8

This amount was changed to 35 percent of instruction ala classroom expenditures and 50 percent of nonclassroom expenditures during the 2005-2006 school year.
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the reversion level impacts the potential levels of spending that may be approved by the
median voter if ξr < μv. Figure 1.8 depicts this situation.
Suppose the initial state is represented by a proposed level of spending of ξp0 and
a reversion level, per the maintenance of effort requirement. Under this scenario, the
median voter would select the proposed level of spending, ξp0, as it lies on a higher
indifference curve than ξr0. Now suppose that the reversion level is increased from ξr0 to
ξr1 due to the phasing in of the BEP. At reversion level ξr1 the median voter will no
longer select the proposed level of spending, ξp0. Instead, the median voter will prefer the
newly increased reversion level. This illustrates that as the reversion level increases, the
highest level of education spending that will be approved by the median voter decreases.
The reversion level increased at a much faster rate during the phase in period than
was seen after the five year phase in. Therefore, it is likely that local education spending
increased at a slower rate during the phase in, after controlling for required spending,
than was seen outside of the phase in years. A real decrease in spending may even be
observed if the median voter consistently chose to remain at the reversion level (which is
based on a nominal measurement). In addition, it is possible that the nominal
maintenance of effort requirement was consistently above the median voter’s preferred
level of spending and spending would never be increased above the required amount.
This is possible, and even likely, in districts with low tastes for education spending.
When the bureaucrat has considerable control of the reversion level set, as seen in
Romer and Rosenthal (1979, 1982), the existence of the reversion level causes spending
to increase. This is because they are able to set the reversion level low enough to where
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the median voter will always select the bureaucrat’s preferred spending level over the
proposed reversion. However, with the maintenance of effort requirement, bureaucrats
do not have free choice over the reversion, so the existence of the reversion may actually
cause spending to remain at the nominal reversion, which amounts to a decrease in real
funds (see Figures 1.5 and 1.6). Over time, the nominal requirement will necessarily
increase, even if districts do not prefer higher spending, as the required matches for
classroom and non-classroom costs increase. This results in the case shown in Figure
1.8, where an increase in the nominal effort requirement decreases the highest approvable
level of local spending.
If the bureaucrat is constrained, the reversion may decrease spending to a level
lower than that seen in the basic median voter model. If the bureaucrat is not constrained
(as in Romer and Rosenthal), the reversion will increase spending when compared to the
median voter result, as the bureaucrat can always set a reversion level low enough to get
their preferred level of spending approved. Although this differential result exists, the
relationship between the level of the reversion in both the constrained and nonconstrained case is the same: as the reversion level increases, the spending level that will
be approved decreases. Therefore, a negative relationship is expected between the
reversion level and local spending levels in the analyses that follow.

1.D

Empirical Model
Due to the bureaucratic nature of the school district budgeting process, the

empirical analysis will investigate both the effect of the nominal maintenance of effort
requirement and the phase-in aspect of the BEP by utilizing a bureaucratic model in the
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spirit of Romer and Rosenthal (1982). Between the 1992-1993 school year and the 19961997 school year, school districts received BEP funds that increased yearly at a much
faster rate than was seen during the pre-BEP period or after the phase-in was complete.
Other than the maintenance of effort requirement, the new rules accompanying the
institution of the BEP were not binding until the program reached full funding. These
rules included increases in teacher salaries and significant decreases in class size. School
districts could use the BEP funding during the phase-in period to implement the new
regulations immediately, or they could have used the funds from 1992 to 1997 to offset
local spending, while maintaining the required level of nominal effort, choosing to delay
compliance with the new rules.
An additional issue existed surrounding the confidence Tennessee school districts
had in the new school finance program. Districts may not have been overly confident in
the full phase-in of the BEP. In addition, the rules associated with the implementation of
the BEP, such as smaller class sizes and higher teacher salaries, were announced in 1992,
but were not put into effect until the completion of the BEP phase-in. If districts had
relatively low tastes for education, they would be expected to delay expenditures related
to these regulations until they became binding. Moreover, districts may not have had
much confidence that these rules would ever be enforced. Districts that did not have faith
that the BEP would be fully implemented as originally proposed may have chosen to
delay investing in new capital needed to comply with the class size restrictions. In some
districts the new rules required building new schools or adding on to existing structures in
order to adequately reduce class sizes. A decrease in local funds, or a slow-down in local
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fund growth, during the phase-in may have occurred if districts chose to delay these
expenses or if they were not confident in the stability of the BEP.
The first statistical analysis was conducted to further analyze effects of the BEP
and its components using locally-provided education revenues as the dependent variable.
This analysis will differ from many previously performed in the literature since it
involves a balanced panel of data rather than a cross-sectional analysis or an examination
of changes in variables between two time periods. Since full population data are
available for analysis, sample selection issues are not problematic, and a simple linear
examination can be employed as the baseline analysis. This follows previous education
expenditure literature that utilizes linear models (Romer and Rosenthal, 1982, Murray et
al, 1997, Card and Payne, 2002). The linear model follows a fixed effect specification
and contains both year and district fixed effects,
Γit = α it + ω1Ν it + ω2σ t + λit Zˆ it + δ it Xˆ it + f i + y t + ξ it

where Гit (LOCALFUNDS) represents locally-provided, per-pupil revenues. The
variable Nit (NOMINALMOE) controls for the reversion level of spending in each
district. The variable σt is a dummy variable (PHASEIN) that takes a value of 0 during
non phase-in years and a value of 1 for the school years from 1992-1993 until 1996-1997.
Vectors of education variables that are available at the district level (property tax base,
sales tax base, classroom and non-classroom requirements, funding from all levels of
government, percentage of special education students, etc.) and community variables
available only at the county level (unemployment rate, per capita income, median home
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value, etc.) are represented by Ẑ it and X̂ it respectively. The variables f i and yt represent
district and year fixed effects which are included in all models. Including fixed effects
allows for control of unobservable characteristics of the school districts and helps to
correct for any omitted variable bias that may result otherwise.9

1.E

Data
The lack of data availability has severely constrained the ability of researchers to

effectively analyze issues related to school finance reform. Nearly all previous studies
utilize data from the United States Census of Governments which is only conducted
every five years. This leads to obvious difficulties in examining the immediate and
ongoing effects of school finance reform. To further complicate analysis, in many states
school districts are not coterminous with counties, and therefore, the collection of data is
especially daunting. In Tennessee, the majority of school districts are coterminous with
the county in which they reside. For the current analysis a balanced panel of 18 years has
been collected for a total of 135 school districts.
As stated previously, the Basic Education Program was instituted in Tennessee
during the 1992-1993 school year, with full funding reached at the end of the 1996-1997
school year. In order to examine the effects of the BEP data covering a significant period
before the reform must also be collected. In order to account for this, data have been
collected at the district/county level data for each of the school years from 1988 to

9

This follows Holtz-Eakin (1986) in which he finds that models without fixed effects are misspecified.
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2006.10 Data on both school district and county characteristics have been collected.
Variables were collected at the district level whenever possible. In addition, all variables
measured in dollars have been inflation-adjusted using 2006 dollars.11
Table 1.2 presents the spending variables collected at the school district level.
The variables CURSPENDING (current per pupil spending) and LOCALFUNDING
(local per pupil school expenditures) are used as the key dependent variables in the
analyses that follow. Current spending is utilized rather than total spending because
expenditures outside of current spending, such as construction and debt service, do not
impact students in an equal manner. For example, only students who attend a new school
are impacted by the funds used in the construction of that school. Because of this it is
standard in the literature to consider current spending alone. As discussed previously,
local funding varies widely across Tennessee school districts. In 2006, local per pupil
expenditures ranged from a low of $701.05 per pupil (Alamo City School District in
Crockett County) to a high of $8,225.47 per pupil (Franklin City Special School District
in Williamson County). The wide range in local spending gives rise to the potential for a
rich analysis regarding how these expenditures vary as other variables change.
In addition, STATEFUNDING (per pupil spending from state sources) and
FEDFUDING (per pupil spending from federal sources) are also included in Table 1.2.
The summary statistics for these variables are presented for the entire time period, 1989
through 2006, as well as for three snapshot years (1989, 1998 and 2006). All variables

10

This is the case with all but a few variables, such as per capita income, that are currently not available up
to 2006. All data is available at least through 2004.
11
In addition to the models presented, additional models were conducted using non-inflation adjusted data.
All results were consistent with those shown herein.
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presented in the analysis, including the maintenance of effort, have been adjusted for
inflation and are presented in 2006 dollars.
STATEFUNDING is measured on a real per-pupil basis, and includes all funds
provided to the local school district by the state. The majority of this funding is provided
via the state sales tax. Due to the equalizing nature of the BEP, the amount of per-pupil
state support granted to each school district varies quite a bit as well. As of 2006, this
figure ranged from $2,395.80 (Hamilton County) to $6,049.36 (Hancock County).
Hancock County had the lowest per capita income in Tennessee in 2006. Therefore, it is
no surprise that they were the largest recipient of state funds during that year. The
variable FEDFUNDING represents the per-pupil funding amount provided by the federal
government. This number represents an average of 12 percent of total school spending in
Tennessee. Federal funding for K-12 education is primarily reserved for support of
special education programs, including the No Child Left Behind Act passed in 2001.
The variables collected for this analysis fall into two broad categories: school
related variables and community variables. These variables may influence both the
school district bureaucrat’s decisions as well as the median voter’s preferences. They
may also help to identify the school district’s overall taste for education expenditures.
School related variables are generally collected at the school district level and include
revenue collected from all sources, number of students, average teacher salary,
percentage of students qualifying for special education, and district level school
expenditures. Community variables are also collected at the school district level when
available, but are more commonly presented at the county level. Community variables
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available at the school district level include property and sales tax rates and bases.
Community variables that must be collected at the county level include per capita
income, percentage of the population between 5 and 17 years of age and over 65 years of
age, and unemployment rates. Table 1.3 presents summary statistics for the variables
utilized in the before mentioned empirical model.
The dataset utilized in the current analysis includes variables that have been
collected for 135 school districts for 18 years. This amounts to an immense dataset that
represents the entire population during the period of analysis. The variables selected in
this analysis were chosen to give further depth to the spending equation. Each of these
variables accounts for an important aspect of the BEP, the school district, or the county in
which the district resides.
The first variable relates specifically the bureaucratic specification.
NOMINALMOE represents one of the key variables, the nominal maintenance of effort
requirement. It is equal to the nominal level of spending in the previous year.12
According to the model presented a higher value of NOMINALMOE, all else equal,
should decrease locally provided school spending. PROPTAXBASE represents the real
property tax base in each school district. This includes all classes of taxable property
within the school district. It is measured as the assessed property values in the school
district. MEDIANHOME represents the median home value in the county in which the
district arises. After controlling for property tax base, a higher value of MEDIANHOME

12

This variable was calculated using the nominal numbers from each year. The nominal values were then
adjusted for inflation.
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would lead to a higher tax price of education in the district. Therefore, a negative
relationship is anticipated between MEDIANHOME and LOCALFUNDING.
The measurement of SALESTAXBASE is a bit more complicated because local
taxable sales are not available at the school district level. However, this data has been
imputed using data available at the county level. Data on total taxable local sales at the
county level were collected for each year in the analysis. For school districts
coterminous with the county, this is equal to taxable sales within the school district..
However, for those that are non-coterminous with counties, the amount is weighted by
the percentage of pupils in each district in order to retrieve a district-level value of
taxable sales. Although this method is not perfect, it allows a school district level
analysis that is much richer than a county only examination. The ability of a school
district to collect revenues using the sales tax is limited significantly by the 2.75 percent
cap on the local sales tax rate in Tennessee. Therefore, LRATECAP is included in the
analyses. This variable is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the district is at the
2.75 percent tax cap and a zero if the district is not.
Several variables utilized are unavailable at the school district level. This is not a
problem for the majority of Tennessee school districts, which are coterminous with the
counties in which they reside. However, in the case of the city and special school
districts, the county-level variable is used both for the county and city/special school
district. These variables include UNEMPRATE (unemployment rate), PCT517 (percent
of county residents between the ages of 5 and 17), PCT65 (percent of county residents
over the age of 65), and PCI (per capita income).
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UMEMPRATE is used to measure the economic conditions within the county for
each time period. Economic conditions within a county may impact the decisions made
by the median voter education spending relative to spending on all other goods and
services. PCT517 and PCT65 are important variables as they allow for an analysis of
how age effects education spending. Considering the fact that over 90 percent of children
in Tennessee attend public schools, it seems likely that a county with a higher percentage
of students between the ages of 5 and 17 has a larger population of residents attending
schools. This may increase the financial burden of school districts. PCT65 may also be
an important determinant of education expenditures. Previous literature asserts that
having a larger percentage of elderly residents is associated with a decrease in education
spending, all else equal (see Poterba, 1995, and Harris et al., 2001).
The final variable collected at the county level is PCI. Per capita income varies
greatly in Tennessee. In 2006, per capita income in Tennessee ranged from just over
$16,000 (Hancock County) to nearly $50,000 (Williamson County). This wide range of
incomes leads to a wide margin of local school expenditures, even under an equalization
system. In general, we would expect there to be a positive relationship between PCI and
overall school expenditures. As income increases, the median voter’s ability to consume
both education and all other goods and services increases. The median voter’s budget
constraint shifts outward and their consumption of all goods, including education, are
expected to increase. This increased ability to consume leads districts with higher
incomes tend to have higher tastes for education spending, and they tend, therefore, to
have higher overall expenditures (See Card and Payne, 2002 and Baicker and Gordon,
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2006). While the relationship between PCI and total expenditures is expected to be
positive, a negative relationship between PCI and STATEFUNDING is anticipated under
an equalization scheme.
All other variables in the analysis are provided at the school district level. The
variable STUDENTS accounts for the number of students in each district and is measured
using average daily membership. This is a common measurement of school enrollment
used across the nation that measures the number of students who attend school each day
rather than the number of enrolled students. This variable is used to control for the
impact of the size of the district beyond what is used in the BEP calculation. It allows for
control of potential economies (or diseconomies) of scale related to education in
Tennessee. The BEP calculation required for most years in the analysis that school
districts provide 25 percent of classroom costs as determined by the BEP and 50 percent
of non-classroom costs. In the last two years of the analysis, the classroom cost
requirement for local districts increased to 35 percent. These amounts are controlled for
on a per-pupil basis via the variable REQSPENDINGPP.
RETENTION and SUSPENSION are utilized to control for student type.
RETENTION is measured as the percentage of students that are retained in each year.
This provides a basic measure of student outcomes. SUSPENSION measures student
behavior and is equal to the percentage of district students that are suspended in each
year. These districts are used to control for environmental factors associated with
education that may otherwise be unobservable, including student achievement and
behavior. Students with low educational outcomes and/or behavioral issues may be more
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expensive to educate and may require additional expenditures by the school district. The
bureaucrat may have to increase the budget of the school district further in order to
account for the existence of these students. PCTSPED also controls for student type and
is calculated as the percentage of district students that qualify for special education
services. Special education students are more expensive, on average, to educate than
non-special education students. A district with a high percentage of special education
students may have additional financial burdens that districts with very few special
education students do not have. A school district bureaucrat may have to adjust spending
on special education as the percentage of special education students in the school district
changes since the federal government does not fully fund special education programs.

1.F

Empirical Results
Table 1.4 presents three empirical models utilized to estimate local school district

expenditures throughout the period of analysis. Each of the three models utilizes panel
data fixed effect estimation.13 Hausman tests were conducted to ensure that the fixed
effect model was appropriate in each case. All results generally concur with the relevant
literature with results that conform to expectations. Model I presented in Table 1.4
represents the baseline empirical analysis introduced in Section IV. Several interesting
results emerge from the analysis. As expected, the results indicate that local funding
decreased during the phase-in period. Specifically, the findings show that local per pupil

13

The coefficients associated with the year fixed effects are eliminated from all results tables in the
analysis due to space considerations. In nearly all cases the year fixed effects were significant and became
more positive, or went from negative to positive, over the time period in question. Year fixed effects that
show a different pattern will be discussed in the text.
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spending decreased by $376.99 on average during the phase-in years. This is as expected
in accordance with theory, as the phase-in period was associated with a tremendous
increase in state funding, and with it, local funding and the nominal maintenance
requirement. In addition, the decrease in locally-provided revenues during the phase-in
period may have been exacerbated by low tastes for education and the fact that the BEPassociated rules were not binding until after the phase-in period. Local districts had the
freedom to reduce the growth in locally-provided revenues early on in the BEP
implementation process, knowing that the class size rule and teacher’s salary mandates
would not be enforced for five years.
The coefficient for NOMINALMOE is negative and highly significant. This
shows that the existence of the nominal maintenance requirement decreased local
funding, all else held constant. Specifically, it shows that a $100,000 increase in the
nominal maintenance of effort decreases local spending by $93.51 per pupil. Operating
from the means of these variables, the coefficient shows that a 0.7 percent increase in the
nominal spending requirement would decrease local spending by over4 percent. This fact
that the NOMINALMOE is a significant determinant of local spending provides
considerable credence to the use of a bureaucratic model. If the median voter model was
appropriate, the nominal spending requirement would not be a significant determinant of
spending.
The coefficient related to income (PCI) is positive and significant, showing that
although the BEP has improved equity considerably (see Essay 2), income still played a
significant role in the level of funds provided by the local government during the period
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of analysis. According to the results, a $1,000 increase in per capita income would result
in a real increase of $28 per pupil from local funds. This is expected with the BEP, since
the program did not limit the amount of money a local government could raise and did
not contain a ‘recapture’ mechanism. Therefore, wealthier districts are expected to spend
more on education at the local level than poorer districts.
The coefficients for PROPTAXBASE as well as HOMEVALUES are positive
and significant. This is expected as these variables impact the tax price the median voter
faces in terms of education expenditures. An increase in both PROPTAXBASE and
HOMEVALUES increases local per-pupil education spending. SALESTAXBASE is
insignificant in the model, but a related variable, LRATECAP, is positive and significant.
This variable represents whether or not the school district is at sales tax rate cap of 2.75
percent. The positive coefficient shows that districts at the cap spend more per pupil than
those who are not at the cap, all else constant.
The independent effect of an increase in state funds (STATEFUNDING) is a
significant decrease in locally-provided funds. More specifically, a $1.00 increase in
state funds, all else constant, results in a $0.37 decrease in locally-provided funds. In
other words, $0.63 of the grant from the state “sticks.” According to the model, the
positive impact of the state grant on spending is larger than the impact of an equivalent
increase in PCI. This shows that, all else constant, a $1.00 increase in PCI during the
time period would result in an increase in per pupil local spending of $0.03 while a $1.00
increase in state funding would result in a $0.63 increase.

54

The coefficient related to STATEFUNDING is in line with the flypaper effect
literature and is expected with the receipt of an intergovernmental grant. Empirical
evidence shows a general range of the flypaper effect from $0.25 to nearly $1.00 (See
Hines and Thaler (1995)). This result shows that local school districts decreased local
spending, or the growth of local spending, when state expenditures increased. Local
bureaucrats may have failed to increase local spending as they would have without the
implementation of the BEP and the influx of state funds. They could not decrease
nominal funds due to the nominal maintenance of effort requirement, but they could
choose to freeze nominal spending, which would certainly result in a decrease in real per
pupil spending as enrollment increased and prices rose via inflation. This decrease in
local funds reflects several potential aspects of bureaucratic behavior. First of all,
districts may have shifted local funds that would have been spent on education prior to
the increased state grant to other expenditure needs. Secondly, districts may have
decreased (or failed to increase) local tax effort with regard to the property of or sales tax.
According to Maher, et al. (2006), this was the result seen after the implementation of
school finance reform in Wisconsin, even though the program stated that tax effort would
be increased. They conclude that effort actually decreased with the implementation of
the new program.
The crowding out of funds is not an issue that is isolated to school expenditures.
Similar results have been found in other empirical analyses. Knight (2002) concludes
that federal highway grants crowd out state spending on highways. He also concludes
that the net result is little to no increase in overall highway spending. His analysis
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indicates that this result could be easily changed by altering the structure of the granting
program. Baicker and Jacobson (2007) examine police policy regarding the seizure of
drug-related funds. Many states have now passed laws in which local police can keep a
significant portion of the funds that they seize in drug related busts. They conclude that
the revenue from the state-level policy is offset by a decrease in local funding for police.
Their results suggest “that the ability to influence public agents through federal and state
laws is limited by the ability of local governments to divert funds to other uses” (Baicker
and Jacobson, 2007). Given the previous literature found both within and outside of the
education realm, the crowding out of local funds is expected within the boundaries set by
school finance policy.
The independent effect of federally-provided school spending is positive and
significant. Specifically, a $1.00 increase in federal education funding results in a $0.31
increase in local funding. This is likely related to the programs that receive federal
funding. The vast majority of federally provided education expenditures are related to
special education programs. The federal government, however, does not provide full
funding for these programs. Therefore, when the federal government gives $1 towards a
special education program, this typically necessitates an increase in local expenditures to
reach full program funding. Related to this is the variable PCTSPED, which measures
the percentage of students in each district that qualify for special education. As expected,
as the percentage of special education students increases, local funding increases as well.
Specifically, a one percentage point increase in the percentage of special education
students is associated with a $40.39 increase in local per pupil expenditures.
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The second model presented in Table1.4, Model II, is the same model as Model I
with the variables related to the sales tax base and price eliminated. This was done in
order to be more consistent with previous literature, which generally only considers
funding provided via the property tax even though local governments elsewhere typically
supplement local funding with non-property tax revenue. Even though a significant
portion of school districts throughout the country receive part of their funding via local
sales tax revenue, previous literature fails to control for the sales tax influence in most
cases (see Romer and Rosenthal, 1982 and Card and Payne, 2002). This is likely due to
two issues. Data on local sales tax revenues is difficult to collect and the information
regarding school district sales tax rates can be even more difficult to obtain. Secondly,
property tax revenue is still the primary funding mechanism for schools in most all states.
While state programs differ in structure, school districts in all states receive at least some
level of education funds via the property tax. Therefore, if the analysis is a national
examination of school funding, the property tax is the most consistent measure of local
tax burden for education.
The deletion of the sales tax variables does not lead to many significant
differences in the models. The coefficient of PHASEIN increases by a significant
amount, indicating that local funds decreased by $400.00 per pupil during the phase-in.
The variable PROPTAXBASEPP is positive and significant. The result indicates that a
$1,000 per pupil increase in property tax base results in a $3.00 increase in per pupil local
funding. Operating from the means, this shows that an increase in PROPTAXBASEPP
of approximately one percent increases LOCALFUNDING by approximately 0.1 percent.
57

This may reflect the fact that districts with a higher per pupil property tax base can raise
equivalent education revenues with reduced effort when compared to districts with lower
per pupil tax bases. The coefficient related to our key variables of NOMINALMOE and
STATEFUNDING are not significantly different in Models I and II.
Model I is the most preferred of the two because of the importance of including
variables related to both the sales tax and the property tax, as well as increased statistical
strength. As of 2006, nearly 40 percent of all local education funds came from local sales
tax revenues. Leaving sales tax figures out of the regression would not be appropriate
since the sales tax plays such an important role in local school finance in Tennessee.
An additional specification similar to Model I in Table 1.4 was run using the
standard median voter model and eliminating the control for the maintenance of effort
since this should have no impact under the traditional median voter model. Surprisingly,
these models performed almost identically to one another in the prediction of local
spending levels. Similarly to Chandler (2005) neither model can be shown statistically to
be preferred. The R-squared related to the bureaucratic model was slightly higher, and
predicted values were slightly more robust, but not at a level that was statistically
significant. However, from a policy standpoint, the statistical significance of
NOMINALMOE when included leads to the conclusion that the bureaucratic model
remains slightly preferred.
For a check of robustness, a log-log model was also investigated using log forms
of the same variables shown in the linear model. This was the model of choice in Romer
and Rosenthal’s models, although substantial model differences do not allow for a
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specific comparison of results. The log-log specification results in coefficients that can
be interpreted as elasticities. Because of the log transformation, any variables with a zero
value during the period of analysis were eliminated. In most cases the significance and
the sign of the variables is consistent, including NOMINALMOE and STATEFUNDS.
One interesting variable of note is SALESTAXBASE. When the log-log model is
estimated without the salestax base included, this elasticity is positive and significant..
The coefficient of PCT65 is negative and significant in Model III, but is not significant in
the other two models. This is consistent with much of the previous literature which
shows that an increase in the percentage of elderly residents decreases school
expenditures.
The presentation of the three models in Table 1.4 shows a great deal of
consistency with regard to the key variables in the analysis: PHASEIN,
NOMINALMOE, STATEFUNDING, and FEDFUNDING. These results are consistent
with the theoretical predictions and propositions presented previously. In addition, the
results show that the implementation of the BEP and the structure of the BEP led to
changes in local government behavior during the period of analysis. Based on the
previous flypaper effect literature this is expected, insofar as the local school district is
able to reduce local expenditures within the confines of the BEP regulations.
The existence of endogeneity was examined and tested for in each analysis, and it
was not found to be an issue. This is in line with recent literature regarding this issue.
Several recent studies have concluded that court-mandated school finance reform is
exogenous to current economic conditions within the state (see Baicker and Gordon
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(2006), Figlio et al. (2004), and Card and Payne (2002)). Each of these studies conclude
that the court mandate to reform the school finance system was exogenous to the prior
state economic conditions. Therefore, an endogeneity issue should not exist between
variables regarding education spending and variables controlling for the local economic
environment when spending variables are utilized as the dependent variable.

Alternate Specifications
The vast majority of the prior literature regarding the impact of school finance
reform on financial outcomes relies on Census of Governments data which limits the
analysis to an observation every fifth year (see Card and Payne, 2006 and Murray et al.,
1997). In addition, other examinations use even sparser data including decennial census
data or a one year cross section (see Maher, et al., 2006 and Romer and Rosenthal, 1982).
Using a sporadic panel of data is less than optimal for reasons discussed previously in the
literature review. In order to test the robustness of using Census of Governments data,
the Model I presented in Table 1.4 was repeated using only data from the years in which
the Census of Governments were conducted. For the dataset in question, this results in a
sporadic panel with data for the years 1992, 1997 and 2002. Results from the Census of
Governments specification are presented in Table 1.5. The variable PHASEIN was
excluded because this variable only takes a value in years 1993-1997, and would be
inappropriate when looking at a three year panel since the dummy variable would only
have a value of one in 1997.14

14

Year fixed effects were included in the analysis, any unusual variation seen in 1997 would be picked up
by the 1997 fixed effect coefficient. No such result was found.
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The results presented in Table 1.5 are mixed when compared to the model run
using the full panel of data. Many of the variables that were found to be significant when
examining the full panel lose their statistical significance when a sporadic panel is
utilized. These variables include NOMINALMOE, PROPTAXBASE, STUDENTS,
TEACHSALREAL, REQSPENDINGPP, PCT517, UNEMPRATE and SUSPENSION.
The results for this model are statistically different from the Model I.15 For a couple of
variables, including our key variable STATEFUNDS, the coefficient is very similar to
that found when using the entire panel, -0.379 for the sporadic panel compared to -0.371
for the complete panel. That is where the similarities end. More significantly,
NOMINALMOE is not significant, which might lead one to incorrectly reject the use of
the bureaucratic model.
These results show that caution should be used when a full panel of data is
unavailable. This is not surprising, since many policy and expenditure decisions can be
made at the local, state or federal level in between the five year intervals covered by the
Census of Governments. In the example of Tennessee, the time period between the 1992
Census of Governments and the 1997 Census of Governments encompassed nearly the
entire phase-in period of the BEP. Therefore, an analysis using Census of Governments
data would not pick up changes in local or state government behavior between those
years.16

15

This was determined via use of the F-test.
In addition an analysis was conducted that separated county-coterminous districts from city and special
school districts. Results were very similar to the results seen in the baseline empirical model. There were
no significant differences between the majority of the variables in the two models. There are two
exceptions. The variable PHASEIN was not significant in the county district model but is highly
significant in the city/special district model. The other difference lies in the STATEFUNDING coefficient.

16
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1.G

The Cost Differential Factor
The models previously presented do not include a breakdown of state level

expenditures. Specifically, it does not differentiate between state funds provided through
the standard BEP and those provided via the CDF. The CDF was implemented along
with the BEP in order to account for local cost differentials that might affect the costs of
delivering elementary and secondary education services. There are several reasons why
school districts may have responded differently to the standard BEP grant and the CDF.
First, different districts faced varied costs, from salary costs to the cost of locallypurchased supplies and services. Salaries in particular vary greatly in Tennessee, and it is
not surprising that teachers, janitors, and other school staff are paid more in high income
districts than they are in low income districts because schools confront a higher wage
structure. The CDF was intended to account for these cost differentials using a straightforward county wage index. Counties in which average weighted wages were greater
than 95 percent of the state’s average wage rate in Tennessee received additional funding
via the CDF.
Second, CDF funds were included as an add-on to the BEP formula for qualifying
school districts. These funds were not guaranteed from year to year to these school
districts; districts had to continue to qualify on a yearly basis. In addition, any CDF
funds spent were subject to the overall maintenance of effort requirement. This may have
led to behavioral effects that differed based on the continued receipt of CDF funds. The
choices made by local governments pertaining to locally provided school funds may have
The county districts decrease local funds per pupil by a statistically larger amount when state funds
increase than city/special school districts do (coefficients of -0.466 for county districts and -0.236 for
city/special school districts).
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also differed based on the confidence school districts had that their receipt of CDF funds
would continue. If school districts were relatively confident that they would receive
money via the CDF on a continuing basis and that the Tennessee legislature would
continue CDF funding, they may have been more likely to establish programs that would
be required to utilize CDF funds in future years. Districts who barely qualified for the
CDF in one year may have been much less likely to pass the entire CDF grant on to
education expenditures for fear that they could not maintain that level of spending if they
did not receive CDF funds in the following year.
CDF Funding Patterns

The CDF adjustment amounted to a considerable increase in state-provided
education resources for some systems. The Memphis School District received the largest
amount of funds from the CDF in each year included in this analysis, totaling $60.9
million in 2006. To put this figure into perspective, this is roughly enough money to fund
food services and the Board of Education budget for the Memphis school district for the
2005-2006 school year.
During the 2005-06 school year, 10 states including Tennessee had mechanisms
in their school finance funding formulas to account for cost differences across districts.
These states include Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, Ohio,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and Wyoming. Some of the formulas provided cost-adjusted
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funds for all districts, while others—including Tennessee—only rewarded a subset of all
systems. The basic premise of each state’s program is discussed below.17
Alaska: Uses an index known as the Area Cost Differential (ACD). The ACD is only
applied to non-teacher personnel costs and administrative costs. (Teacher salaries do not
vary significantly between school districts in Alaska.) The district cost factor is
calculated by comparing the cost of running an identical school (same type of students,
same teachers, etc.) in Anchorage. Schools located in Anchorage are assigned a base
value of 1.00. Other school districts are assigned higher figures to account for their
increasingly rural locations. The state then adjusts basic need by the district cost factor.
Rural schools in Alaska generally face increased costs due to transportation and climate
considerations.
California: The state uses cost of living information published on U.S. metropolitan
areas by the U.S. Department of Commerce to adjust the annual revenue limits used in
the district funding formulas. The funding amount given to all California districts is
adjusted to reflect the cost of living.
Colorado: The Cost of Living Factor (CLF) is calculated every two years by comparing
the differences in the cost of housing, goods and services in each of Colorado’s school
districts. This factor is then incorporated into the Personnel Costs Factor (PCF) which
uses historical information along with the CLF. The PCF is applied to the portion of state
funding that is allocated towards personnel.
Florida: The District Cost Differential (DCD) is calculated using a two-step method.
The Florida Price Level Index (FPLI) is calculated in the first step. It is a county-level
index that is based on a standard basket of consumer goods, similar to the consumer price
index. After the FPLI is determined, the DCD is calculated by taking the average FPLI
for each district for the past three years. The DCD is then applied (via the funding
formula) to the basic per student funding.
Massachusetts: The state uses a wage adjustment factor that accounts for cost of living
and salary expectation differences across school districts. Districts located in geographic
areas associated with higher than average wages receive additional funding. The wage
adjustment factor is calculated using average wage data collected by the Massachusetts
Department of Employment. The calculation is based on the labor market area rather
than the county or city where the district is located.

17

Generally see Thompson and Silvernail (2001), National Center for Education Statistics (2001) and State
of New York (2000). For Florida see Bureau of Economics and Business Research (2007) and for Texas
see Alexander et al. (2001).
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Ohio: The cost adjustment factor in Ohio is known as the Cost-of-Doing-Business
Factor. It is based on an index of all hourly wages for the county in which the school
district is located as well as the school district’s contiguous counties. The range of index
values is limited by state law, which creates an Adjusted Cost-of-Doing-Business Factor.
This factor is multiplied by district membership and the formula funding amount.
Texas: The Cost of Education Index is used to account for varying costs beyond the
control of Texas school districts. The index takes into account district size, county
population, the percentage of low-income students and teacher salaries.
Virginia: The state adjusts their funding formula for nine high-cost school districts in
northern Virginia near Washington, D.C. As of 2006, a 9.83 percent add-on was given
for instructional salaries and a 19.07 percent add-on was given for support salaries.
These percentages are adjusted by the Virginia Legislature as they see fit. This factor is
known as the “Cost of Competing Factor.”
Wyoming: The funding formula is adjusted to account for differences in costs across
school districts. The adjustment is based on an index calculated by comparing consumer
prices. Prices of 140 different consumer goods including housing, food and
transportation are considered.
On average, ten counties qualified for the CDF each year between 1992 and 2006.
As shown in Figure 1.9, six of these counties (10 districts) in Tennessee received the
CDF in each of the fourteen years, while eleven additional counties (20 districts) received
the CDF at least once during that period.
As a part of the BEP, the CDF was calculated at the county level. Therefore, in
counties that qualified for CDF funds and contained more than one school district, all
districts within the county received the CDF. For example, if Anderson County received
CDF funds, then the Clinton and Oak Ridge city school systems also received CDF
funds. The CDF determined the percentage of funds to be provided to school districts
above and beyond the base funding of salaries and benefits identified by the BEP funding
formula. Therefore, if Anderson County received an additional 14 percent of funds via
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the CDF, the Clinton and Oak Ridge schools also received a 14 percent increase in
funding.
Figure 1.10 shows the geographical pattern of the counties receiving additional
money via the CDF. As revealed by the figure, most school districts receiving CDF
funds were located in or around one of Tennessee’s largest cities: Chattanooga,
Knoxville, Memphis and Nashville. This is not surprising considering that the CDF is
calculated using a wage index. Average wages, as well as overall per capita personal
income, tend to be higher in these metropolitan areas.
Figure 1.11 shows the current spending levels of districts broken down by
whether or not they received CDF funds. Districts that received CDF funds generally
spent more on education per student even prior to the implementation of the BEP. On
average, districts that received extra funds via the CDF spent 19 percent more per pupil
than districts that did not receive CDF funds between 1992-1993 and 2005-2006.
Districts that received CDF funds in all fifteen years spent an average of 6.0 percent more
than districts that receive CDF funds in some, but not all, of the years since BEP
implementation. In the four years prior to the institution of the CDF (and the BEP) these
same districts spent an average of only 1.9 percent more. The average increase in
funding via the CDF was 4.8 percent per student across all years of our analysis. Not
surprisingly, districts that consistently received CDF funds qualified for a larger
percentage increase in revenues. Districts that received the CDF funding in each year
saw an average increase of 5.4 percent per student while districts that received CDF
funds in only some years received an average increase of 2.7 percent per student. A wide
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array of factors may explain these spending differentials other than receipt of the CDF as
is discussed more fully below.
Counties were not guaranteed CDF funds from year to year, which created some
uncertainty for the school districts. While some counties, such as Williamson County,
could reasonably expect to receive CDF funds on a year-to-year basis, other counties
could not make such an assumption. The actual and potential variability of the CDF may
have affected the spending decisions of school district bureaucrats. For example, Shelby
County, which qualified for CDF funds in all years, could reasonably make budget
decisions assuming that they would continue to receive some additional funds through the
CDF.18 Other counties that received CDF funds on an irregular basis, on the other hand,
might have chosen to avoid any long-term funding commitments, such as hiring new
employees or instituting ongoing programs, which would have been supported by the
CDF because of funding uncertainties. Therefore, if funding is uncertain, local
bureaucrats may not want to make a commitment to spending the same amount the
following year regardless of CDF receipt.
All districts receiving CDF funds would have spent their complete CDF allocation
provided by the state. But like the basic BEP grant discussed above, CDF funding would
allow a local district to reduce its tax effort or reallocate its own funds to other spending
programs as long as the nominal maintenance of effort requirement was satisfied.
Because it is part of BEP funding and not a separate grant, the CDF also required the
local matching of classroom and non-classroom funds previously discussed. The

18

While Williamson and Shelby Counties could count on qualifying for CDF funds, even these counties
were subject to the vagaries of the legislative cycle which determined the level of CDF funding.
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majority of the money, $1.8 billion provided via the BEP, was provided to the districts
that received CDF funds in all years. The remainder was paid to the 20 school districts
who inconsistently received revenue through the CDF.
Figure 1.12 shows both the average amount of real CDF funds measured on a per
pupil basis as well as the number of school districts receiving funds via the CDF between
1993 and 2006. The number of school districts qualifying for the CDF (measured on the
right axis) decreased slightly after reaching its peak in 1996. In the first year of the BEP,
19 Tennessee school districts received CDF funds with an average grant of $256.71 per
pupil. The peak of CDF funding was 1999, with an average CDF amount of $343.36 per
student. By 2006, this number fell to an average of $281.32 a student.
While some Tennessee school districts lost CDF funding, or saw significant
decreases, there were also some Tennessee school districts that had significant increases
in CDF funds over time. In 1993, Williamson County received $266.42 per pupil via the
CDF adjustment. In 2006, Williamson County received $524.19 per pupil. In 1993,
CDF funds accounted for 5.1 percent of current per pupil spending in Williamson
County. In 2006, this had risen to 7.8 percent.

The Impact of the CDF on Current Spending

An important policy question that remains is how the receipt of CDF funds
affected current education spending. All districts receiving the CDF could account for
the complete disbursement of their grant allocation. However, it is possible that CDF
funds simply supplanted, in part or in whole, local funds that would have been provided
beyond the maintenance of effort requirement. Because money is fungible, grant
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proceeds might have been used to support spending in other programmatic areas of the
local government budget or to lower local tax rates. This would be consistent with the
flypaper effect discussed above in the context of the BEP phase-in, where governments in
receipt of a grant from a higher level of government increase overall spending by less
than the amount of the grant. While this response on the part of local governments may
not have been the intent of the policy, it is nonetheless a possible outcome.
The variation in funding levels and districts receiving CDF funds may also affect
local government spending. In particular, one would expect to see a smaller increment in
spending in districts where the presence or absence of CDF funding was inconsistent
from year to year. This is due to the fact that school districts might have been hesitant to
increase spending in one year when they had a good reason to believe that funding might
disappear or be reduced in the subsequent year. On the other hand, districts who
consistently received CDF funds each year would be less fearful of the loss of funds and
thus more likely to spend a greater share of their state grant.
The empirical model shown previously was augmented in order to examine the
potential impact CDF funding had on state and local education funding. This analysis
includes four years of data before the implementation of the BEP, with data ranging from
1989 until 2006. The estimated equations used real per pupil current education
expenditures across school districts, inclusive of CDF funds, as the dependent variable.
A number of control variables were utilized, many of which have been described in
previous sections. Newly introduced control variables include CDFFUNDS which
measures real, per-pupil CDF funds provided by the state, and
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NONCDFSTATEFUNDING, which measures state provided funds (STATEFUNDING)
minus CDFUNDS received from the state.19
Two additional variables SOMETIMES and ALWAYS are dummy variables
which reflect a district’s propensity to receive CDF funds. SOMETIMES measures the
amount of CDF funds received by districts who received CDF funds in some years of the
analysis, on an inconsistent basis. ALWAYS measures the amount of CDF funds
received by school districts who received funds via the CDF consistently during the
period of analysis20 These variables are employed in order to investigate whether these
districts behaved differently when receiving CDF funds. More specifically, this allows
for an analysis regarding the impact uncertainty may have had in the expenditure of CDF
funds. If CDF funds were fully expended with no reduction in spending from local
sources, the coefficient of the variable CDFFUNDS should be 1 since the dependent
variable is inclusive of the CDF funds: every CDF dollar received should be directly
reflected in spending. If the flypaper effect is present, then this coefficient should be
greater than that associated with PCI, and is expected to be greater than zero but less than
1. This would mean that for every dollar of state aid received, current spending increased
by less than a dollar. The coefficient for the interaction term ALWAYSINT should also
be 1 if funds are fully passed on to spending. This is not expected, however, due to the
flypaper effect literature and the results found in previous sections showing local fund
19

The preceding analyses in this essay measured state funding in sum (STATEFUNDING) and did not
differentiate between the types of state funding. This portion breaks down STATEFUNDING into two
categories: general BEP funds (NONCDFSTATEFUNDING) and CDF funds (CDFFUNDS).
20
. If a district received funds via the CDF in only one or two years consecutively, they are given a value
of one for the dummy variable SOMETIMES. In addition, if a district lost the CDF during the time period
analyzed, after a significant time of receipt, they are given a value of one for SOMETIMES in subsequent
years. Districts who received CDF funds in all years or in more than two years consecutively are given a
value of one for the variable ALWAYS during that period.
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depreciation when state funds increase. Based on the discussion above, the coefficient
related to SOMETIMESINT should be smaller than the coefficient on ALWAYSINT. In
other words, it is expected that current spending will be stimulated more in districts with
ongoing CDF funding than in districts with sporadic CDF funding.
Table 1.6 presents a model measuring the impact of CDF funds on current per
pupil expenditures. Model I utilizes the variable CDFFUNDS as well as SOMETIMES
and ALWAYS to examine this relationship. Based on the empirical flypaper effect
literature, and prior studies regarding state grants for public education, there is an
expectation that overall current spending will rise by an amount that is less than the value
of the CDF but is greater than a current spending increase associated with an equivalent
rise in income. The results confirm this hypothesis. Specifically, the estimates show that
holding all else constant districts that received the CDF add approximately 9.0 percent of
CDF funds to their current per pupil expenditures (see Model I in Table 1.6). This is a
much larger increase in spending than that associated with PCI, which has a coefficient of
0.014 in the model. The coefficient related to CDFFUNDS funds means that the
remaining 11.0 cents of every grant dollar received is used to support spending in other
areas of the local government budget, support tax relief for local taxpayers or some
combination of these responses. As with the BEP discussed above, insofar as the overall
maintenance of effort requirement was satisfied, this would free up funds from one year
to the next to accommodate lower tax effort or greater spending elsewhere in the local
budget. Interestingly, by comparing the coefficients for CDFFUNDS and
NONCDFSTATEFUNDING in Model I we can see that a $1 increase in CDF funds led
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to a larger increase in per pupil spending than did a $1 increase in other state funds (a
$0.89 increase versus a $0.70 increase). Figure 1.11 previously showed that districts that
received the CDF spent more per pupil than districts that never received the CDF funds
even in the years preceding the implementation of the BEP, and with it the CDF. This
indicates that these districts may have higher tastes for public education than non-CDF
recipient districts. It is also conceivable that they faced higher costs since controlling this
occurrence was the intent of including the CDF as a part of the BEP. Therefore, it is not
surprising that CDF receiving school districts passed a higher percentage of BEP funds
into per pupil expenditures, all else constant.
The analysis also shows that the two groups—those districts that always received
CDF funds and those that received CDF funds in only some years—did not have
statistically different levels of per-pupil current spending. The results in Model I indicate
that the consistency of CDF fund receipt did not have a statistically significant impact on
per-pupil spending. Per pupil expenditures are expected to increase with the receipt of a
grant from the state via the flypaper effect. However, there is no theoretical certainty
regarding what will happen to local spending as the grant is provided. In order to
investigate this further, an additional analysis was conducted examining the impact of
CDF fund receipt on locally provided revenues. Once again, it is hypothesized that
districts receiving funds in all years may have a different behavioral response to districts
that receive CDF funds on an inconsistent basis. Table 1.7 presents these results.
Model II presents the model utilizing per pupil CDF revenues as a control
variable to explain locally provided per pupil revenues. The model shows that an
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increase in the CDF does not produce a statistically positive impact on locally provided
revenues. The variable representing state funds in Model II excludes those funds
provided via the CDF (NONCDFSTATEFUNDS). The coefficient related to this
variable is negative and significant, and shows that a $1.00 increase in non-CDF related
state funds (after controlling for other variables, including the maintenance of effort
requirement) leads to a $0.42 decrease in local funds. Therefore, approximately $0.58 of
the $1.00 grant “sticks” a la the Flypaper Effect.
As in previous models, the existence of the maintenance of effort requirement, all
else equal, decreases locally provided revenues. The coefficient of NOMINALMOE in
Model II is larger, in absolute terms, than in the models in previous sections that did not
control for CDFFUNDS. Once again, this follows the theory presented in the beginning
of this analysis, in which a higher reversion level decreases the maximum amount of
funding that will be approved by the median voter. So, why would controlling for the
CDF increase the impact of NOMINALMOE? This is likely because districts who
receive the CDF are in high wage areas and likely have higher tastes for education than
many non-CDF recipient districts. This can be seen by analyzing the spending patterns
of CDF recipient districts before the institution of the BEP (See Figure 1.11). Therefore,
districts who receive CDF funding are less likely to have spending levels at or near the
reversion level than low wage districts. If those districts with higher wages are less likely
to decrease the growth in spending due to the nominal maintenance of effort, then the
coefficient of NOMINALMOE may have been biased upward when the CDF was not
specifically controlled for in previous models.
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According to Model II, both districts who always receive CDF funds and
sometimes receive CDF funds statistically alter local spending due to the CDF grant.
Districts who receive CDF funds on an inconsistent basis decrease local funding by a
statistically larger margin than do districts who consistently receive CDF funds. This
result conforms to expectations described previously. Districts who receive these funds
in all years may take their receipt of the CDF as given, and may not change spending
allocations due to CDF receipt. Conversely, districts who receive the CDF on an
inconsistent basis, may doubt future receipt, and will likely be more hesitant to increase
spending to a level that cannot be supported without CDF receipt. How one reacts to
these findings on the CDF will depend on what view is held regarding the intent of CDF
program itself. Consider first those districts that received CDF funds for all fourteen
years. If the intent was to stimulate funding in high-cost jurisdictions above the level that
would have otherwise prevailed, then the CDF was modestly successful since each grant
dollar increased current spending by slightly less than $0.50. Similarly, if the grant was
intended to compensate local districts for the high costs they incur in providing education
services, then the CDF was also effective since it freed up about 50 cents of every grant
dollar to support spending elsewhere or to support tax relief.

1.H

Tax Effort Analysis
Tax rates in Tennessee vary considerably from county to county and district to

district. Two taxes primarily fund K-12 education in Tennessee: the sales tax and the
property tax. As of 2006, around 60 percent of local school funding was provided via the
property tax. In order to increase local education spending (without the aid of an
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enrollment increase or an increase in tax base), districts must increase their tax effort, the
extent to which they tax the available base.
Not surprisingly, districts with relatively higher per pupil education expenditures
typically have relatively high levels of tax effort. In theory, these levels of tax efforts
could be affected due to the implementation of school finance reform. In a study
specifically analyzing Wisconsin’s most recent school finance reform, Maher et al.
(2006) find that the reform did not alter the disparities in tax effort across the state. Tax
effort was not significantly altered even though this was a stated goal of Wisconsin’s
reform. Wisconsin’s school finance system incorporates a recapture mechanism in which
revenues collected above a set amount are ‘recaptured’ by the state. This discourages
districts with high level of expenditures from increasing their tax effort since some of
those funds may be recaptured. Tennessee’s program lacks a recapture mechanism, so
the impact on tax effort may be quite different than the result found in Wisconsin. The
analyses that follow examine whether or not the increase in state funds over the time
period, and specifically during the BEP phase in, was a significant determinant of district
level tax effort.
School district and county government bureaucrats have some degree of
flexibility when determining the tax liability that their residents will confront. This
flexibility varies based on the residents’ toleration of tax increases and tax statute limits.
For example, some areas may have such a high taste for education that voting residents
would prefer a local sales tax rate of 3.0 percent. However, since the law caps local tax
rates at 2.75 percent, the local government cannot levy a 3.0 percent tax. This locality
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will have to look to the property tax in order to increase the tax rate. Currently there is no
statute limit on property taxation; however there has historically been considerable
aversion to higher tax burdens. Tennessee has one of the lowest average tax burdens in
the United States, and its residents have historically been relatively tax averse.
An interesting question is how local tax effort responded to school finance
reform. Results in the previous section showed that local school spending decreases as
state school funding increases. In addition, results showed that local spending decreased
during the phase-in period, relative to other years in the analysis. The question remains
as to how districts decreased the funds. Did they divert money otherwise reserved for
schools to other programs or did they actually decrease tax rates faced by residents in the
district? They may have also chosen to increase property or sales tax rates at a slower
rate than they would have without the institution of the BEP. Examining the pattern of
tax effort during the period of analysis will help to explain what may have happened
throughout the existence of the BEP, and in the years leading up to the program.
Tax effort is always difficult to measure, and it is especially difficult when more
than one tax is used to fund the expenditure category. Such is the case with education
expenditures in Tennessee since both the sales and property tax are used to generate local
education funds. Tax effort for this examination has been calculated as sales tax effort
alone, property tax effort alone, and combined tax effort. The method used follows
Chervin (2007). His method is especially developed to accommodate the measurement
of tax effort in Tennessee. He uses the representative tax system method in which, the
average tax rate in the state is applied to the relevant base in order to obtain potential
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revenues raised at the average tax rate. These potential revenues are then compared to
the actual revenues collected by the jurisdiction. Tax effort is measured as the ratio of
actual revenues to potential revenues under a relative tax system (see also Tannenwald,
1999).
Property tax rates in Tennessee are specific to the school district in which the
resident resides. Each county sets a property tax rate, and city and special school districts
are able to levy a tax above and beyond the county level. The property tax base in each
school district is measured as the total assessed value of all property in the district. This
includes all classes of property. The rate used in all calculations is the effective property
tax rate. This rate can be interpreted as the amount of tax collected per $100 of assessed
property value. Therefore, a rate of 2.6 would mean that $2.60 would be collected for
each $100 of assessed value. To take it a bit further, $100,000 worth of assessed property
value in a county would result in $2,600 worth of property tax revenues.
The variables PROPRATE and LSALESRATE represent the property tax rate and
local sales tax rate respectively. Local school districts are able to set their own property
tax rates. Districts that are not coterminous with the county receive property tax revenue
from both the county levied tax rate and the school district specific rate. This rate is not
capped in Tennessee, and can be raised as high as local residents allow via the political
process. The local sales tax is set quite differently. The state sales tax rate on non-food
purchases in Tennessee is 7.0 percent. County governments are able to levy an additional
tax up to 2.75 percent. Therefore, the highest rate a jurisdiction can have in total is 9.75
percent. If a county chooses to levy less than the allowed 2.75 percent, school districts
77

that are not county-coterminous can levy up to the 2.75 percent mark. As of 2006, 50 out
of 135 school districts were at the 2.75 percent cap. Only three districts had local sales
tax rates below 2.0 percent. Local school expenditures come from both property and
sales tax revenues. Although the percentages vary from district to district, approximately
60 percent of locally provided education revenues come from property tax levies and 40
percent come from sales tax revenues. This analysis improves on previous studies as
many of them neglect the importance of local sales taxes in the funding of schools.
The previous models in this essay have confirmed the hypothesis that local
funding for schools decreased as a result of the increase in state provided education
funds, all else constant. Local governments could have used the funds otherwise reserved
for education spending in a number of ways. They may have diverted local funds for
education to other local government expenditures needs. They also may have decreased
local tax effort in response to the increase in state funding. Maher et al. (2006) conclude
that this was the local response to school finance reform in Wisconsin. The increase in
state funds allows districts to decrease local tax effort (or to fail to increase tax effort)
while still increasing overall education spending in the district. The Wisconsin reform
expressly stated that local tax effort would be improved and would not be decreased, yet
the evident shows that local tax effort was not maintained as desired. Since the
Tennessee reform did not require a maintenance of tax effort, Tennessee school districts
may have had a similar response.
The following empirical examination investigates the changes in tax effort across
Tennessee in response to the BEP. The models utilize three measures of effort as the
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dependent variable: property tax effort, sales tax effort and combined tax effort. Control
variables include many of the variables utilized previously. The measure used for
combined tax effort is calculated by adding the potential levels of sales and property tax
revenue and dividing it by the amount of property and sales tax revenue collected by the
district. This shows the level of effort expended by each school district across schoolspecific taxes.
Table 1.8 presents the results of each of the three tax effort models. All three
dependent variables are examined using a panel data, fixed effect model using both year
and district fixed effects.21 The levels of PROPRATE and SALESRATE have been
lagged when included in the models in order to deal with the endogeneity associated with
tax rates and tax effort.22 In order to make the results shown more manageable, the tax
effort figures have been multiplied by 1,000.
The results presented in Table 1.8 differ considerably based on the measure of tax
effort employed. This shows the importance of examining effort in all taxes used to fund
the expenditure in question. The property tax effort model presented in Table 1.8 uses
property tax effort as the dependent variable. In this model a negative and significant
relationship can be seen between property tax effort and the phase-in period. In addition,
a negative relationship exists between real per capita income and property tax effort as
well as property tax effort and property tax base. This is not surprising as a wealthier
district with a larger property tax base would have higher property values, and would not
need to tax residents at a high rate to earn average revenues. This highlights one of the
21

Hausman tests confirmed in each case that the fixed effects model was the preferred approach.
A Hausman test showed that the issue of endogeneity was eliminated via lagging the property and sales
tax rate.

22
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main differences between sales tax and property tax at the local level. Some districts,
especially those in urban areas, are able to export a large percentage of their sales tax
burden to residents of other school districts. A large percentage of retail sales in urban or
tourist areas come from those who reside outside of the county. Therefore, it is not
surprising that a strong relationship is not found between sales tax effort and income (see
the sales tax effort model that follows). The property tax burden is much more difficult
for most districts to export (except maybe those in areas with a significant percentage of
second homes). Therefore, we expect districts with wealthier residents to have a much
easier time raising money via the property tax than districts with poorer residents. It
would be surprising to see an insignificant relationship between income and property tax
effort because of this relationship.
The property tax model shows a negative relationship between state-provided
education funds and property tax effort. Previously presented expenditure models
showed a negative relationship between state-provided funds and locally-provided funds.
This adds depth to that analysis by demonstrating that an increase in state funds for
education allows school districts to decrease their property tax effort. The coefficients
associated with the year fixed effects were consistently positive and significant in the
property tax effort model from 1998 until 2006. Prior to 1998 year fixed effects are only
significant in two years, 1993 and 1994, and both coefficients are negative.
Another interesting result remains in this model. Having a higher percentage of
both young residents (5 -17 years old) and older residents (65 plus years old) increases
the district’s property tax effort. After closer examination, these results are as would be
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expected. Younger residents do not own homes, and therefore, cannot pay property
taxes. Further, having a higher percentage of school age children in a district may force
school districts to tax their base more heavily in order to raise ample per pupil revenues.
In addition, older residents tend to live in homes with lower assessed values than nonelderly residents. Therefore, having a high percentage of both of these age groups will
likely lower the district’s ability to raise revenue via the property tax.
The second model presented uses sales tax effort as the dependent variable. The
results show that, after controlling for other factors, school district sales tax effort
decreased during the phase in period, from 1992-93 until 1996-97. This may partially
explain the results found in the expenditure analyses previously presented. Previous
results showed that locally provided spending, all else equal, decreased during the phase
in period. However, the previous model could not explain the manner in which this took
place. It was not possible to tell if it was due simply to the shifting of funds, or if funds
were reduced via a reduction in tax effort.
Results in Table 1.8 also show that sales tax effort is not statistically impacted by
an increase in state funds. This shows that any decrease in overall tax effort during the
period of analysis was generally driven by a decrease in tax effort with respect to the
property tax. The level of federal funds is also insignificant. This is expected, as federal
fund provision is exogenous to most influences and is primarily provided for special
education funding. According to the sales tax effort model, having a higher percentage of
young residents lowers the district’s sales tax effort. After controlling for per capita
income and the other control variables utilized, more school age children means lower
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school district sales tax effort. This may seem surprising since having a higher
percentage of younger residents puts greater pressure on the local school district.
However, families with young children tend to spend a high percentage of their income,
which may lessen the districts need for increased sales tax effort. Because of this, a
community with a large percentage of families may not have to maintain as high of a
level of effort as a community without a large percentage of school age residents.
The third model in Table 1.8 presents the combined measure of tax effort that
unites both property and sales tax effort into a single measure. This measure is the
strongest of the three, and gives the best overall picture of the true impact of the BEP on
tax effort in Tennessee. However, there is a tradeoff, as using the combined measure
forces both effects (sales and property) into a single coefficient, which limits the models
ability to examine specific tax effort impacts. The combined measure shows a negative
and significant relationship between the phase-in period and overall tax effort. This is
not surprising given the results found in the first two models. This finding also
corresponds well with previous models in which the phase in alone was shown above to
have a negative effect on local education expenditures. Together the tax effort and local
revenue collection results indicate that overall tax effort decreased during the BEP phasein period. In addition to a decrease in local tax effort, local revenues may have been
diverted to other spending categories within local government during the phase-in
window.23

23

These results are partially confirmed by an analysis using data for a subsample of counties obtained from
the U.S. Census Bureau. Results are not shown due to the lack of information regarding sampling
techniques and the incomplete nature of the dataset. The regressions examined local spending categories
controlling for a variety of different factors, including the introduction of the BEP grant. The coefficient
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In the combined tax effort model in Table 1.8 it is shown that the nominal
maintenance of effort requirement and tax effort are significantly and negatively related.
This follows the expenditure models previously presented, which showed a negative
relationship between the maintenance of effort (the reversion level) and local spending.
In addition, a negative relationship between overall district tax effort and state funds, per
capita income and teacher salaries is shown. Positive coefficients are shown for other
significant variables including the percentage of residents in both age groups, the number
of students, and the unemployment rate.
The results for the combined effort model mirror the property tax effort model
much more than they do the sales tax effort model. This is likely due to the fact that the
majority of local education revenues continue to come from the levy of the local property
tax. However, the differences in the property tax and sales tax effort models emphasize
the importance of including all important taxes in the effort calculation. Results from
models not fully utilizing data from all tax sources must be considered less than optimal,
since a significant amount of local education funding comes from multiple tax sources.

1.I

Conclusion
The analyses contained in this essay reinforce previous studies regarding the impact

of intergovernmental grants on school expenditures. Consistent with the empirical
flypaper effect literature, a grant received from a higher level of government results in an
overall increase in spending that is greater than what would be seen with an equivalent
of the BEP grant variable had a positive sign indicating the BEP was associated with higher spending on
highways and public buildings at the local level. The Census public buildings category does not include
school buildings.
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increase in income. Empirical research has shown that the amount of the spending
increase is greater than zero but less than the full amount of the grant. While the state
instituted the nominal maintenance of effort requirement in order to prevent districts from
decreasing locally-provided spending, a nominally based requirement does not prevent
the decrease of real spending, especially when it fails to account for enrollment growth.
Further, as shown by both the theoretical and empirical models, the nominal maintenance
of effort requirement may actually cause an independent decrease in education spending
as district bureaucrats are unable to set a reversion level of spending low enough to
induce the median voter to increase spending to the bureaucratically desired level.
Indeed each statistical analysis shows the negative relationship between spending and the
maintenance of effort requirement. A negative relationship between the phase-in period
and spending (or effort) is also commonly observed. This is likely due to two factors:
the delayed enforcement of class size and teacher salary mandates and the sharp increase
in the maintenance of effort requirement during the phase-in years (due to the increased
classroom and non-classroom match calculated under the BEP).
There are numerous policy implications that accompany this analysis. First of all,
the institution of a nominal maintenance of effort requirement does not maintain spending
levels in real terms and actually causes a decrease in locally-provided real per pupil
expenditures over the time period analyzed. A real, per-pupil maintenance of effort
requirement would likely do a much better job of maintaining school spending levels
across the state. Secondly, education expenditures from local sources decreased during
the phase-in period of the BEP, from 1993-1997, all else constant. The state of
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Tennessee had little choice but to phase in BEP funding because of the sudden policy
change and the Supreme Court decision. However, having such a long period of phasein, especially for the new class size and teacher salary rules, may have led to greater
uncertainty regarding these policies and bureaucratic hesitancy in spending money to
comply with the new regulations.
In addition to these policy inferences, the existence of the CDF and the lack of a
regulation regarding district tax effort also led to changes in local spending that may or
may not have been desired or expected. It is hard to imagine that the state of Tennessee
desired for districts who consistently received the CDF to behave differently than those
who didn’t, especially if wage costs really differed related to those who did not receive
the CDF. However, the CDF may have been instituted for political gain in order to
please the large counties who were by and large seen as the losers in the move to the
BEP. These districts generally received the CDF, and therefore had less uncertainty
regarding receipt. So, by making these districts content they may have achieved their
political goal. Similarly, while controlling tax effort may have led to a more equitable
distribution of spending, it may have limited wealthy districts’ ability to spend on
education in accordance with their tastes for education. These analyses point out the
importance of close examination of all institutional factors, as they each play a significant
role in the bureaucrat’s and median voter’s determination of education spending at the
local level.
It is impossible to accurately predict what the outcomes would have been if the
BEP was not phased in or if class size and teacher salary mandates were immediately
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enforced. In addition, one cannot tell what difference it would have made if the state of
Tennessee had instituted a real per pupil maintenance of effort requirement or a true tax
effort requirement as is seen in many other states’ programs. Given the evidence
presented, it is likely that either of these maintenance of effort programs would perform
better than Tennessee’s nominal maintenance requirement as long as the goal of that
requirement is to prevent districts from decreasing local spending as state funds increase.
While Tennessee’s nominal maintenance of effort requirement may prop up spending
levels in districts with low tastes for education, it may have also decreased the ability of
bureaucrats in wealthy districts to take part in agenda control (a la Romer and Rosenthal)
which may have increased spending further.
School finance reform is a constantly evolving phenomenon. New reforms
continue to be proposed and instituted across the country each year. While the first court
cases had equity underpinnings, the newest court challenges are adequacy based. It is
highly unlikely that Tennessee has seen the last of their school finance court challenges,
especially since Tennessee has avoided an adequacy case up to this point. Other states
are dealing with very similar issues and can potentially learn a great deal from
Tennessee’s experience.
The General Assembly in Tennessee introduced the BEP 2.0 in the 2007
legislative session and instituted it in Tennessee school districts during the 2007-2008
school year. The new program has a simplified formula that is no longer based on a
regression analysis. Additionally, the CDF has been eliminated and teacher salaries are
being improved further under the BEP 2.0. For now the nominal maintenance of effort
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requirement remains. As time goes on, and data becomes available for the years under
the BEP 2.0, new analyses will be necessitated in order to examine the change from the
BEP to the BEP 2.0 and to investigate whether this change led to a more efficient and
equitable school financing system in Tennessee. However, since the BEP 2.0 is relatively
similar to the original BEP, it is somewhat doubtful that significant changes will be seen.
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Figure 1.10
CDF Receipt Across Tennessee
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Figure 1.12
CDF Funding Per Pupil
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Table 1.1
Nominal vs. Real Revenue
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Table 1.2
Summary Statistics of Revenue Measures
Variable
CURSPENDING

1989-2006
$5,557.37
($1096.16)

1989
$4,161.88
($718.41)

1998
$5,643.49
($738.94)

2006
$6,670.72
($770.72)

LOCALFUNDING

$2,035.82
($1027.26)

$1,720.84
($792.26)

$2,015.76
($991.23)

$2,351.82
($1260.64)

STATEFUNDING

$3,188.91
($764.80)

$2,192.20
($197.33)

$3,582.10
($488.17)

$3,924.97
($685.31)

FEDFUNDING

$663.81
($267.81)

$501.78
($188.32)

$621.56
($196.94)

$904.47
($265.96)

*The mean of the variable is shown with standard deviation in parentheses.
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Table 1.3
Summary Statistics
Variable

1989-2006

1989

1998

2006

$13,844.07
($27,077.02)

-

$15,427.72
($27,492.02)

$21,840.05
($38,214.85)

PCI

$24,472.91
($4,749.74)

$21,882.08
($3,981.68)

$24,956.11
($4,601.94)

$26,948.92
($5,073.92)

STUDENTS

6,396.108
(12,807.042)

5,960.015
(12,089.832)

6,502.146
(12,940.86)

6,916.140
(13,663.32)

TEACHSALREAL

$39,485.65
($4,026.16)

$39,045.78
($4,028.00)

$39,738.61
($3,946.83)

$39,977.12
($3,161.95)

REQSPENDINGPP

$655.17
($447.19)

-

$805.50
($291.67)

$936.08
($379.11)

PCT517

17.640
(1.294)

18.308
(1.097)

17.852
(1.217)

16.689
(1.271)

PCT65

13.870
(2.023)

13.957
(1.812)

13.593
(1.789)

14.599
(2.513)

RETENTION

3.691
(2.131)

4.670
(1.996)

3.752
(2.257)

2.758
(1.628)

SUSPENSION

6.575
(6.253)

4.734
(4.498)

5.470
(3.954)

5.150
(2.884)

PCTSPED

1.492
(0.917)

1.628
(0.882)

1.397
(0.927)

1.294
(0.862)

UNEMPRATE

6.583
(2.305)

6.243
(1.904)

7.312
(3.114)

6.012
(1.403)

PROPTAXBASEPP

$92,208.84
($49,796.28)

$70,366.61
($37,692.32)

$92,825.11
($46,785.79)

$120,611.20
($62,555.22)

SALESTAXBASEPP

$47,055.39
($26,905.26)

$42,264.19
($22,883.91)

$50,707.24
($28,880.92)

$45,869.77
($26,944.99)

NOMINALMOE

1

*The mean of the variable is shown with standard deviation in parentheses.
1

The values of these variables have been divided by 1,000 in order to allow for manageable numbers.
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Table 1.4: Baseline Results
Dependent Variable : LOCALFUNDING
Model I

Model II

Model III

-376.992***

-400.760***

-

(53.138)

(72.044)

-0.935***

-1.036***

-0.687*

(0.348)

(0.340)

(0.003)

PROPTAXBASE

0.352**
(0.170)

0.301*
(0.168)

-0.004
(0.012)

SALESTAXBASE

-0.740
(0.500)

-

0.144***
(0.021)

PCI

0.028***
(0.007)

0.027***
(0.007)

0.176***
(0.071)

STATEFUNDING

-0.371***
(0.039)

-0.363***
(0.039)

-0.415***
(0.042)

FEDFUNDING

0.313***
(0.061)

0.314***
(0.061)

0.135***
(0.018)

STUDENTS

-0.031***
(0.009)

-0.033***
(0.009)

-

TEACHSALREAL

0.037***
(0.007)

0.036***
(0.007)

0.465***
(0.092)

REQSPNDINGPP

0.518***
(0.064)

0.492***
(0.062)

-

PCTSPED

40.390***
(11.501)

41.089***
(11.503)

-

PCT517

34.722***
(11.267)

32.034***
(11.213)

0.034
(0.073)

PCT65

-8.037
(6.748)

-8.467
(6.749)

-0.054*
(0.033)

UNEMPRATE

7.842
(4.785)

9.789**
(4.717)

0.018
(0.014)

RETENTION

-2.843
(4.891)

-2.435
(4.893)

-

SUSPENSION

5.026***
(1.476)

5.058***
(1.477)

-

LRATECAP

58.986**
(27.003)

-

-

HOMEVALUES

0.003***
(0.001)

0.002***
(0.001)

-

CONSTANT

182.028
(398.267)

321.431
(394.902)

5.352***
(1.167)

PHASEIN

NOMINALMOE

Standard errors shown in parentheses.
*, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 1.5: Results Using Census of Governments Data
Dependent Variable : LOCALFUNDING
Census Years Only
PHASEIN

-

NOMINALMOE

-1.965
(6.255)

PROPTAXBASE

0.377
(0.421)

SALESTAXBASE

-0.268
(0.219)

PCI

0.066**
(0.026)

STATEFUNDING

-0.379**
(0.156)

FEDFUNDING

0.584**
(0.262)

STUDENTS

-0.032
(0.049)

TEACHSALREAL

0.030
(0.024)

REQSPNDINGPP

0.482*
(0.251)

PCTSPED

73.982*
(38.955)

PCT517

26.180
(31.878)

PCT65

-7.262
(19.895)

UNEMPRATE

-1.413
(15.241)

RETENTION

2.292
(17.324)

SUSPENSION

10.635
(6.594)

HOMEVALUES

-0.253
(2.760)

CONSTANT

-653.284
(1281.574)

Standard errors shown in parentheses.
*, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 1.6: CDF Model I Results
Dependent Variable : CURSPENDING
Model I
CDFFUNDS

0.885***
(0.103)

ALWAYS

10.877
(38.852)

SOMETIMES

16.737
(32.719)

PHASEIN

-362.925***
(37.456)

NOMINALMOE

-0..549**
(0.232)

PROPTAXBASE

0.235**

(0.113)
SALESTAXBASE

0.892***
(0.334)

PCI

0.014***
(0.004)

NONCDFSTATEFUNDING

0.697***
(0.028)

LOCALFUNDING

0.281***
(0.014)

FEDFUNDING

0.740***
(0.041)

STUDENTS

-0.024***
(0.006)

TEACHSALREAL

0.037***
(0.004)

REQSPNDINGPP

0.319***
(0.050)

PCTSPED

8.998
(7.692)

PCT517

7.130
(7.512)

PCT65

-19.399***
(4.511)

UNEMPRATE

-4.338
(3.184)

RETENTION

-5.630*
(3.261)

SUSPENSION

1.317
(0.984)

HOMEVALUES

0.002***
(0.001)

LRATECAP

-15.361
(18.002)

CONSTANT

485.773
(273.617)

Standard errors shown in parentheses.
*, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 1.7: CDF Model II Results
Dependent Variable : LOCALFUNDING

Model II
CDFFUNDS

-0.139
(0.155)

ALWAYS

-139.455**
(58.274)

SOMETIMES

-353.146*
(49.101)

PHASEIN

-429.398***
(55.530)

NOMINALMOE

-0.943***
(0.348)

PROPTAXBASE

0.303*
(0.170)

SALESTAXBASE

-0.642
(0.501)

PCI

0.026***
(0.007)

NONCDFSTATEFUNDING

-0.416***
(0.041)

FEDFUNDING

0.313***
(0.061)

STUDENTS

-0.035***
(0.009)

TEACHSALREAL

0.037***
(0.007)

REQSPNDINGPP

0.452***
(0.074)

PCTSPED

43.949***
(11.514)

PCT517

35.435***
(11.257)

PCT65

-6.447
(6.773)

UNEMPRATE

7.527
(4.780)

RETENTION

-3.361
(4.897)

SUSPENSION

5.130***
(1.474)

HOMEVALUES

-0.002***
(0.001)

LRATECAP

56.871**
(27.009)

CONSTANT

488.504
(410.784)

Standard errors shown in parentheses.
*, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 1.8: Tax Effort Model Results
Property Tax Effort

Sales Tax Effort

Combined Model

-12.092***
(3.474)

-5.705***
(1.452)

-10.823***
(2.144)

0.006
(0.022)

-0.002
(0.009)

-0.027**
(0.013)

-0.966**
(0.413)

0.148
(0.172)

-0.345
(0.255)

STATEFUNDING

-19.427***
(2.505)

1.017
(1.047)

-8.077***
(1.257)

FEDFUNDING

11.980***
(3.899)

-2.447
(1.630)

4.100*
(2.461)

STUDENTS

1.483***
(0.499)

-0.337*
(0.209)

0.717**
(0.345)

TEACHSALREAL

-0.777*
(0.417)

0.413**
(0.174)

-0.514*
(0.263)

REQSPNDINGPP

8.931**
(4.118)

0.147
(0.197)

3.223
(2.542)

PROPTAXBASEPP

-0.114***
(0.030)

0.013
(0.012)

-0.039**
(0.018)

SALESTAXBASEPP

-0.825***
(0.085)

-0.252***
(0.036)

-0.574***
(0.052)

PCT517

2714.066***
(705.020)

-1853.179***
(294.719)

1313.121***
(435.144)

PCT65

2373.480***
(431.700)

-275.665
(180.463)

1126.045***
(266.449)

SPECED

-1246.009*
(735.373)

31.873
(307.408)

-896.635**
(453.879)

UNRATE

1034.291***
(305.270)

837.065***
(127.612)

936.970***
(188.415)

RETENTION

1081.302***
(313.595)

460.668***
(131.092)

864.081***
(193.554)

SUSPENSION

411.176***
(94.511)

-14.195
(39.508)

288.814***
(58.333)

PHASEIN

NOMINALMOE

PCI

Standard errors shown in parentheses.
*, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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Part 3: Essay 2:
Differing Responses to School Finance Reform:
The Haves vs. the Have-Nots*

*Thanks to Daphne Kenyon, Kristy Piccinini, and Yesim Yilmaz for helpful
comments and insights.
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2.A

Introduction
In the landmark Serrano v. Priest decision, the California Supreme Court declared

that California’s school finance system was unconstitutional because “it makes the
quality of a child’s education a function of the wealth of his parents and neighbors.”
Therein began a school finance revolution in which nearly all states faced claims based
on similar foundations. Over 30 years of legislation, this litigation has moved the typical
school finance program from a simple foundation grant to programs that contain some
form of equalization between wealthy and poor districts.
Feldstein’s seminal 1975 work on wealth neutrality and local choice in public
education imparted a theoretical construct in which a state can achieve any level of
wealth neutrality desired with respect to public school expenditures by using a matching
grant structure in which the net price of educational services varies with wealth in an
appropriate way. The success of these programs depends highly on the institutions and
regulations surrounding the school finance system. He finds that Massachusetts’s school
finance program in the 1970s was set up in a way that he predicted would overcorrect for
wealth inequities and would result in an inverse relationship between local wealth and
local educational spending.
Complete wealth neutrality, where district wealth has no impact on overall
education expenditures is not a stated goal of most school finance systems. While the
vast majority of programs desire to make spending more equal to some degree, it is likely
that in most cases complete neutrality is neither expected nor desired. This can be seen
based on the institutional rules that govern school finance systems. The degree to which
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the state controls local spending on education varies from total control to little to no
control at all. This varies considerably from state to state.
Hawaii funds all schools at the state level and has no local school districts. This
system could quite easily result in complete wealth neutrality since no revenues are
distributed at the local level. This is possible in Hawaii because of its limited population
and small number of schools. Hawaii represents the extreme in state school financing.
Other states have programs with a lesser degree of state control. A good number of
school finance systems currently in practice (Kansas, Montana, Texas, Vermont and
Wyoming for example) contain what are commonly known as recapture mechanisms in
which funds raised by local governments over a certain prescribed level must be returned
to the state. The state can then distribute the funds as they so desire. This allows the
state the ability to limit spending at the local level, and thus controlling the upper limit of
overall spending on education.
Additional states’ programs contain a regulation that sets a maximum level of
funding that may be undertaken at the local level. Some other programs contain
maintenance of tax effort requirements in which local governments cannot decrease tax
effort from year to year and must therefore maintain a prescribed level of revenue
collection. Others have spending maintenance requirements or contain no effort
requirements at all. These varying school finance regulations play a significant role in
the ability of the state to obtain a high degree of wealth neutrality. The more control the
state has over the amount of education spending that occurs at the local level, the more
likely they are to achieve a high degree of neutrality.
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Many equity based school finance lawsuits have been filed with the charge that
the existence of varying levels of school spending across a state, high spending in
relatively wealthy districts and low spending in relatively poor districts, violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Tennessee’s first equity based lawsuit,
Small Schools v. McWherter, was based on these claims and was initiated by several
superintendents from small school systems in Tennessee. These superintendents argued
that they were receiving unfair treatment with regard to school funding because their
small property and sales tax bases could not support a very high level of local spending.
As of 1992, the year of the McWherter v. Small Schools decision, the 10th percentile of
current per pupil expenditures was $3,465 while the 90th percentile level of expenditures
was $5,182.24 This is a gap in spending of over $1,700 per pupil. At the same time, the
gap in property tax base per pupil was over $95,000 per pupil. The Tennessee Supreme
Court agreed with the plaintiffs and charged the Tennessee Legislature to “develop and
adopt policies, formulas, and guidelines for the fair and equitable distribution and use of
public funds among public schools and for the funding of all requirements of state laws,
rules, regulations, and other required expenses” (Tennessee Code Annotated, 1992).
The BEP was the Tennessee Legislature’s answer to the Supreme Court’s order.
It is clear, because of the language used, that improving spending equity was a primary
goal of the institution of the BEP. Although this was a stated goal of the BEP, no
regulations were contained within the confines of the BEP to ensure that a high level of
overall spending equity was achieved. Tennessee’s program is structured slightly
different than many other programs across the country in that it includes a nominal
24

All figures have been adjusted for inflation and are stated in 2006 dollars.
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maintenance of effort requirement rather than a maintenance of tax effort requirement.
Tennessee’s maintenance of effort requirement mandates the maintenance of local
revenues in aggregate nominal terms from year to year. School districts are free to raise
any level of funds above that amount that are desired to support public education
spending. Tennessee’s BEP regulations contain no recapture mechanism and no cap on
local spending. Therefore, since the state cannot control the amount invested in
education at the local level, complete wealth neutrality would not be expected under the
confines of the BEP. In fact, from a pure economics point of view, wealthy districts with
a high taste for education would be expected to continue to increase spending at a rate
higher than relatively poorer districts that may have a lower taste for education services.
The state of Tennessee equalized BEP funds via the Fiscal Capacity Index
developed by the Tennessee Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
(TACIR). The TACIR capacity measure estimated the level of funding that each county
could afford to raise in order to fund education within the county. They calculate the
county’s fiscal capacity by using a multiple linear regression in which fiscal capacity was
the dependent variable. Several independent variables were included in the regression to
control for the factors that contributed to a county’s capacity. These variables included
own-source revenue, the property tax base, the sales tax base, per capita income, the
county assessment ratio of farm and residential property to all property and the
percentage of the population that were public school students. The regression was
performed using three-year moving averages for all variables. The three-year averages
were used in an attempt to avoid the volatility in aid associated with planning and
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budgeting issues. The capacity number for all 95 counties in Tennessee was summed and
the amount for each county was divided by the statewide total. That amount represented
the Fiscal Capacity Index. This number was essentially the share each Tennessee county
had of total statewide capacity to raise local education funds (Green et al., 2004).
A notable issue arises from the use of three-year moving averages of each
variable. The most recent data used in the calculation was never less than 12 months old.
In fact, it was often 24 months old due to delays in data collection. Therefore, the earliest
year in the three-year average may have been as much as five years old. The TACIR
method, therefore, was slow to adjust for growth that increased capacity quickly over a
short period of time. It may have taken up to five years for the Fiscal Capacity Index to
fully recognize the true change in capacity. Because of this lag, an inconsistent link
could be seen between an increase or decrease in observed variables and a resulting
change in county capacity. Performing a statistical analysis using panel data will allow
for a richer exploration between the relationship between district wealth and education
spending in Tennessee.
The level of per pupil public education expenditures in Tennessee is ultimately
determined at the district level. School districts, and the counties in which they reside,
can decide how much to spend in excess of the BEP grant. These decisions are based on
several factors including district needs, local education tastes, district wealth and the
institutional factors of the BEP formula. The decisions made by school district
bureaucrats and the district median voters determine the level of overall school spending
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equity across the state. As the factors used in their decision-making process change, it is
anticipated that spending equity may change as well.
The following essay examines both spending and revenue equity since the
implementation of the BEP. Multiple measures of equity are calculated and examined at
the district level. This is an improvement over TACIR’s county-level approach. The
capacity (and therefore spending levels) of a city school district may be very different
than the capacity in the county in which the city resides. In addition, multiple
econometric models are included that investigate the gap in spending between rich and
poor school districts in Tennessee as well as examinations regarding the existence of a
relationship between district incomes and school spending.
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. Section 2.B presents previous
literature related to the topic at hand. Section 2.C examines the equity of school spending
and revenues by examining commonly used measures of equity. Section 2.D presents the
theoretical model under consideration. Section 2.E summarizes the baseline empirical
model utilized and Section 2.F describes the data that has been collected for the analyses.
Section 2.G presents the empirical results from the baseline model and additional
alternative models, and section 2.H wraps up the analysis with a conclusion.

2.B

Previous Literature
Several studies have examined the effect of modern school finance reforms on the

distribution of school spending and specifically on the distribution across income groups.
This is an important topic to analyze because it is generally the basis of school finance
reform itself. Most of the court cases across the nation have begun because of perceived
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inequalities between districts. The concern over inequality may not be based solely on
the amount spent on students in the district. Rather, it may also be due to concerns about
one district’s ability to raise revenues more easily than other districts. This ability to
raise revenue in wealthy districts may then lead to a disparity in the real spending levels
seen in wealthy and poor districts.
Earlier studies tended to look at the absolute effect of education reform on
educational expenditures. More recent studies examine these reforms further, including
the effect on variables such as tax effort, spending equity, and income differentials.
Murray, et al. (1998) examined the effect of nationwide school finance reforms on the
distribution of school resources from 1972 until 1992 (all before Tennessee’s reform).
They find that school finance reforms across the country had significant impacts on
equality. Depending on which measure of inequality they use, they find that school
finance reforms have led to 16 to 35 percent more equitable school financing. They also
conclude that school finance reforms across the country significantly increased per pupil
expenditures.
Hill and Kiewiet (2005) update the Murray, et al. analysis to 2002 and find that
school finance reform has indeed increased education spending equity. They also
conclude, however, that overall per pupil expenditures have not statistically increased as
a result of the reforms. Both of these studies, while thorough, base their empirical
investigations on a limited dataset, the U.S. Census of Governments. Because the Census
of Governments is only conducted every 5 years, Murray et al.’s 1972-1992 time period
only includes five years of data: 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1992. This is a significant
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limitation, as nothing can be observed during the years in between the Census. An
additional weakness of these analyses is their grouping together of school finance reforms
across states and time. They create a simple dummy variable to represent the existence of
a reform. Hoxby (2001) warns of this simplification and assumption that all school
finance reforms are “created equal.” Their analyses do not differentiate between small
reforms and comprehensive reforms mandated due to severe inequities. Their analyses
also assume that a change to an equalization scheme would have the same impact as a
change to a guaranteed tax base system. This essay will be a tremendous improvement
over these methods as yearly data are utilized for a significant period of time at the school
district level. In addition, this essay will focus on the full time period encompassed by
the BEP in Tennessee, so there are no missing periods of time to contend with.
Most school finance reforms are geared toward lessening the gap in spending
between property rich districts and property poor districts. However, as stated
previously, local districts in Tennessee are able to spend as much as they can raise on
education, so school finance reform does not guarantee that the spending gap will be
closed, or even narrowed. Card and Payne (2002) study the impact of school finance
reforms on the distribution of school spending across richer and poorer districts. They
use Census of Governments data similar to other school finance reform studies and utilize
a difference-in-difference framework. They find that a court decision in favor of the
plaintiff tends to increase the relative funding available to poor districts. In other words,
the gap between spending in wealthy districts and spending in poor districts is narrowed
significantly. Their results suggest that every additional dollar of state funding results in
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an increase in overall education spending of 30 to 65 cents. This finding is consistent
with previous flypaper effect estimates in education and other expenditure literature (See
Hines and Thaler, 1995). Card and Payne face data limitations as due to their use of
Census of Governments data, and only examine two points in time to investigate the
improvement in school spending equity.
In a national study, Baicker and Gordon (2004) conclude that school finance
reforms increase both state school spending and the progressivity of that spending. In
other words, state spending increases, but so does the propensity of high income districts
to spend more than poor districts. Therefore, while overall spending increases, the gap
between rich and poor districts does not narrow. The different findings seen in Baicker
and Gordon when compared to Card and Payne are primarily driven by the level of
analysis used and the data employed. Baicker and Gordon utilize a multi-year panel,
while Card and Payne rely on cross-sectional analysis of two years.25
Because these studies do not have access to district level data, most (including
Card and Payne, 2002 and Baicker and Gordon, 2004) use state level numbers or
aggregate all school districts to the county level. In most states, the typical county has
more than one school district. Therefore, these studies are commonly aggregating the
behavior of several school districts into one observation. This process can be extremely
limiting, especially in a state like Texas that has around 1,100 independent school
districts but only 254 counties.26 In Texas, and many other states, these independent

25

Card and Payne’s 2002 analysis utilizes data from two years, 1979 and 1992.
This is not a limited phenomenon. The state of New Jersey has 604 school districts and only 21 counties.
The state of Arkansas has 75 counties and 310 school districts. In fact, Tennessee has one of the smallest
school district to county ratios in the country, so county aggregation is much more reasonable in Tennessee

26
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school districts have independent taxing authority and may cross county boundaries and
exist within more than one county. By aggregating the data to the county level you
negate the fact that the decision making process regarding local education spending and
taxing often originates at the district level. The school district bureaucrat proposes the
initial school budget and, in independent school districts, determines the school district
tax rates. Aggregating this decision making process severely limits the ability to examine
the impact school finance reform may have on actual school district behavior.
Few studies have been conducted utilizing school district level data due to the
collection difficulties (especially in states where school districts and counties are rarely,
if ever, coterminous). However, several recent district-level studies have been conducted
and generally conclude that spending is increased by education reforms and that equity is
improved at the state level. Dee and Levine (2004) find that reforms in the state of
Massachusetts increased state aid to and spending in the districts that spent the least prior
to the reforms. In addition they find that the increased spending was put towards
instructional and capital expenditures. Maher, Skidmore and Statz (2006) find a similar
result for the state of Wisconsin using a cross-sectional district level analysis. In a report
prepared for the Kentucky Department of Education, Picus, et al. conclude that the equity
of revenues provided to Kentucky school districts improved between 1990 and 2000.
They also conclude that the link between property wealth and overall revenue per pupil
has essentially vanished.

than it is in most states. This is a significant benefit to analyzing Tennessee data. Data not available at the
district level, including income, can be collected at the county level without fear of significant error since
the majority of Tennessee school districts are coterminous with the county in which they reside.
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Eliminating the link between property values and education expenditures or
revenues via school finance reform is significant in that it eliminates the potential for the
Tiebout outcome in which residents sort into homogeneous communities based on their
taste for public goods (including education). The Tiebout model results in the efficient
provision of public goods at the local level. If this outcome is no longer possible due to
the legislation regarding school financing, a less efficient level of education provision
would be anticipated. Rather than dealing with residents with very similar tastes for
education, school district bureaucrats may have to attempt to accommodate residents with
very different education tastes. This embodies the economic principle of the
efficiency/equity tradeoff in which an increase in equity is generally associated with a
decrease in efficiency.
The following essay will greatly improve on the prior literature regarding the
impact of school finance reform on spending and revenue equity. First of all, the
analyses are performed at the school district level rather than an aggregated analysis at
the county or state level. This allows for a much more precise analysis of how districts
respond to the equalization of state aid since many spending related decisions are made at
the district level. Secondly, the case of Tennessee represents an interesting examination
given the structure of the BEP. Since local districts are able to control local funding
(above a relatively low prescribed level), school districts have considerable control over
the level of funding that exists in their schools. Tennessee districts have a great deal
more control than many other states in which the local school district bureaucrats
confront recapture mechanisms, tax effort requirements or revenue caps (such as in
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California, Texas, and many other states). As previously mentioned, the dataset used is a
tremendous improvement over any other known study done to this point. The time
period covered is longer than other studies and a full population, balanced panel is
utilized.27

2.C

Equity Measurement and Descriptive Analysis
The desire to improve equity within the state was the primary rationale behind the

school finance reforms in Tennessee and in many other states in the past thirty years.
Whether or not the switch from the foundation grant program to the BEP was truly
effective in achieving greater equity across districts is yet to be determined. It is
expected that state revenue provided to local school districts has become more equalized
since the 1992 implementation of the BEP since state revenues were equalized via the
Fiscal Capacity Index. However, without further analysis the impact on current spending
and local revenue equity is unknown. Since there were no caps placed on local revenue
collection and no recapture mechanism was utilized in Tennessee, a decrease in local
revenue equity may be expected. If this is the case, what is the overall impact of the BEP
on overall education spending equity? Employing frequently used equity measurements
can aid in the ability to examine this question further.
There are multiple measures of equity commonly used to examine education
spending equity within states (See Murray, et al., 1998; and Berne and Stiefel, 1999).
Four of these measures will be calculated and considered in this analysis. The benefit of
27

In subsequent sections the dataset will be limited to the years included in the Census of Governments to
analyze whether or not different results would have been obtained if only those years were included. As
was seen in Essay 1, using only Census of Government years leads to tremendous differences in the results.
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using these four measures is that none is affected by the unit of measurement selected for
education spending. Additionally all four decrease when a dollar is redistributed from a
wealthy district to a poorer district. All of the measures have potential limitations, so it is
helpful to compare the results across multiple equity measures. Each of these measures is
limited by the fact that they only include the differences seen in education revenues and
spending. These measures are not able to control for additional factors that may impact
equity amongst school districts. Further empirical analyses will be conducted in
subsequent sections to accomplish this task.
The Gini coefficient measures inequality of a distribution and is commonly used
within the economics literature to measure income inequality. Within the education
finance literature it is used to measure the average difference in resources between any
pair of school districts relative to the average resources for all districts in the state. The
coefficient is a measure of income dispersion calculated as a ratio in which the numerator
is the area between the Lorenz curve of the income distribution and the uniform
distribution line and the denominator is measured as the area under the uniform
distribution, or the 45 degree, line. The coefficient is a number between 0 and 1, where 0
corresponds to perfect equality and 1 corresponds to perfect inequality. Perfect equality
occurs when every district has equal resources. Perfect inequality would result if one
district had all the resources and all other districts had zero resources. The Gini
coefficient for district j can be written as follows:
I

(1)

Γj =

∑
i =1

xi − x j ηiη j
J

2 x ( ∑η j )

,
2

j =1
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where x is district per pupil expenditure, x is average per pupil expenditure for the state,
and η is district enrollment.28 This measure is beneficial since it is a ratio measure that
takes a significant portion of the data into consideration. There are, however,
disadvantages to using the Gini Coefficient, including the fact that the coefficient may
understate inequality if wealthier school districts are able to use their income more
efficiently than lower income school districts.
The second measure of inequality that will be utilized is the Theil index first
proposed by economist Henri Theil in 1967. For district j the Theil index can be stated as
(2)

Tj =

η j x j ln( x j / x )
.
ηjxj

Similarly to the Gini coefficient, a value of zero for the Theil index represents perfect
equality among districts. A value of one would occur if one district has all state
expenditures and the remaining districts have no state expenditures. Arguably the most
attractive property of the Theil index is that the coefficient for the state as a whole can be
decomposed into a within district effect and a between district effect. The decomposition
can be represented by the following:
(3)

J

J

j =1

j =1

T = ∑ (η j x j / x ) ln( x k / x ) + ∑ (η j x j / x )T j ,

where the first term on the right hand side represents between-district inequality and the
second term represents within-district inequality.

28

District enrollment is measured as average daily attendance within the district during the relevant school
year.
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The third measure of inequality is known as the coefficient of variation (CV),
which is a measure of dispersion of a probability distribution. In the current analysis of
education expenditures, the CV measures the dispersion around mean per pupil
expenditures. By definition, it is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the
mean. One drawback of this method is that it treats transfers of funds between all
districts the same. In other words, the CV measure sees a transfer between a very rich
district and a poor district as identical to a transfer between two relatively poor districts.
The CV can be decomposed in a similar manner to that seen with the Theil index. The
variation in spending in the state of Tennessee can be decomposed into between-district
variation and within-district variation.
The fourth and final measure of inequality is the ratio of per-pupil education
expenditures between the 90th and 10th percentiles of per-pupil district wealth. The
wealth level of the school districts will be measured by property wealth per student since
property taxation is the primary method of local public school funding. This measure is
less sensitive than the previous three to extremely large or small values within the
dataset. Contrary to the previous three measures, a value of one indicates perfect equality
between the 90th percentile district and the 10th percentile district. The drawback of using
this method, as with the Gini coefficient, is that it cannot be decomposed into betweendistrict and within-district effects. In addition it only examines two specific points in the
data. It does not take a large part of the data into account. Two districts with identical
90th and 10th percentile property wealth figures result in the same value regardless of the
distribution of property wealth in the district. Therefore, this method cannot differentiate
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between a district with property wealth that is normally distributed and a district with a
bimodal distribution of property wealth.
Some previous examinations have used the 95th and 5th percentiles as the
comparison units (Murray et. al, 1998). In the case of Tennessee, however, it may be
more appropriate to use the 90th and 10th percentiles. This is due to the extreme variation
in property values and per capita income in Tennessee counties. Tennessee has counties
on both extremes of the wealth spectrum. Williamson County is the 15th richest county in
the country, with 2004 per capita income of $44,298 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005). On the
opposite end of the spectrum, Hancock County is one of the poorest counties in the
United States, with 2004 per capita income of only $14,885. Due to the wide range of
income and property wealth in Tennessee counties, it is believed to be more appropriate
to use the 90th and 10th percentiles as comparison units, therefore lessening the effect that
the outlier counties have on the analysis. Examining the 5th and 95th percentiles may give
a less accurate picture of overall equity since the school districts below the 5th percentile
and above the 95th percentile may be considered to be outliers when compared to all other
Tennessee school districts.
Calculations of these equity measures show that per pupil spending and overall
revenue equity have been improved significantly since the implementation of the BEP.
However, if local and state revenue equity is examined, it appears that local revenue
equity as well as state revenue equity has become less equitable over the same time
period. State revenue allotments for education have been shifted towards poorer districts
(the have-nots). This is a direct result of the way in which the BEP is calculated and the
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equalization method it employs. The Fiscal Capacity Index directly adjusts BEP
allotments based on the revenue capacity of local school districts. Therefore, districts
with a lower ability to pay for public schools receive a relatively larger amount of state
support. Because of this, a decrease in state revenue equity is expected in an education
finance system that incorporates an equalizing scheme as wealthy districts receive less
from the state and poor districts receive more.
Local revenues have become more unequal as well, with rich districts increasing
per pupil local revenues at a faster rate than is seen in poorer districts. This is not
necessarily expected based on the structure of the BEP, but since local districts in
Tennessee are allowed to raise as much local funds for education as the community will
support, this conclusion is not surprising. The results of these calculations are shown in
Tables 2.1 through 2.4 and show a tremendous amount of consistency across the multiple
equity measures.
Simply examining the change in equity measurements is not enough to determine
what is changing the distribution of spending and revenues in Tennessee school districts
over time. Is it because poor districts are taxed with more non-traditional students (e.g.
special education students)? Is it because rich districts have increased their dependence
on their large property and sales tax bases? Have wealthy districts increased spending at
a faster rate than less wealthy districts because of their residents’ higher taste for
education? Without additional analysis the reason behind the improved spending equity
remains unknown. In addition, it is impossible to tell why local revenues have become
less equitable in recent years without further analysis.
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2.D

Theoretical Considerations
The level of overall spending employed at local schools is a function of both aid

and behavior. Aid to schools via the state is formula driven. However, the amount of
local revenue contributed to education spending (above and beyond that mandated by the
BEP) is based on local behavior and tastes. The analysis that follows considers the
factors that impact this behavior and how the choices made by school districts and the
counties in which they reside impact overall equity in terms of both spending and
revenues.
The analysis will begin with the theoretical model proposed by Card and Payne
(2002).29 This model has been selected due to its explicit focus on spending equity. In
addition, data are available on a yearly basis in Tennessee at the district level for the
model proposed which allows for an analysis of how the findings change over time.
Substantial changes have been made as Card and Payne perform a cross-sectional model
rather than a panel model. This model is fashioned off of the median voter model
presented by Bergstrom and Goodman (1973).
Suppose that ζit represents the amount of state aid received by district i in year t.
Let ρit represent the total amount of current per pupil spending in district i in year t,
where all per pupil variables are calculated using average daily membership of the
district. Let γit represent the mean level of per capita income in district i in year t, and let
29

The objective of the initial analysis is to compare and improve on the Card and Payne examination. All
models for state and local expenditures were also analyzed using the theoretical model employed in Essay 1
(the constrained bureaucrat model). The two methods resulted in similar findings and will be utilized for a
future research project. As stated in Essay 1, the results from the bureaucratic model are not generally
preferred (on a statistical basis) to the median voter model, however, the significance of the nominal
maintenance of effort variable lends credence to the use of the bureaucratic model over the median voter
model.
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μit represent a vector of observable factors (excluding revenue related variables) that
affect school spending such as the number of special education students in the school
district and whether the district is in a high wage area. Projections can then be made
based on these variables related to the level of state funding per capita and expenditures
per capita on both γ and μ.
(4)

ζ it = α1t + β1t γ it + δ 1t μit + ε it

(5)

ρ it = α 2 t + β 2 t γ it + δ 2 t μit + vit
According to the Card and Payne model the coefficient β1t represents the

redistributive nature of the Tennessee school finance reform system in a given district in
a given year. The more negative β1t is the more equalizing the state funding formula is.30
Due to the school finance reform history in Tennessee, a more equalized pattern of state
aid is expected after implementation of the BEP, although the effect may be delayed
some do the phase-in of funding and regulations. The coefficient β2t in equation (5)
shows the level of spending inequality across higher and lower income districts by
investigating the impact of district wealth on overall per pupil expenditures.
Card and Payne assert that equations (4) and (5) are linked via the budget
constraint of the district and by the way in which voters and local governments react to
changes in the level of revenue provided by the other levels of government. This is
represented by the following

30

Equation (4) is essentially a reduced form version of the BEP formula in Tennessee. The focus of this
essay is on the impact of district wealth and the degree of revenue and expenditure equalization all else
equal. This specification has been chosen because it can investigate the impact of current levels of these
variables on current year spending. Interestingly, the cost aspect of the BEP is calculated using current
figures, while the Fiscal Capacity Index, which equalizes state revenue, is based on the delayed three-year
averages previously discussed.
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(6)

ρ it = ζ it + λit + ϕ it

where λit represents the revenues that are provided to district i in year t by the local
government, and φit represents federal funds received by district i in year t.
Finally, assume that the desired level of per pupil spending in a district is
determined by a function
(7)

ρ it* (Yit , Γit , τ it ; π it ) ,

where Yit represents total available resources per pupil in the district and Гit represents the
total amount of outside aid per pupil in the district where Гit = ζit + φit. Any flypaper
effect present in the granting of state and federal funds would be measured as ∂ρit /∂Гit.
In the context of the BEP calculation, Yit would include property and sales tax revenues.
The tax price associated with an additional dollar of district level school spending per
capita is represented by τit and πit is a set of district and community characteristics. This
aligns well with the BEP in which local spending depends on the amount of funds
designated from state and federal sources as well as the level of expenditures determined
by local school district bureaucrats and district voters. The level of local spending is
primarily determined by school district characteristics such as tax base, special education
population, and percentage of school age residents.
The basic premise of Card and Payne’s theoretical analysis is that when observing
the level of overall spending equity, it doesn’t matter which level of government is
providing the funding. Increases in overall equity can come from more equitable

129

spending from local sources, state sources, or a combination of the two.31 Therefore, it
would be inappropriate to include state aid in equation (5). The focus of this essay rests
in the relationship between district wealth and total spending without holding the source
of revenue constant. State revenue receipts are expected to be negatively related to
district wealth due to the fiscal capacity adjustment of the BEP. At the same time, a
positive relationship is expected between locally provided funds and district wealth.
Since these effects offset, it is important to investigate the overall impact of district
wealth on total spending on education in Tennessee. This can be accomplished by
examining the coefficient β2t in equation (5).
The baseline empirical application analyzes whether or not the BEP reforms in
Tennessee have had disproportionate effects on poor and wealthy school districts. In
order to accomplish this, an empirical strategy that is modified from that used by Card
and Payne (2002) is utilized which directly follows the theoretical model presented
above. The procedure must be modified substantially because Card and Payne used
cross-sectional analysis and the current analysis utilizes panel data methods. In addition,
Card and Payne use state and county level data while the analysis at hand focuses on
school district level data.
The variables of particular interest to this analysis are PCI, which measures real
per capita income, and PROPTAXBASEPP, which is calculated as the per pupil real
assessed property value in each school district. The calculation of property tax base
takes both the appraisal and the assessment ratios into account. Therefore, the number
31

It is highly unlikely that federal government spending would have an effect on overall equity since
federal government spending on education is almost entirely based on the number of special education
students in a school district.
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presented as PROPTAXBASEPP represents the per pupil taxable amount of property in
each district. Both variables will be used in the analyses that follow as a measure of
district wealth. Tennessee is a very diverse state with a wide range of represented
incomes. This can be seen in the range of both per capita income and taxable property
values in Tennessee school districts and enriches the following analyses of education
spending in poor districts relative to spending in wealthy districts.

2.E

Empirical Model
The baseline analysis follows Card and Payne by using per-capita income as the

local wealth measure rather than property wealth. Card and Payne state that they prefer
this option for two reasons. First of all, property wealth tends to be highly correlated
with family income and therefore would result in similar results. Between 1989 and 2006
in Tennessee, PCI and PROPTAXBASEPP have a correlation coefficient of 0.65.
Secondly, per capita income data are widely available at the county level while property
wealth data are more difficult to obtain at the county level. In a subsequent analysis in
this essay assessed property value per student will be utilized as the wealth measure as
property assessment data for all years and all school districts during the period of analysis
has been collected in order to compare these measures of district wealth.
The empirical application introduced by Card and Payne relies on the Bergstrom
and Goodman median voter model (1973). Under that model, Bergstrom and Goodman
assert that ρ it* is the demand function for education spending at the district level by the
median-income voter in the district. ρ it* is independent of Гit . In other words, in their
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median voter model, the median voter’s demand function is not dependent on the amount
of outside aid received by the district in each year. Instead, it depends on the price of
school spending and the district resources that are available. Based on Bergstrom and
Goodman’s theory, districts all have a taste for education spending given the property tax
price and the available resources. After their level of educational demand has been
determined, it is not affected by who pays what. It doesn’t matter to them by whom it is
funded. Local demand for education is not altered if the federal share of spending goes
from 9 to 10 percent as long as their tax price remains constant. Bergstrom and
Goodman measure tax price as the individual tax share of the median resident. In
general, ρ it* represents the process of district-level determination of school spending
(Card and Payne, 2002).
Equations (4) and (5) were estimated for the 18 year time period ranging from
1989 to 2006. This allows for an examination of how school district wealth (as measured
by real per capita income) impacted both state-provided revenues and overall per pupil
expenditures over time. These models will serve as the baseline, with multiple alternate
models to follow including a breakdown of the pre-BEP and post-BEP periods and yearly
analyses of school aid and spending. In addition to these models, further examinations
will investigate the use of per capita income as the primary wealth measure.

2.F

Data
The availability of data has severly constrained the ability of researchers to

effectively analyze issues related to the consequences of school finance reform. The
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usage of Census of Governments or other sporadic data leads to obvious difficulties in
examining the immediate and ongoing effects of school finance reform since the
datapoints are only observed every fifth year. Because of this, the data could ignore a
significant impact whose impact was seen for a period of time less than five years. In
addition, in many states, school districts are not conterminous with counties, and
therefore, the collection of school district level data is especially daunting. For the
current study on Tennessee, a balanced panel spanning 18 years has been collected, much
of which had to be collected by hand from Tennessee Department of Education
documents. This data represents a tremendous improvement over data used in previous
studies analyzing similar topics.
As stated previously, the Basic Education Program was instituted in Tennessee
during the 1992-1993 school year, with full funding reached during the 1996-1997 school
year. In order to examine the effects of the BEP, data covering a significant period
before the reform must also be collected. In order to account for this district/county level
data for each of the school years has been collected from 1989 to 2006. Data on both
school district and county characteristics have been collected. Variables were collected
at the district level whenever possible. If data were not available at the school district
level, county level data are utilized. The majority of Tennesee school districts are
coterminous with the county, so for those districts, county and district data are one in the
same.
In order to estimate equations (4) and (5) variables must be collected that may
impact the median voter’s choice of education expenditures and the state’s level of
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educational aid. These variables fall into two broad categories: school related variables
and community variables. School related variables are generally collected at the school
district level and include revenue collected from all sources, number of students,
percentage of special education students, and district level school expenditures. Most
community variables must be collected at the county level since school district level data
are available. One exception is collection of the property tax base data, which were
collected at the school district level. Community variables that must be collected at the
county level include per capita income, percentage of the population between 5 and 17
years of age and percentage of the population over 65 years of age.
Table 2.5 shows summary statistics for funding-related variables utilized.32 Local
revenues per pupil, LOCALFUNDING, as well as state revenues per pupil,
STATEFUNDING, and federal funding per pupil, FEDFUNDING, are presented in
Table 2.5. The mean of each variable is shown for selected years. The years chosen are
the first year in the analysis, 1989, the first year after the completion of the BEP phase-in,
1998, and the final year of the analysis, 2006. These numbers are calculated on a per
pupil basis using average daily membership. All variables utilized in the analyses that
follow have been transformed into real values using the yearly consumer price index. All
variables are shown in 2006 dollars.
Table 2.6 presents the additional variables utilized in this analysis. The variables
PCTSPED, RETENTION, SUSPEND and STUDENTS are used to control for school
district characteristics. Additional variables are included to control for community
characteristics and demographics including PCT517, PCT65, and UNEMPRATE (which
32

These variables are defined identically to the same variables presented in Essay 1.
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controls for local economic conditions during the period of analysis). One variable is
added to the analysis that was not described in Essay 1. This variable, CDFDUMMY, is
a variable that has a value of one if the district receives CDF funds in that year and zero if
they do not. This variable is included in order to control for the existance of high wages
in a district and the fact that these districts spend more per pupil, on average, than nonCDF districts (See Essay 1). Summary statistics are broken down into four time periods.
Column 1 presents the mean and standard deviation of the variables for the entire time
period, 1989 to 2006. The last three columns show the summary statistics for three
specific years: 1989, 1998, and 2006. 1998 was chosen because this is the first year after
the completion of the BEP phase-in.

2.G

Empirical Results
Panel data ordinary least squares fixed effects models were run in order to

estimate both β1 and β 2 presented in the theoretical model in equations 4 and 5. This
estimator was chosen given the availability of a balanced yearly panel with full
population data. Both district and year effects are used in the panel data analyses.33
Results are presented below in Table 2.7. 34
As expected, the coefficient estimate β1 (the coefficient of PCIREAL in the
STATEFUNDING model) is negative and significant. This demonstrates that the higher
33

The specific results related to the year fixed effects are not included in the results tables throughout the
paper due to space limitations. These results are available by request from the author.
34
All analyses included in this essay using the 18 year panel were also conducted using only those years
available in the Census of Governments in order to compare this analysis to Card and Payne (2002) in
which they use Census of Governments as the primary data source. In this case, the years analyzed were
1992, 1997 and 2002. Results were tremendously different in all cases with inconsistencies seen in the
significance and signs of the variables included. Further analysis is being conducted on this topic for a
future project.
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county per capita income is in a district, the less state funds they will receive. Since the
BEP formula equalizes state funds based on local wealth, which is highly correlated with
per capita incomes, this is the anticipated result. Specifically, a $1,000 increase in per
capita income results in a decrease in per pupil state revenue of just over $62. The
variable PHASEIN is positive and highly significant in both models showing that both
state revenues and overall education spending increased significantly during the phase-in
period. The coefficient of PHASEIN in the STATEFUNDING model is larger than that
in the CURSPENDING model which indicates that overall current spending did not
reflect the total increase in STATEFUNDING during that period. This is consistent with
the findings in Essay 1 which show a decrease in local funding during the phase-in
period.
The coefficients of PCT65 and PCTSPED are both negative and significant in the
STATEFUNDING model. PCT65 is likely negative because the higher the percentage of
elderly residents in a district, the lower the percentage of school-age children. An
increase in the percentage of elderly residents may therefore decrease the state’s burden
of education provision in that district. It may also reflect the lower sales tax revenues
associated with a higher percentage of elderly residents. The coefficient of PCTSPED is
likely driven by the availability of federal funds for special education programs. The
majority of special education funds are provided by the federal government, and these
funds may offset programs that the state government would otherwise choose to partially
fund (for example, reading and extracurricular programs).
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The fact that the coefficient of STUDENTS is negative and significant in both
models, given the controls for other variables in per pupil terms, may relate to the lower
number of students per school in smaller districts. For instance, some Tennessee school
districts are so small that they contain only one school. Even though the school is small,
they are still allotted a principal and at least one teacher per grade via the BEP.
Therefore, the BEP may provide a higher level of instructional expenditures per pupil in
small schools than is seen in schools in larger districts (e.g. one principal per 354
elementary students in the Richard City School District compared to one principal per
820 elementary students in the Memphis City School District.)
The coefficient estimate β2 (the coefficient of PCI in the CURSPENDING model)
is positive and significant, revealing that an increase in per capita income during the
period of analysis increases per pupil current expenditures. The results show that a
$1,000 increase in per capita income results in a $34.12 increase in per pupil current
education expenditures. These results correspond well with the results found in Card and
Payne (2002) which also show a negative relationship between wealth and state funding
and a positive relationship (in most cases) between district wealth and per pupil spending.
In the CURSPENDING model the coefficients of PCT517 and PCT65 are both
negative and significant. The negative coefficient of PCT517 likely reflects the burden
school districts face when a large percentage of residents are enrolled in the public school
system. The sign of the coefficient for PCT65 may reflect the lower tax revenues
associated with a higher percentage of elderly residents. This result is commonly seen in
the education finance literature (See Poterba, 1997). SUSPENSION is also highly
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significant and has a positive coefficient, showing that districts with more behavioral
issues spend more per pupil. In the CURSPENDING model CDFDUMMY is also
positive and significant as expected. This indicates that districts who received the CDF,
and had relatively high wage structures, spent more per pupil than those who did not.
This may be due to several factors including the existence of higher costs and/or higher
tastes for education.
These results illustrate that state funding in Tennessee, primarily driven by the
BEP during the time period analyzed, was equalized between poor and local districts on
the basis of per capita incomes. However, the results of the per pupil spending equation
show that a gap in school spending based on income remains between Tennessee school
districts. Mean per capita income in Tennessee counties was $26,949 in 2006. The range
however was from $16,176 to $49,990. This is nearly a $34,000 gap in per capita
income. Based on these results, school spending in these two counties would be expected
to differ by $1,160. In actuality these two districts had a gap in per pupil expenditures of
just over $2,200 ($7,547 compared to $9,825). This is obviously a significant difference,
especially considering that mean per pupil current spending in Tennessee was only
slightly above $6,670 in 2006.
While the panel analysis gives some insight into the redistributive nature of the
BEP, it does not allow us to observe how these effects evolved over time. For instance,
have state revenues per pupil become more or less redistributive since BEP
implementation? An examination of the per pupil spending data show a widening of the
gap between rich and poor district spending beginning after 1999. This is shown in
138

Figure 2.1 which examines the difference (gap) in spending between school districts in
the top 10 percent of PCI (the rich) and the bottom 10 percent of PCI (the poor).
Figure 2.1 shows that the gap between district spending in the years leading up to
the BEP was quite large, maximizing at nearly $1,500 in 1991. This gap decreased
significantly throughout the phase-in period of the BEP, reaching a minimum of $60 in
1999. Nothing significant changed regarding the BEP in 1999. However, this was the
first year following the full funding of the BEP, so the changes may reflect the end of the
phase-in and a return to the education tastes and district behavior seen prior to BEP
implementation. From 2000 until 2004 the gap in spending between rich and poor
districts widened yet again. In the last two years of the analysis the gap appears to have
narrowed. The narrowing of the spending gap at the end of the analysis may be due to a
change to the BEP implemented in 2005. Between 1993 and 2004 school districts were
required to supply 25 percent of instructional classroom costs calculated via the BEP. In
2005 the required provision was increased to 35 percent (in other words, the state
decreased their provision of instructional classroom costs from 75 percent to 65 percent).
This may have forced school districts that chose to maintain low levels of spending at or
near the state requirement to expand their spending at an increased rate.
In a 2008 analysis, Arroyo examines the funding gap in states across the country
between 1999 and 2005. She uses the districts with the highest levels of poverty (top 25
percent) to represent the poor districts and districts with the lowest levels of poverty
(bottom 25 percent) to represent the rich districts. She finds that Tennessee is one of 16
states in the United States in which the funding gap between high-poverty and low139

poverty districts increased by more than $200 a student between 1999 and 2005.35 This
finding is supported by the data presented in Figure 2.1. In addition, she concludes that
Tennessee has one of the largest funding gaps in the nation. While the gap in spending
can be seen by simply glimpsing at the data, further statistical analysis is needed, that
examines all districts, in order to tell if state supported spending has become less
sensitive to changes in per capita income in recent years, or if the observed inequities are
coming from differences in local spending.
Pre- and Post-BEP Analyses
In order to examine the possibility of differential effects after BEP
implementation, further analyses were conducted. The first splits the previous period of
analysis (1989 to 2006) into two time periods: pre-BEP and post-BEP. The pre-BEP
time period runs from 1989 to 1992. The post-BEP period is from 1993 until 2006.
Fixed effects panel regressions were conducted using both dependent variables shown
previously, state revenues per pupil and per pupil current spending, as well as local
revenues per pupil.36 Both district and year fixed effects were included in the
regressions.37 Tables2.8 and2.9 present the results from these analyses.
When only those years prior to the BEP are analyzed, per capita income
surprisingly does not have a significant impact on any of the three dependent variables
utilized. This result implies that, when controlling for year and district fixed effects, per
35

Other states whose funding gap increased include: Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and
Wisconsin.
36
Hausman tests were conducted in order to test the appropriateness of fixed vs. random effects for all
models.
37
These results are not shown in the following tables. The same is true for all remaining analyses. Fixed
effect results are available by request from the author.
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capita income was not the driving force of the spending gap between rich and poor
districts. The only variable that is consistently significant is the percentage of special
education students in a district which has a positive and significant impact on each of the
three dependent variables. The positive impact of percentage of special education
students on STATEFUNDING during the pre-BEP period is opposite of what is seen in
the analysis of the full time period. This is likely due to the significant special education
legislation that occurred during the 1990s and early 2000s including the Individual with
Disabilities Act of 1990 and the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. These laws reduced
the burden of local and state governments with regard to special education provision and
increased federal funds for the purpose of educating those students with special needs.
The post-BEP analysis, shown in Figure 2.5, results in very different coefficients
than those seen previously. Hausman tests confirm that the results are statistically
different in all three cases. Of particular interest is the significance of the per capita
income variable in the post-BEP period. As was previously discussed, the BEP adjusted
state funding based on fiscal capacity, which is a statistical measure of district wealth.
The Fiscal Capacity Index used to equalize state aid in Tennessee included per capita
income as part of the calculation of district capacity. Therefore, it would be surprising if
these coefficients were insignificant. As anticipated, an increase in per capita income
leads to a decrease in state revenues.
The relationship between PCI and LOCALFUNDING is positive and significant,
which is expected given the structure of the BEP, under which local governments can
raise as much revenue for local education funding as they prefer. Districts of higher
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wealth can collect education revenues at a relatively lower price and will therefore be
expected to collect a larger amount of per pupil local funds than districts of lower wealth.
In addition, it is possible that districts with higher levels of wealth have a higher taste for
education, on average, and would therefore expend more for education at the local level.
The post-BEP model also shows a positive and significant relationship between PCI and
CURSPENDING. Given the fact that PCI has a negative impact on state funding and a
positive impact on local funding, the coefficient of PCI in the CURSPENDING model
depends on which effect is larger. Examining the magnitudes of the PCI coefficient in
each model shows that the increase in per pupil expenditures associated with an increase
in per capita income is primarily driven by the increase in locally provided revenues.
The coefficient of PHASEIN is negative and significant in each of the three
analyses. The negative coefficient in the STATEFUNDING model may seem surprising
at first glance, especially since it was positive in the full panel analysis, but it is important
to remember that only those years after BEP implementation are included in this model.
Since state funding was ramped up during the phase-in period, it makes sense for state
funding to have been lower during the initial phase-in years than it was once full-funding
was achieved. The story is the same for PHASEIN in the CURSPENDING model.
Overall current spending was lower during the phase-in, all else equal, than it was after
full-funding was complete.
The variable CDFDUMMY is also worth further examination. The coefficient of
CDFDUMMY in the STATEFUNDING model and the CURSPENDING model is
positive and highly significant. Those districts who qualified for the CDF received
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significantly more funds per pupil, all else equal. In addition the coefficient in the
CURSPENDING model shows that this increase in state funds via the BEP was
translated into a significant increase in per pupil expenditures. The coefficient of
CDFDUMMY in the LOCALFUNDING model is negative and significant at the 10
percent level. This shows that districts receiving CDF funds spent less money per pupil
from local sources than those who did not. These findings correspond well with the
findings previously presented in Essay 1.
These results are important because they show that examining school revenues
over a long time period, and across multiple school finance systems, can be a bit
misleading. The coefficient related to per capita income’s impact on state revenues for
1989 to 2006 was -0.062. However, when we limit the time period of analysis to those
years after school finance reform, the value of the same coefficient is only -0.024.
Similarly, the primary regression overestimated the impact of per capita income on
current per pupil expenditures because of the equalizing nature of the school finance
system post-BEP. In order to deepen the analysis to examine the path of these impacts
over time, yearly analyses should be considered.

Yearly Analyses
In an attempt to break the results down even further, yearly analyses were
conducted using OLS regression analysis. This allows a year-by-year examination of the
time period included in the full panel analysis previously presented. In addition, special
attention can be paid to the time period since 1999 when the gap in school spending
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appears to have widened between the richest and poorest school districts in Tennessee.
The fact that spending patterns of rich and poor schools changed around 1999 may not be
surprising since the BEP was fully phased-in the year before. Previous examinations in
Essay 1 showed a negative relationship between spending at the local level during the
BEP phase-in period. Once this period was over, districts may have altered their
behavior. Table 2.10 presents the results for the yearly regression analyses using real
current per pupil expenditures as the dependent variable. Only significant coefficients
are presented. Coefficients shown in italics are significant only at the ten percent
confident level. All others are significant at the five percent level or above.
The coefficient related to per capita income, β1, is positive in all years that the
coefficient is significant. This shows that higher per capita income is generally
associated with a higher level of per pupil spending. There is an interesting pattern that
emerges over time. Prior to BEP implementation (1989-1992) β1 is positive, significant,
and larger than is seen in the majority of the later years.38 This is expected, as the BEP
provided greater equalization than the foundation program that existed prior to the BEP.
Interestingly, per capita income is not a significant determinant of per pupil current
spending during any of the years in which the BEP was phased in. In the phase-in years
per capita income had no distinguishable effect on per pupil current spending in
Tennessee. This may indicate a great deal of equalization on the basis of income in
school spending during that period and may reinforce the previously calculated equity

38

This is a particularly interesting result when compared to the pre-BEP panel analysis which found PCI to
be an insignificant determinant of per pupil expenditures. It is not clear exactly what leads to the difference
seen in the two analyses, but it is likely due to the inclusion of school district fixed effects in the panel data
model.
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measures that show a significant improvement in spending equity during the phase-in
period. It is also possible that the tremendous growth in state funds during this period
reduced the impact that taste for education (which worked through income) had on per
pupil spending. The analysis shows that a year before BEP implementation, in 1992, a
$1,000 increase in per capita income was expected to coincide with $62 more in per pupil
spending, all other things equal. At the end of the BEP phase-in, in 1998, this had
dropped to only $20 more in per pupil spending. The relationship between per capita
income and per pupil spending was cut by more 65 percent during the BEP phase-in.
After that period, beginning in 1999, the coefficient relating per capita income
and per pupil current spending once again becomes positive and significant, representing
a strengthening of that relationship when compared to the phase-in years. This at least
partially explains the widening of the spending gap between rich and poor districts since
1999 as shown in Figure 2.1. This likely reflects a return to the district behavior seen
prior to the implementation of the BEP. School districts with a higher ability to raise
local revenues increased their own source funds at a rate significantly higher than those
districts with a lower ability to pay. Since there is no cap on the amount of revenue
raised at the local level, the gap between wealthy and poor districts began to widen again.
It is also likely that these wealthy districts had a relatively higher taste for education than
poor districts and that these tastes were reflected in the widening of the spending gap.
Towards the end of the period of analysis, the relationship between PCI and
CURSPENDING was similar to levels seen prior to the BEP.
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In addition to the per capita income variable there are other variables of note in
this analysis. One key variable, CDFDUMMY, is positive and significant in each year
since BEP implementation. This variable represents whether or not the district has been
distinguished as a high wage area and has received CDF funds. This result shows that
districts in high wage areas spend more money per pupil than those not in high wage
counties. This result appears to have lessened after the phase-in period, only to
strengthen again after 1999. By 2004, being designated as high wage, all else constant,
was associated with an increase in spending of over $1,000 per pupil.
The coefficient related to the percentage of school age children in the county,
PCT517, is negative and significant in most years. This may be attributed to two things.
First of all, a county with a higher population of school age children may very well have
a lower working age population. A jurisdiction with fewer workers is likely to have a
lower level of assessed property and taxable sales, all else constant. Secondly, a county
with a high share of school age children would have to collect more revenue than a
county with a lower population of school age children in order to maintain the same level
of per pupil expenditures. Having a larger population of school aged children is a burden
to a school district. The coefficient related to PCTSPED is positive and significant in all
years of the analysis. This is expected since special education students have special
needs which require expenditures above and beyond those spent on traditional students.
Yearly analyses examining the path of β2 (the relationship between PCI and
STATEFUNDING) were also conducted. These regressions, which use state revenues
per pupil as the dependent variable, give greater insight into the equalization of revenue
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provided by the BEP. In 1989, the first year of the analysis, an increase in $1,000 of per
capita income only led to a decrease of $14 in per pupil state revenues. However, by the
end of the analysis in 2006 this number had grown to $83. This is a tremendous change,
and is one that occurred gradually over time throughout the analysis. There are two years
in which the yearly change in β2 is highly significant: 1993 and 1997.39 This result is not
overly surprising since they represent the beginning and end of the phase-in period. The
yearly results from these regressions are presented in Table 2.11.
As with the previous table, only significant results are shown. The relationship
between per capita income and per pupil state revenues is negative throughout the
analysis period. In nearly all cases, the coefficient (β2) becomes more negative each year.
This shows that the provision of state revenues in Tennessee has become much more
equalized over time with respect to per capita income levels. This is an interesting
outcome given the stability of the Fiscal Capacity Index used to distribute BEP funds.
There were no major changes to this formula after BEP implementation. So why would
the BEP have become more equalizing over time? Since there was no change to the
formula itself, it must be due to changes in the factors included in the formula. As
described previously, the Fiscal Capacity Index used per capita income as well as
property and sales tax bases in order to calculate district capacity. The capacity numbers
were then translated into the Fiscal Capacity Index which represented each school
district’s capacity as a percentage of the state’s total capacity. Therefore, if the wealthy
districts’ relative capacity increased over time and the poor districts’ relative capacity
decreased over time, the BEP would become more equalizing. This aligns well with the
39

This was determined via an F-test.
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equity measures presented previously which show an increase in per pupil state revenue
equity over time.
The analysis of state revenues per pupil shows a consistently positive relationship
between CDF recipients and state revenues. This is expected since CDF funds were
provided by the state to high wage districts. For the first few years of the analysis the
percentage of special education students in a district was a positive and significant
determinant of state funding.40 In the later years of the analysis it is no longer significant.
This change may be due to the federal government’s increased commitment to special
education funding through the passage of several recent legislative acts regarding special
education. The majority of federal funding for K-12 education is provided for the
imparting of special education services. This commitment was accelerated most recently
with the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act in 2001.
The yearly regressions related to β1 and β2 leave an additional question
unanswered. If state revenues are becoming more equalized over time and the coefficient
of β2 remains strongly negative and significant, why has β1 remained positive and
significant? In addition why has β1 increased since the phase-in period when it was
insignificant? In other words, if the state provision of revenues continues to be more
equalizing on the basis of district wealth, why has the gap between spending based on per
capita income widened since the completion of the BEP phase-in?

40

The percentage of special education students in each district is included as a component of the BEP
calculation. Specifically, having a larger number of special education students leads to a larger number of
allotted teaching positions and a higher level of other classroom allocations such as classroom materials
and instructional equipment.
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In order to analyze this further an additional yearly analysis was conducted using
local per pupil revenues as the dependent variable.41 Based on the previous analyses, the
relationship between PCI and LOCALFUNDING is expected to lessen after the
implementation of the BEP and then strengthen again after the phase-in period. This is
due to the ability of local governments to raise local funds for education over and above
that provided by the state. Local governments with a high taste for education tend to
have higher levels of educational attainment, and therefore have higher levels of per
capita income. Over time, as the BEP implementation was phased-in, districts with high
tastes for education, and those for which raising local funds is relatively less expensive,
would be expected to continue to raise a great deal of funds at the local level. On the
contrary, districts with a lower taste for education expenditures, and those for which
raising local funds is relatively more expensive, may have backed off of local revenue
raising due to the increased state funding provided by the BEP.
Table 2.12 presents the results of the yearly regression using LOCALFUNDING
as the dependent variable. The results show that the coefficient on per capita income is
positive as would be expected. It also confirms the expected behavioral effects related to
income and changes in local spending. The specification of the model is identical to the
model used to estimate yearly estimates of β1 and β2 except for the change in dependent
variable.
As anticipated, the coefficient related to per capita income is positive and
significant throughout the analysis. It is much more interesting, however, to note the

41

A panel model using local revenues as the dependent variable was also analyzed and results were in line
with the yearly results currently presented as well as the results seen in Essay 1.
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changes in the coefficient over time. In the first year of the BEP (during the 1992-1993
school year) the coefficient is 0.094. This illustrates that a $1,000 increase in per capita
income would lead to a $94 increase in per pupil local education revenues. In the final
year of the analysis, 2006, the coefficient is 0.167, meaning that a $1,000 increase in per
capita income results in a $167 increase in per pupil local revenues. This is nearly a 76
percent increase from the first year of the BEP. And, more importantly, by 2006 it is
significantly higher than the levels seen prior to the BEP. More specifically, beginning in
2000, the coefficient of PCI is higher than those seen prior to BEP implementation.
Since the BEP has caused greater equalization of state revenues, districts in high income
counties may have needed to collect a larger amount of local revenues in order to
maintain relative spending levels.
These coefficients are very revealing because we can now compare the impact of
an increase in per capita income on both state and local revenues over time. We can do
this by examining the sum of the coefficients presented in Tables 2.11 and 2.12. The first
two years after BEP implementation actually resulted in a relationship between combined
per capita income and state and local revenues that was much lower than that seen prior
to the BEP. According to the results, in 1992, a $1,000 increase in per capita income
would have resulted in an increase in overall state and local school revenues of $98. A
$1,000 increase in per capita income in 1993, the year of BEP implementation, would
have resulted in an increase in revenues of only $65. The effect on overall state and local
revenues rebounded in 1994, but fell steadily past that point throughout the remaining
years of the phase-in. In 2000 the combined impact on state and local revenues jumped
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over 100 percent to 0.58 and climbed to 0.75 in 2001. This number continued to climb
until 2004. This provides an explanation for the gap between spending in the richest and
poorest school districts that began to widen after 1999 and then began to narrow again
after 2004.

Property Tax Base vs. Per Capita Income
Thus far, this analysis has been consistent with that of Card and Payne (2002) in
which they used per capita income as a measure of local wealth even though most states,
including Tennessee, use property wealth as the basis for equalization. Card and Payne
state that they chose to use per capita income due to data limitations and the close
relationship between income and property wealth. While per capita income and per pupil
property tax base are correlated in Tennessee, they are far from being perfectly correlated
with a correlation coefficient of 0.65. Therefore, per capita income may not be the most
appropriate measure of school district wealth in the case of Tennessee.
For the current analysis, property assessment data were collected for all school
districts in Tennessee for all 18 years. Thus, similar models can be conducted in which
district wealth is measured as assessed property values per pupil. As was previously
stated, the assessed property value amount takes appraisal and assessment ratios into
consideration, and therefore represents the total taxable value of all district property.
This amount was divided by the number of pupils in each district in order to calculate the
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per pupil taxable property in each district. Table 2.13 presents the results of a panel data
fixed effects model in which property base per pupil is utilized.42
These results are very similar to those in which per capita income served as a
proxy for school district wealth. The same variables are significant in both sets of
analyses and have comparable magnitudes. The PROPTAXBASEPP coefficient can be
interpreted as follows. A $1,000 increase in per pupil assessed property value is expected
to result in a decrease in state revenues of $26 per pupil. Put in alternative terms,
operating from the mean, a one percent increase in the property tax base per pupil is
associated with a 0.08 percent decrease in state revenues.
Additional yearly analyses, identical to those previously performed, were run in
order to compare the use of per capita income versus assessed property value. The results
for the regressions using real current expenditures as the dependent variable are shown in
Table 2.14. The results are similar in magnitude and scope to those seen when per capita
income was used rather than property wealth. The coefficient estimate related to per
pupil assessed property is positive and significant in all years analyzed. The coefficients
range from 0.033 to 0.076. For the year 2000, the coefficient related to per pupil assessed
property value for 2000 is 0.044. This means that a $1,000 increase in per pupil assessed
property would increase per pupil expenditures by $44. Mean per pupil assessed property
value in 2000 is $101,120and mean per pupil current expenditure is $5,974. This reveals
that, moving from the mean, an increase in per pupil assessed property to $102,120, a
0.99 percent increase in per pupil assessment, would result in an increase in per pupil

42

This model is identical to that shown in Table 2.7 with the exception of the replacement of per capita
income by per pupil property tax base.
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expenditures to $6,018, an increase of 0.07 percent. The remaining coefficients show a
very similar pattern to that seen when per capita income was used as the wealth measure.
Per capita income appears to be a good proxy for property value when examining the
impact of district wealth on per pupil expenditures over the entire time period studied.
Using property wealth rather than per capita income as a measure of district
wealth leads to more significant differences in the case of the state and local revenue
regressions. Table 2.15 presents the results of the regression analysis using state
revenues per pupil as the dependent variable. The most significant difference comes in
the significance of the primary wealth measure. While PCI was a significant determinant
of state funding in all years, PROPTAXBASEPP is only significant after the
implementation of the BEP. This may reflect the inclusion of property tax base as a part
of the Fiscal Capacity Index used to equalize BEP funds.
It is important to remember, given the fact that the Fiscal Capacity Index was
calculated using regression analysis, that PCI and PROPTAXBASEPP would not have
been given equal weight in the fiscal capacity calculation. In fact, the weights assigned
to each Fiscal Capacity Index component changed on a yearly basis. Remember, too, that
these weights were based on a three-year average of variables in which the data collection
may have been significantly delayed. This can lead to significant differences based on
the wealth measure utilized. Because most school finance systems equalize based at
least partially on property tax base, it may be inappropriate to utilize PCI as the primary
wealth measure given the varied results.
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When per capita income was used as the measure of district wealth, the existence
of high wages in a county (CDFDUMMY) was always positive and highly significant in
the state revenue equation. However, when property values are used instead, the
existence of high wages is rarely significant. This is likely due to a positive relationship
between high wage districts and property values. An area with high wages is likely to
have higher values of both residential and commercial properties. When PCI is used as
the sole wealth measure, the coefficient of CDFDUMMY may be picking up some
additional district wealth effects due to high tax bases in those districts. Although the
existence of high wages is not significant in the state revenue regression, it is significant
in half of the years analyzed in the local revenue regression.
In the state revenue per pupil regression, presented in Table 2.15, a higher level of
per pupil assessed property is generally associated with lower amounts of state education
funding. As expected, this number increases post-BEP. An additional analysis was
conducted considering the impact of PROPTAXBASEPP on LOCALFUNDING. As in
previous analyses, an increase in district wealth leads to an increase in per pupil local
revenues when assessed property is used as the district wealth measure. Table 2.16
below presents these results.
Using property values as the measure of district wealth shows relatively similar
coefficients to those seen when per capita income was used, however some coefficients
do differ between the models in both sign and significance. Therefore, while it cannot be
said that per capita incomes are an inappropriate proxy for district wealth when

154

examining local expenditures, they certainly do not appear to be a perfect substitute for
the use of that data.
In order to examine the overall effect on state and local revenues both sets of
coefficients must be examined. In all 18 years of the analysis the increase in per pupil
local revenues associated with a property wealth increase outweighs the decrease
associated with per pupil state revenues. The combined effect of an increase in property
wealth on state and local revenues decreases between 1997 and 2000. Between 2000 and
2002 the effect begins to increase. Once again, this is able to partially explain the
widening gap in spending between rich and poor schools that appears beginning in 1999.
These results as a whole show that while state revenues have become more
equalizing with poorer districts receiving relatively more revenue from the state over
time, local revenues have become less equal with relatively wealthy districts collecting
significantly more revenue per pupil than their less wealthy counterparts. This is not
surprising considering the lack of controls on local level funding in the BEP discussed in
Essay 1. The nominal maintenance of effort requirement is certainly not sufficient to
eliminate the gap in spending between rich and poor districts. If the state of Tennessee
desired to lessen this gap considerably, or eliminate it altogether, much more stringent
regulations on local funding would be required, such as a revenue cap (as seen in
California) or a recapture mechanism (as seen in Texas). Why might this be very
important? Tennessee has now faced three reincarnations of the initial Small Schools v.
McWherter case. While the most recent case was dismissed, this certainly does not mean
that another equity case could not be brought upon Tennessee based on the claim of
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continued inequities in Tennessee school funding. The state of California’s Supreme
Court has now mandated that the gap between the highest level of per pupil expenditures
and the lowest level of per pupil expenditures can be no more than $300 per pupil. In
2006, the same gap in Tennessee remained at over $4,400. California led the way with
the Serrano case in the 1970s. If California continues to lead the school finance reform
trend, Tennessee may have to eliminate this differentiation in spending at some point.
Adding to this concern is the fact that Tennessee has not yet faced an adequacy suit,
which has become the new wave of school finance litigation. Therefore, Tennessee may
face an adequacy challenge in the future as well.
In their 1992 finding, the Tennessee Supreme Court found that the Tennessee
General Assembly must “maintain and support a system of free public schools that
affords equal educational opportunities to students in small counties as well as large, and
rural counties as well as urban” (TN Code Ann.). In the General Assembly’s legislation
related to the court finding later that year, The Education Improvement Act of 1992
directed the Tennessee State Board of Education to “develop and adopt policies,
formulas, and guidelines for the fair and equitable distribution and use of public funds
among public schools and for the funding of all requirements of state laws, rules,
regulations and other required expenses” (Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-3-351 et seq.). It will be
up to the courts to decide, but it seems well within reason for a $4,400 gap to be
considered inequitable. Allowing the gap in spending to remain leaves Tennessee open
for further challenges and the potential for another round of fundamental education
finance reform.
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Tennessee’s switch to the BEP 2.0 in 2007 may lessen this gap somewhat due to
its change in fiscal capacity formula. The BEP 2.0 includes a much simplified formula in
which tax rates are calculated for each county as the average use of property and sales tax
base by local governments. However, the BEP 2.0 is vastly similar to the BEP and does
not include additional mechanisms to deal with the funding gap. It is highly unlikely that
the BEP 2.0 will eliminate the gap, but it is wholly possible that it could decrease
significantly.

2.H

Conclusion
Currently there is no limit to the amount of revenue that can be raised and spent

locally in Tennessee. There is no property tax cap and there is no spending limit set by
the Tennessee Department of Education. Therefore, rich districts can continue to
increase spending by taxing their large property and sales tax bases. Poor districts, which
have much smaller tax bases, may be much more constrained in regard to the raising of
local school revenues. In addition, differing tastes for education between rich districts
and poor districts may also lead to a gap in local spending between these districts. If the
goal is true equalization, or total equity, with regards to school spending, then the state
would have to ensure that rich districts could not increase their spending past some fixed
level. Hawaii has accomplished this by collecting all school revenues at the state level
and dividing it up equally per student. Without an extreme measure such as this, it would
be relatively difficult to prevent the rich/poor school spending gap.
Arroyo (2008) comments that states that have been successful in narrowing the
funding gap between rich and poor school districts have generally employed two tactics.
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First of all, they have taken more responsibility for overall education funding at the state
level. This can be done like in Hawaii, where all funding goes through the state, or it can
be accomplished via strict regulations of local spending. Introducing a recapture
mechanism or a cap on local spending gives states a great deal of control over the amount
of money spent on education at the local level. Secondly, states that have been successful
in narrowing the gap have used state money to target student needs and have
compensated districts based on the district’s ability to pay for education. Tennessee’s
program does a relatively good job of equalizing based on ability to pay. The BEP
formula, as well as the new BEP 2.0, calculate the fiscal capacity of each district and
distribute state funds accordingly. Therefore, it appears that a substantial narrowing of
Tennessee’s gap would likely take increased state control over local spending since they
are already employing an ability to pay system.
It is important to remember that states may not desire to completely eliminate the
rich/poor gap. The previous analyses showed that overall spending equity has been
improved in Tennessee since before BEP implementation. That may have been the only
desired outcome with regard to equity. If Tennessee lawmakers desired to entirely
eliminate the differential in funding between poor and rich districts they could have
easily incorporated a local spending cap or a recapture mechanism that would have aided
in the accomplishment of that goal. The fact that those mechanisms were not included,
lends credence to the idea that an elimination of the gap was not of top priority.
Choosing a school finance system that is not totally wealth neutralizing may be
good policy. The improvement of education spending equity between school districts
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that has resulted from many school finance equity-based court challenges comes with
considerable costs beyond the increased state dollars provided. By making spending
equal across school districts, and therefore reducing the choices available to the local
school district, a decrease in education provision efficiency should be expected. This
comes about through the breakdown of the well-known Tiebout model in which citizens
can sort themselves into homogenous communities that align with their taste for public
goods. If all school districts in Tennessee were forced to provide the same level of
education, there would be little incentive for citizens to vote with their feet and sort into
new communities based on education provision. This would result in school districts
with identical spending levels in which residents with very different tastes for education
would reside.
From an equity viewpoint, this is fine. However, this is certainly less than
desirable from an efficiency standpoint. The provision of public education would likely
be much less efficient under a school finance system that aimed for complete wealth
neutrality (equity). Why is the reduction of efficiency so important in today’s education
market? The answer lies in the importance of adequacy. While the efficiency argument
would not likely play a significant role in an equity-based court challenge, efficiency of
education provision would be very important in the provision of an adequate education.
A less efficient system may mean lower student attainment, and therefore more difficulty
in providing students with what would be considered adequate.43 As stated earlier, the
majority of new school finance system challenges today are adequacy based. Therefore,

43

Student attainment may be lessened by a decrease in education efficiency because of the difficulty of
educating students from different backgrounds and with dramatically different tastes for education.
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states may be forced to confront issues related to both equity and adequacy within school
districts. In the end having an equitable system while maintaining an adequate system
may not be wholly possible because of the tradeoff between equity and efficiency.
Tennessee is a unique state due to the wide amount of variation seen in both per
capita incomes and property values across the state. Therefore an examination of
Tennessee provides interesting insight into the anticipated effect of school finance
equalization reform in states with diverse economic populations. Nearly all school
finance studies conducted on the subject of poor vs. rich responses have been conducted
at the state level. Using district-level data allows for a distinctive analysis of the intrastate responses to school finance equalization. In addition, the dataset collected allows a
much more thorough analysis to be conducted of the impact of increased school aid than
has been conducted previously. Lastly, the data collected allow for a thorough analysis
of the pre-BEP and post-BEP effects. Much of the existing literature does not utilize a
full panel of data and cannot accurately examine the pre-reform and post-reform impacts.
Most commonly studies utilize cross-sectional data or a non-yearly panel, such as the
Census of Governments which allow for very few years of analysis.44
Results included in this analysis highlight the importance of not only examining all
years of a reform when at all possible, but also the importance of using an appropriate
measure of district wealth. Although this variable may be difficult to obtain in many
cases, the difference seen with regards to locally-provided revenues in models using
income versus models using property wealth as an explanatory variable shows that per

44

For example, the Card and Payne (2002) study uses data from only the 1977 and 1992 Census of
Governments.
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capita income cannot be substituted freely as a measure of district wealth as it has been in
many previous studies.45
As previously mentioned, the state of Tennessee transitioned from the BEP to the BEP
2.0 during the 2007-2008 school year. While the BEP 2.0 contains a new fiscal capacity
measure, and has eliminated the use of the CDF, it does not contain any limits on local
funding. It also continues the use of a nominal maintenance of effort rather than a
maintenance of tax effort requirement. It will be very interesting in coming years to
analyze whether this switch to the BEP 2.0 will again narrow the gap in spending
between rich and poor districts as was seen in the early years of the BEP. In addition, if
the BEP 2.0 remains in place for several years it will be interesting to see if it can sustain
a narrowing of the gap between those districts. However, because of the constantly
evolving nature of school finance reform, chances are great that the BEP 2.0 will not
remain in its current form for long before it is challenged by some group striving for
greater equity or adequacy in Tennessee schools.

45

For a future research project, data will hopefully be obtained that provides the exact measure of fiscal
capacity used by TACIR in their calculation of the Fiscal Capacity Index. This amount will then be
analyzed as a more appropriate measure of district wealth.
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Figure 2.1
Gap in Spending Between Rich and Poor School Districts
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Table 2.1
Current Spending Equity Measures

1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

Federal Range Ratio

90/10 Ratio

0.418
0.424
0.404
0.406
0.363
0.355
0.374
0.354
0.359
0.347
0.356
0.334
0.324
0.339
0.324
0.317
0.301
0.306

1.468
1.449
1.420
1.496
1.424
1.403
1.401
1.414
1.362
1.339
1.355
1.358
1.334
1.321
1.305
1.332
1.311
1.308

Coefficient of Variation Gini Coefficient Theil's T-Statistic
0.173
0.165
0.154
0.170
0.146
0.144
0.139
0.137
0.141
0.131
0.130
0.122
0.123
0.125
0.123
0.123
0.114
0.116
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0.088
0.085
0.082
0.088
0.076
0.074
0.073
0.073
0.073
0.069
0.069
0.065
0.065
0.066
0.065
0.064
0.060
0.062

0.014
0.013
0.011
0.014
0.010
0.010
0.009
0.009
0.009
0.008
0.008
0.007
0.007
0.007
0.007
0.007
0.006
0.006

Table 2.2
Local Revenue Equity Measures

1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

Federal Range Ratio
0.743
0.737
0.719
0.743
0.763
0.761
0.755
0.757
0.783
0.779
0.767
0.768
0.794
0.789
0.766
0.781
0.778
0.774

90/10 Ratio
2.672
2.928
2.782
2.872
2.948
3.144
3.006
2.840
3.105
3.082
3.358
3.349
3.362
3.360
3.440
3.572
3.422
3.647

Coefficient of Variation
0.461
0.447
0.428
0.462
0.469
0.468
0.464
0.475
0.488
0.492
0.489
0.496
0.519
0.541
0.498
0.515
0.506
0.536
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Gini Coefficient Theil's T-Statistic
0.232
0.091
0.230
0.087
0.221
0.081
0.235
0.092
0.238
0.095
0.240
0.095
0.238
0.094
0.243
0.098
0.251
0.104
0.252
0.105
0.253
0.104
0.254
0.106
0.262
0.114
0.267
0.121
0.258
0.108
0.265
0.115
0.260
0.111
0.271
0.122

Table 2.3
State Revenue Equity Measures

1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

Federal Range Ratio

90/10 Ratio

0.234
0.249
0.255
0.262
0.233
0.271
0.296
0.340
0.356
0.352
0.368
0.373
0.368
0.362
0.364
0.412
0.428
0.457

1.223
1.247
1.231
1.243
1.228
1.254
1.310
1.318
1.378
1.430
1.441
1.439
1.460
1.448
1.512
1.538
1.544
1.585

Coefficient of Variation Gini Coefficient Theil's T-Statistic
0.091
0.092
0.095
0.097
0.089
0.097
0.105
0.117
0.126
0.136
0.136
0.139
0.138
0.141
0.142
0.161
0.165
0.175

166

0.047
0.047
0.048
0.051
0.046
0.051
0.058
0.064
0.070
0.076
0.076
0.078
0.077
0.079
0.080
0.090
0.092
0.097

0.004
0.004
0.004
0.005
0.004
0.005
0.005
0.007
0.008
0.009
0.009
0.010
0.009
0.010
0.010
0.013
0.013
0.015

Table 2.4
Total Revenue Equity Measures
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

Federal Range Ratio
0.451
0.426
0.418
0.461
0.424
0.401
0.390
0.370
0.343
0.320
0.334
0.376
0.384
0.337
0.302
0.349
0.302
0.328

90/10 Ratio
1.502
1.510
1.449
1.526
1.476
1.423
1.375
1.359
1.343
1.334
1.341
1.324
1.358
1.351
1.336
1.320
1.311
1.330

Coefficient of Variation
0.185
0.178
0.167
0.186
0.162
0.154
0.144
0.142
0.137
0.126
0.135
0.138
0.146
0.156
0.130
0.134
0.126
0.134
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Gini Coefficient
0.094
0.093
0.088
0.096
0.083
0.079
0.075
0.073
0.070
0.065
0.070
0.070
0.071
0.076
0.068
0.068
0.065
0.069

Theil's T-Statistic
0.016
0.015
0.013
0.016
0.012
0.011
0.010
0.009
0.009
0.007
0.009
0.009
0.010
0.011
0.008
0.008
0.007
0.008

Table 2.5
Summary Statistics of Revenue Measures
Variable
CURSPENDING

1989-2006
$5,557.37
($1096.16)

1989
$4,161.88
($718.41)

1998
$5,643.49
($738.94)

2006
$6,670.72
($770.72)

LOCALFUNDING

$2,035.82
($1027.26)

$1,720.84
($792.26)

$2,015.76
($991.23)

$2,351.82
($1260.64)

STATEFUNDING

$3,188.91
($764.80)

$2,192.20
($197.33)

$3,582.10
($488.17)

$3,924.97
($685.31)

FEDFUNDING

$663.81
($267.81)

$501.78
($188.32)

$621.56
($196.94)

$904.47
($265.96)

*The mean of the variable is shown with standard deviation in parentheses.
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Table 2.6
Summary Statistics – Control Variables
Variable

1989-2006
$24,472.91
($4,749.74)

1989
$21,882.08
($3,981.68)

1998
$24,956.11
($4,601.94)

2006
$26,948.92
($5,073.92)

PROPTAXBASEPP

$92,208.84
($49,796.28)

$70,366.61
($37,692.32)

$92,825.11
($46,785.79)

$120,611.20
($62,555.22)

STUDENTS

6,396.108
(12,807.042)

5,960.015
(12,089.832)

6,502.146
(12,940.86)

6,916.140
(13,663.32)

PCT517

17.640
(1.294)

18.308
(1.097)

17.852
(1.217)

16.689
(1.271)

PCT65

13.870
(2.023)

13.957
(1.812)

13.593
(1.789)

14.599
(2.513)

RETENTION

3.691
(2.131)

4.670
(1.996)

3.752
(2.257)

2.758
(1.628)

SUSPEND

6.575
(6.253)

4.734
(4.498)

5.470
(3.954)

5.150
(2.884)

UNEMPRATE

6.583
(2.305)

6.243
(1.904)

7.312
(3.114)

6.012
(1.403)

CDFDUMMY

0.100
(0.301)

-

0.146
(0.354)

0.126
(0.333)

PCI

*The mean of the variable is shown with standard deviation in parentheses.
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Table 2.7
Fixed Effects Panel Regression
Full Time Period: 1989 - 2006
STATEFUNDING
-0.062
(0.005)

CURRSPENDING
0.034
(0.006)

1562.599
(38.515)

1102.701
(47.132)

PCT517

-11.629
(8.264)

-30.803
(10.113)

PCT65

-10.840
(5.016)

-38.095
(6.138)

RETENTION

-0.501
(3.656)

-6.095
(4.474)

SUSPENSION

1.439
(1.105)

3.069
(1.353)

STUDENTS

-0.037
(0.006)

-0.052
(0.007)

PCTSPED

-33.969
(8.523)

-1.062
(10.429)

UMEMPRATE

-7.956
(3.476)

-7.854
(4.254)

CDFDUMMY

-33.709
(25.470)

148.677
(31.168)

PCI

PHASEIN

Significant variables at the 5% or higher level are shown in bold type.
Significant variables at the 10% level are shown in italics.
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Table 2.8
Panel Analysis of the Pre-BEP Period
STATEFUNIDNG
-0.001
(0.007)

LOCALFUNDING
-0.018
(0.025)

CURSPENDING
-0.003
(0.015)

-

-

-

PCT517

-200.401
(63.199)

151.761
(220.782)

-124.378
(131.733)

PCT65

87.118
(47.170)

148.498
(164.787)

-5.431
(98.322)

RETENTION

1.474
(3.380)

3.610
(11.808)

-2.663
(7.045)

SUSPENSION

-0.984
(1.218)

1.352
(4.256)

0.902
(2.539)

STUDENTS

-0.045
(0.013)

-0.014
(0.045)

-0.069
(0.027)

PCTSPED

25.048
(9.849)

80.516
(34.408)

53.016
(20.530)

UMEMPRATE

-8.028
(3.290)

17.968
(11.493)

-10.126
(6.857)

CDFDUMMY

-

-

-

PCI

PHASEIN

Significant variables at the 5% or higher level are shown in bold type.
Significant variables at the 10% level are shown in italics.
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Table2.9
Panel Analysis of the Post-BEP Period
STATEFUNDING
-0.024
(0.005)

LOCALFUNDING
0.056
(0.008)

CURSPENDING
0.026
(0.007)

-1300.501
(30.821)

-393.595
(51.477)

-1626.127
(42.014)

PCT517

-28.588
(7.236)

27.353
(12.085)

-22.764
(9.863)

PCT65

-12.779
(4.405)

-3.669
(7.358)

-25.211
(6.005)

RETENTION

-0.827
(3.576)

-3.711
(5.973)

-7.451
(4.875)

SUSPENSION

0.515
(1.051)

4.458
(1.755)

-0.196
(1.433)

STUDENTS

-0.040
(0.007)

0.015
(0.011)

-0.027
(0.009)

PCTSPED

-38.497
(8.694)

61.764
(14.520)

2.568
(11.851)

UMEMPRATE

-15.467
(3.385)

17.698
(5.654)

-5.758
(4.615)

CDFDUMMY

251.571
(28.674)

-80.540
(47.891)

152.747
(39.086)

PCI

PHASEIN

Significant variables at the 5% or higher level are shown in bold type.
Significant variables at the 10% level are shown in italics.
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Table 2.10
Yearly OLS Regression Results: CURSPENDING
PCI
PCT517
PCT65
PCTSPED
RETENTION
SUSPEND
STUDENTS
1989
0.058
-150.701
232.373
1990
0.065
-228.565
196.421
1991
0.070
-222.048
230.789
1992
0.062
-234.420
162.956
-18.992
1993
-144.128
150.289
1994
-96.243
59.332
101.894
1995
60.248
155.088
1996
117.003
1997
131.556
1998
-101.135
264.490
1999
0.020
264.594
2000
0.034
-94.976
232.369
2001
0.043
203.824
2002
0.072
-105.025
161.925
-61.950
38.864
2003
0.047
-102.546
125.455
32.760
2004
0.062
-180.823
-57.678
138.601
2005
0.055
-248.421
-75.943
125.455
128.038
2006
0.052
-237.408
-64.191
120.375
68.591
All variables shown in italics are significant at the 10% level. All other coefficients are significant at the 5% level or higher.
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UNEMPRATE

-50.655

95.284
102.487

CDFDUMMY

910.226
1003.364
946.682
1119.657
967.753
675.238
450.444
568.949
646.567
605.297
870.048
1049.118
908.566
700.147

Table 2.11
Yearly OLS Regression Results: STATEFUNDING
PCI
PCT517
PCT65
PCTSPED
RETENTION
SUSPEND
STUDENTS
1989
-0.014
78.874
-18.746
1990
-0.017
64.252
1991
-0.021
21.207
77.248
1992
-0.016
-29.214
53.223
1993
-0.030
61.435
1994
-0.036
35.606
23.016
41.438
1995
-0.044
41.569
-0.008
1996
-0.048
50.984
-0.008
1997
-0.061
63.469
67.538
-0.009
1998
-0.067
50.892
-42.264
68.830
-0.009
1999
-0.071
62.306
-41.121
-0.010
2000
-0.071
56.795
-39.656
-0.010
2001
-0.070
77.862
-0.009
2002
-0.083
101.363
-0.008
2003
-0.086
93.829
44.495
-18.794
-0.009
2004
-0.079
62.853
2005
-0.072
-28.658
2006
-0.083
All variables shown in italics are significant at the 10% level. All other coefficients are significant at the 5% level or higher.
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UNEMPRATE
-17.592

CDFDUMMY

170.284
204.250
192.670

135.370
107.890

441.421
413.061
427.962
405.265
518.424
285.778
344.749
321.590

Table 2.12
Yearly OLS Regression Results: LOCALFUNDING
PCI
PCT517
PCT65
PCTSPED
RETENTION
SUSPEND
STUDENTS
1989
0.094
-223.981
114.758
59.439
1990
0.117
-214.399
91.577
-22.943
1991
0.124
-213.670
119.861
-14.560
1992
0.114
-246.885
-16.376
1993
0.095
-179.147
1994
0.075
-199.599
1995
0.102
-185.051
1996
0.093
-152.935
71.383
1997
0.097
-175.860
71.078
1998
0.100
-195.331
1999
0.099
-127.366
211.071
-33.354
2000
0.129
-212.316
273.941
2001
0.145
-196.071
226.597
2002
0.195
-265.924
197.140
-145.135
2003
0.147
-225.240
-123.485
2004
0.179
-253.585
173.600
-93.401
2005
0.162
-268.866
122.945
2006
0.167
-262.194
All variables shown in italics are significant at the 10% level. All other coefficients are significant at the 5% level or higher.
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UNEMPRATE

CDFDUMMY

772.387
773.033
629.059
846.815
587.529
538.609
-87.222

786.227
707.191
535.233

Table 2.13
Panel Model Using Property Tax Base
STATEFUNDING
-0.026
(0.003)

CURRSPENDING
0.029
(0.003)

1323.457
(28.167)

1256.050
(34.447)

PCT517

-24.795
(7.933)

-23.163
(9.881)

PCT65

-22.608
(4.903)

-35.230
(9.881)

RETENTION

-0.064
(3.581)

-7.494
(4.461)

SUSPENSION

1.210
(1.082)

2.865
(1.348)

STUDENTS

-0.062
(0.005)

-0.038
(0.007)

PCTSPED

-27.173
(8.353)

-2.465
(10.400)

UMEMPRATE

-13.695
(3.440)

-8.327
(4.327)

CDFDUMMY

-32.201
(24.881)

156.212
(30.936)

PROPTAXBASEPP

PHASEIN

Significant variables at the 5% or higher level are shown in bold type.
Significant variables at the 10% level are shown in italics.
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Table 2.14
Yearly Results Using Property Tax Base: CURSPENDING
PROPTAXBASEPP
PCT517
PCT65
PCTSPED
RETENTION SUSPENSION STUDENTS
1989
0.049
-153.169
242.565
1990
0.075
-210.160
216.142
1991
0.063
-226.525
257.251
1992
0.076
-204.050
190.069
-18.370
0.023
1993
0.044
-128.336
160.365
1994
0.045
-16.454
114.857
1995
0.050
65.690
65.690
1996
0.034
131.475
1997
0.033
145.862
1998
0.047
266.181
1999
0.042
262.109
2000
0.044
236.813
2001
0.046
-93.531
206.043
2002
0.061
50.748
186.214
-68.948
51.991
2003
0.055
134.457
37.339
2004
0.030
138.009
37.511
2005
0.035
-165.025
127.230
40.990
2006
0.040
-140.548
All variables shown in italics are significant at the 10% level. All other coefficients are significant at the 5% level or higher.
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UNEMPRATE CDFDUMMY

-45.706
781.200
839.192
808.579
982.779
828.452
579.182
417.363
553.195
727.278
681.477
1002.491
1138.823
925.568
623.026

Table 2.15
Yearly Results Using Property Tax Base: STATEFUNDING
PROPTAXBASEPP
PCT517
PCT65
PCTSPED
RETENTION SUSPENSION STUDENTS
1989
76.675
-17.335
1990
61.819
1991
25.259
72.189
1992
18.522
12.703
1993
-0.017
20.060
60.725
-0.009
1994
-0.020
28.872
47.693
-0.010
1995
-0.031
-0.014
1996
-0.037
51.286
-0.014
1997
-0.047
60.760
-0.016
1998
-0.043
86.499
-0.018
1999
-0.040
-0.018
2000
-0.039
-0.019
2001
-0.030
82.479
-0.020
2002
-0.034
38.387
-0.019
2003
-0.039
55.373
-21.214
-0.020
2004
-0.046
-50.318
47.891
-0.020
2005
-0.040
-73.651
-65.006
-0.020
2006
-0.046
-89.638
-63.825
All variables shown in italics are significant at the 10% level. All other coefficients are significant at the 5% level or higher.
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UNEMPRATE CDFDUMMY

142.297
18.958
41.021
41.786
23.708
31.131
57.389

75.870
61.843
126.764
180.126
162.606

172.655

279.608
259.192

293.175
290.112

Table 2.16
Yearly Results Using Property Tax Base: LOCALFUNDING
PROPTAXBASEPP
PCT517
PCT65
PCTSPED
RETENTION SUSPENSION STUDENTS
1989
0.065
-243.296
130.804
1990
0.095
-216.664
119.113
53.788
-21.254
1991
0.072
-244.974
157.541
-17.489
0.021
1992
0.085
-232.233
116.367
-15.847
0.024
1993
0.053
-162.269
1994
0.062
-152.506
0.018
1995
0.082
-145.968
1996
0.079
-104.450
1997
0.083
1998
0.080
-150.794
1999
0.077
175.690
-34.232
2000
0.090
-179.097
263.741
2001
0.084
-174.262
215.972
0.022
2002
0.100
220.775
-173.164
0.021
2003
0.081
-139.419
2004
0.083
171.232
-179.460
2005
0.080
-94.605
2006
0.080
All variables shown in italics are significant at the 10% level. All other coefficients are significant at the 5% level or higher.
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UNEMPRATE CDFDUMMY
-57.479
-83.306
-64.150

-55.498
-58.895
-54.194
-60.265
-122.022
-73.905
-130.119
-122.006
-133.304
-175.412
-199.033

865.778
805.441
633.697
826.292
595.755
603.697

804.178
1055.773
877.658
687.643
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